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Abstract 
 
The family business is ubiquitous. Its prevalence in the various forms of 
capitalisms that exist is a clear indication of its importance. Even throughout 
China’s history and now within its version of a modern socialist market, the 
family business has proven to be a foundation of societies. 
 
In the United Kingdom (UK), family businesses have been successful and had 
steady growth thanks to a conducive macro-environment that consisted of a 
democratic political system, an advanced legal system and a Western social-
cultural context. In contrast, China has a socialist and centralised political 
system.  It has an inadequate legal framework for its private-sector and is set 
in a social-cultural context that has strong Confucian underpinnings. Such a 
macro-environment presented family businesses with immense challenges.  
 
Many of the challenges faced by family businesses in advanced Western 
countries have been addressed through a now healthy and functioning 
corporate governance framework. Such frameworks are well studied and 
established in countries such as the UK. China on the other hand, only began 
its corporate governance reform in the 1990s, mainly focusing on SOEs, and 
borrowing corporate governance literature from other developed countries. 
 
This thesis undertakes a comparative study of corporate governance 
challenges faced by family business within the macro-environments of China 
and the UK. A number of challenges faced by family businesses in China are 
analysed and shown to be intricately related, and so a holistic approach is 
recommended to find further solutions. By adapting and transplanting Western 
corporate governance mechanisms, it is possible that challenges can be 
overcome at an organisational level, despite the macroeconomic differences. 
Changes to the political and legal systems at a central government level are 
also proposed to improve the situation for family businesses over the long run
 1 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Research Background 
 
Whilst capitalism literature broadly recognises different types of capitalism such 
as the Anglo-American system; the communitarian system of countries such as 
Germany; and the family orientated capitalism of countries like Italy; in all of 
them family businesses play an important role.1 The same has been true for 
China throughout most of its history and, even in the modern socialist market 
economy with Chinese characteristics, family businesses have played an 
important role.2  
 
China’s economy started to rapidly grow since Deng Xiaoping’s “open up” policy 
in 1978, the economy grew with an annual GDP growth rate averaging over 8 
per cent since the 1980s.3 Thereafter, China has experienced a fast-growing 
period for decades, and became a member of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) in December 2001. This certainly brought more trade with other 
members in the WTO. The membership of the WTO boosted China’s economy 
prior to the worldwide financial crisis.4  China’s economy grew with an average 
                                            
1 Hall P A, Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage 
(OUP 2001). Hanckle B, Debating Varieties of Capitalism (OUP 2009). Hampden-Turner C 
and Trompenaars F, The Seven Cultures of Capitalism (Judy Piatkus (Publishers) Ltd 1994). 
2 Von Glahn R, The Economic History of China: From Antiquity to the Nineteenth Century 
(CUP 2016). 
3 Brown D H and MacBean A, “China’s macro environment and enterprise challenges” in 
Brown D H and MacBean A (eds.) Challenges for China’s Development: An enterprise 
perspective (Routledge 2005). 
4 World Trade Organization, “International Trade Statistics 2015” 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2015_e/its2015_e.pdf (accessed 21 September 
2016).  
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growth rate of over 6 per cent annually whilst most of the developed countries 
suffered from the effects of the 2008 financial crisis. Since the financial crisis, 
China has continued to maintain the annual GDP growth rate at 6 per cent which 
enabling it to develop strong trading relationships with many countries. The 
strong economic growth attracted investment from foreign businesses in China 
since the 1980s. These foreign businesses have achieved significant goals in 
China. Then with the financial crisis, and the latest referendum of Brexit, 
investors in China took opportunities to invest overseas, especially in Europe. 
Taking an example of the investments in to the United Kingdom (UK) market, 
sizeable investments have appeared in sports, tourism, culture and 
entertainment industries. A large number of these investments were made by 
Chinese Stated-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and successful and large private 
enterprises. These events reflect recent developments in China’s economy in 
general, and the changes that China’s economy is experiencing. One of the 
biggest changes in China is a shift of emphasis from manufacturing for other 
countries to creating and innovating for itself. China’s policy is to move towards 
developing a more diverse and innovative economy.   
 
As commented by the Innovation Policy Platform, “China’s growth pattern is 
currently changing, with a reduction in the rate of growth and an attempt to 
rebalance the economy from exports and investment towards private 
consumption…”5 However, due to the unique nature of China’s long history, its 
cultural influences, and political upheavals in the twentieth century, China has 
developed a named socialist economy with Chinese characteristic. Therefore, 
                                            
5 The Innovation Policy Platform, World Bank & OECD, “China”, 
https://www.innovationpolicyplatform.org/content/china (accessed 20 September 2016). 
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enterprises in China face a number of challenges specific to its political and 
cultural context. Chinese SOEs have great support from Chinese governments 
and banks. In contrast, SMEs do not, and subsequently face challenges in 
China's macro environment. Most of the SMEs in China are privately owned 
businesses, which are family organised. 
 
Family businesses have increasingly received attention from academic and 
business advisors during recent decades. Such businesses contain unique 
conflicts stemming from the involvements of families and businesses at the 
same time when compared with other business forms. Studies of family 
business are relatively recent (circa four decades). The field has developed 
within several disciplines and avenues of research including: history, economics, 
management studies, law, sociology and psychology. 
 
This research explores and compares the corporate governance challenges for 
family businesses in the context of the UK and China. This combination study 
explores the challenges with regards to family businesses from several 
perspectives, which usually are looked at individually in the literature. The 
connections between these challenges affect family businesses in more 
important ways than expected. Examining from a comprehensive level offers a 
more complete analysis towards challenges for family business.  
 
Family businesses across the world face a series of challenges in a variety of 
areas ranging from management issues to negotiating legal regulations, and 
from raising finance to adapting to political changes. Even across cultures, these 
 4 
challenges are correlated and overlapping, suggesting that a solution to a 
specific challenge would have limited scope for success. By exploring and 
comparing family businesses and macro environments in both China and the 
UK, this thesis highlights the importance of doing an integrated analysis and 
argues that the characteristics and theories of the family business in both 
countries overlap.  This potentially allows for theories of family business and 
corporate governance in the UK to be transplanted into a Chinese context 
subject to the general problems associated with legal transplantation. 
 
1.2 Research Objectives 
 
1.2.1 Research Objective - China 
 
The growing influence that China is exerting on other parts of the world is being 
increasingly reported by the media. China has become a centre of opportunities, 
challenges and problems in the globalized world of the 21st century. Recently 
in practice, many family offices have appeared in China, which highlights the 
influence of Western business operations. However, the literature and theories 
relating to family businesses in the context of China are relatively limited as there 
is little research and examination on the part of Chinese scholars. For instance, 
there is not, as yet, an integrated study of the existing challenges of family 






1.2.2 Research Objective – A Combined Research of Several Aspects 
 
Existing research on the family business and its challenges are concentrated to 
individual field of study in the UK including: (i) looking into the family business 
from the perspective of social sciences, such as psychology analysis in the 
process of family business succession, long and successful family businesses’ 
history analysis in historical study, and (ii) corporate governance theories – 
agency theory, life cycle theory, performance et cetera and conflicts in family 
businesses from the perspective of management science studies. However, 
there is rarely a research that combines all relevant challenges that family 
businesses face in social contexts, which makes this research novel. This thesis 
examines the challenges through disciplines of law, governance, history, politics, 
social science and management in an integrated manner. Using the lens of life 
cycle theory in family business study, this thesis hopes to integrate the 
challenges in corporate governance in a social context, a political environment, 
a legal framework, and management issues that family businesses are 
experiencing, or will experience. 
 
In the UK, existing policies, laws, regulations and support from the government 
are at a variety organisational levels. They are all designed and serve to aid 
SMEs. However, policies in China, China’s legal framework and economic 
environment are often dictated from the top down. Introducing crucial 
differences that cannot be overlooked is needed in analysing family business in 
China. Indeed, China’s every aspect highlights the lack of formal support that 
SMEs have in comparison to the UK. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse 
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challenges for family businesses in a combined/integrated manner as examining 
individual aspects alone will only lead to omitting other issues in relation to family 
businesses. In this thesis, the author chooses historical, legal, managerial and 
social aspects to lay out the corporate governance challenges for family 
businesses in contexts. Furthermore, this thesis aims to contribute a dynamic 
perspective for future studies in family business and corporate governance, and 
to raise attention for law makers and legislative framework, and calling for legal 
reform or guidance of policies to focus more on small and medium-sized family 
business.  
 
Through analysis in varied fields of study, it is possible to transplant some 
Western corporate governance mechanisms to the social and legal contexts in 
China. Compared with the UK, research on Chinese family businesses is sparse. 
Many studies have remained at the early stage of introducing the field of 
research in a Western context, or translating Western studies. Transplanting is 
not strange to China, particularly with legal frameworks. However, in family 
business studies, transplanting corporate governance mechanisms is a novel 
venture. The research of family businesses in China is very much at a theoretical 
stage and there is even less guidance in applying family business theories in 
practice. The context of China is also considered to be unique, so it is hard to 
imagine governance mechanisms of family businesses applied to small to 
medium-sized family firms in practice. This thesis analyses political environment, 
law, culture and history, to raise the possibility of applying certain mechanisms 
to a Chinese family businesses in China’s context. Ultimately, this thesis 
suggests that it is possible to implement corporate governance mechanisms in 
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Chinese family businesses from organisational level. It further raises the 
expectation for future studies in developing and applying mechanisms properly 
in both contexts.  
 
1.2.3 Research Objective – Family Businesses 
 
Family business study is a relatively new research field, which is just over four 
decades in the Western context. A lot of research has been conducted in various 
fields that related to family businesses. The study of family business has not 
flourished in China. Significant more research conducted on large corporations 
and Chinese SOEs. In comparison with the relative sparsity of family business 
study in China, Western scholars have examined the family business in a more 
systematic way and through the prism of many theories.6 Family business has 
been considered to be the bedrock of the economy for many countries, and it 
remains be recognised as being important in China. However, their 
implementation is an issue. Corporate governance mechanisms in the context 
of family business are not widely applied in practice in Chinese context except 
those which already exist in relation to public quoted companies under the 
existing Chinese corporate governance system. Mostly, it is the large sized 
family businesses which apply corporate governance mechanisms. The 
Chinese family business study and theories are not seen as an important 
guidance by practitioners either. Hopefully, with the influence of Western 
                                            
6 Nordqvist M, Melin L, Waldkirch M and Kumeto G (eds.) Theoretical Perspectives on Family 
Businesses (Edward Elgar 2015). 
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education and recent development of economic policies, family business study 
will be gain ground in the near future in China.  
 
1.3 Methodology  
 
1.3.1 Social-Legal Methodology 
 
The thesis aims to discover the challenges faced by family businesses. The UK 
and China have very different legal systems, political environments, economic 
contexts and social contexts. Family businesses in China have experienced 
many challenges in the fields of social science, management, politics and law. 
However, there is not enough awareness nor are there sufficient solutions to 
address the challenges at an organisational level.  
 
Under these circumstances, the author chooses the socio-legal research 
methodology to conduct the research. The reasons are: (i) family business study 
has been examined within several disciplines, including history and social 
science. The law is one of the disciplines that regulates corporation types. It 
does not regulate family business particularly, but rather through general 
corporation types in companies in corporate law and commercial law. (ii) The 
challenges that family businesses face in legal framework are connected closely 
to the political, social and economic environment in both contexts. Therefore, 
the examination of the corporate governance challenges for family firms takes 
the research beyond the confines of the legal system. (iii) There is a gap 
between the existing research of family business and Law itself in the proposed 
 9 
context of China. It is important to have an external perspective – through 
managerial and social contexts to examine existing law in China and identify the 
gap, further to raise the needs of reform in law, or propose alternative solutions 
in applying policies or regulations at a lower regulatory level. Therefore, it is 
proposed to not apply a Doctrinal research methodology due to the family 
businesses’ complex involvements with related disciplines. It is however crucial 
to examine the social contexts, political environments, economic backgrounds 
et cetera, and so a law in context research methodology is adopted.  
 
Analytical and descriptive methods are used to conduct this social-legal 
research.  The existing challenges for family businesses in various fields in the 
UK and China will be described and analysed in order to explore the important 
issues and propose potential solutions to current problems. Investigations into 
the corporate governance challenges for family businesses comparing China to 
the UK will be carried out by utilising the theoretical research method. The thesis 
raises and describes the existing challenges in a combination of fields and 
relates its challenges to the Chinese context.  
 
In contrast with the empirical tested method, the theoretical method adopted to 
answer the research question could contribute to family business studies and 
legal research. There is a limited amount of family business research available 
from the external perspective of legal studies, and there are few studies looking 
at legal reform through research on family businesses (especially small and 
medium-sized family businesses) in the extant literature. This research has 
taken a theoretical approach due to the need to do cross-field analysis. Empirical 
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research in family business studies is often very specific and focuses on a 
particular attribute of family business. It would be difficult to gather sufficient 
sample data from family businesses in China that would yield significant 
empirical results, and therefore makes an empirical analysis beyond the scope 
and resources of this study. However, with more resources and support, it might 
be possible to conduct a quantitative analysis on specific aspects of small and 
medium-sized family businesses in future. 
 
1.3.2 Comparative Law Research Approach 
 
Another research approach applied in this thesis is that of comparative law. 
Simone Glanert argued the different views of whether comparative law is a 
method or a methodology. 7  He stated that the comparatists consider 
comparative law as a “methodological endeavour”, but often comparative law is 
regarded as a method.8 Since there is no unified definition in literature, this 
research does not state comparative law as a method or methodology but a 
research approach.  
 
Since part of this thesis looks at the possibility of transplanting Western 
corporate governance mechanisms in family business studies into another 
completely different context, it is important to apply a comparative approach to 
explore one social context and legal system, and to compare it with another 
                                            
7 Glanert S, “Method?” in Monateri P G (ed.) Methods of Comparative Law (Edward Elgar 
2012). 
8 Ibid. 3. 
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context and legal system. Therefore, regardless of whether comparative law 
research is a method or methodology, it is useful for this research.  
 
As stated by M. Van Hoecke, “When one tries to improve one’s own legal system, 
be it as a legislator or as a scholar, it has become obvious to look at the other 
side of the borders.”9. This is why this research chooses comparative law to 
analyse transplantation. The comparison between different law frameworks in 
two completely different jurisdictions is to understand and learn from one, then 
apply or reform the other in legal research; it is the foundation of transplantation.        
 
Comparative law was viewed as a “tool” to learn and understand law from the 
end of the nineteenth century by some scholars, such as Raymond Saleilles 
from France10 and this method expanded to the whole Europe. Comparative law 
facilitates learning and understanding laws that exist in other countries, being 
able to evaluate one’s own law and legal systems and improve the ones’ own.11 
M. Van Hoecke suggested using comparative law as an approach to study legal 
system across borders, as “…importing rules and solutions from abroad may 
not work because of a difference in context. Hence, a more thorough contextual 
approach may be required”12.  Accordingly, this thesis uses detailed analysis 
and description of existing contexts to show the uniqueness and similarities of 
                                            
9 Van Hoecke M, "Methodology of comparative legal research · law and method · Recht en 
methode in onderzoek en onderwijs," (2015) 12 (3) Law and Method. 
10 Saleilles R, “Droit civil et droit compare”, Revue inter. enseignement 1911, 22, in Van 
Hoecke M, supra n 9, 2. 
11 Glenn H P, “The Aims of Comparative Law” in Smits J M, (ed.) Elgar Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law (Edward Elgar 2006), 57-65, in Van Hoecke M, supra n 9, 2. 
12 Van Hoecke M, supra n 9, 3. 
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contexts, further to learn corporate governance mechanisms from Western 
context and transplant solutions to the Chinese context. 
 
Language in comparing legal systems matters too. As is often the case, the 
majority of researchers compared their research objects in their own language. 
For instance, a number of researchers compared common law systems that are 
mainly in their own language.13 It is easy to compare and learn about similar 
legal systems since the countries have common ground on their social contexts 
and other aspects.14 However, as M. Van Hoecke pointed out that, research 
conducted in this way is limited. 15  With globalisation and developments in 
language, many studies and legislation are brought in varied languages and to 
different countries. But the limitation of those translation works is that the scale 
and scope of law is not wide enough to gain accurate results. To conduct 
appropriate comparative research, the author compares a common law system 
with a civil law system in two official languages, aiming to gain the correct 
background in legislation, to introduce their social contexts and legislations in a 
more specific manner. Further, to gain knowledge and find potential solutions to 
solve challenges that family businesses face.  
 
To understand the modern shape of legal systems with different languages and 
social contexts, it is important to know the development of each country and the 
current status of each state. Therefore, historical contexts and development 
shall also be studied. According to M. Van Hoecke, since the 19th century, 





“…many authors on comparative law emphasize also the importance of taking 
into account the socio-economic and historical context of the law when carrying 
out comparative legal research.”16 Hence, the historical perspective in this thesis 
provides a viewpoint to learn how the differences in the two legal systems were 
shaped by their history and development, while the comparative law analysis 
offers insight in to Chinese contexts allowing exploration of possible legal 
reforms at national and organisational levels. 
 
1.4 The Structure of This Research 
 
The thesis is organised as 7 chapters. Each chapter deals with different 
challenges that family businesses face in a modern legal framework, paying 
consideration to their management and social environments. Chapter 2 
examines the historical development of family business and corporate 
governance frameworks, comparing both jurisdictions, and follows a recent 
trend of analysing family businesses from a historical perspective. This will also 
highlight the importance of both legal and non- legal factors. The chapter 
emphasises the importance of family business studies in particular fields, which 
builds the foundation for later chapters of the thesis. This historical comparison 
can be used to help predict the future of their development bearing in mind the 
sometimes helpful approach of path dependency. 
 
Chapter 3 introduces and compares the legal frameworks in China with the 
British. The Chinese Civil Law system has changed in the past decade and legal 
                                            
16 Ibid. 
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reform is catching up with changes to the economy and political systems. 
Analysing the changes made to the Chinese legal framework and comparing 
them with UK law will help predict legislative changes for family business 
development. Analysing the UK corporate governance system will also help to 
predict family business practices in China. 
 
Chapter 4 analyses details and theories of corporate governance together with 
its mechanisms to explore their use in family businesses. Corporate governance 
mechanisms are applied directly to family businesses in many Western 
countries, especially ones where family businesses are well-established. These 
mechanisms may solve similar issues in the Chinese context, though 
complications introduced by China’s macro environment make these 
businesses more difficult to control and maintain through a governance model. 
Chinese family businesses have their own unique business operation and 
traditional Confucian traditions prevent businesses from operating in quite the 
same way as Western ones. Consequently, some part of the chapter is spent 
examining existing Western mechanisms of corporate governance with the 
intention of adapting them to their own circumstances for implanting. Finally, by 
comparing company law in both jurisdictions, insight is gained into how 
corporate governance related rules work for Western family businesses and how 
they can be applied to Chinese family businesses in future. 
 
Chapter 5 examines family business literature together with theories that exist 
in major countries including the United States (US), UK, and China. The main 
theory, called life cycle theory is covered in depth, and formalises a notion of 
 15 
business development cycles. Chinese family business studies from some 
distinguished scholars are looked at, covering succession research and 
developing cycles.  
 
Finally, Chapter 6 looks at the social challenges for family businesses in China, 
with a focus on “guanxi”. Guanxi is a complex net of relationships connecting 
people, and it forms the foundation of numerous businesses deals within China, 
potentially having been exported to many other countries too. Guanxi and trust 
are inseparable, and it can therefore be regarded as a barrier for controlling 
businesses through a legal framework. There are theories and research on trust, 
but there are relatively few theories and literature on guanxi itself. The chapter 
explores this area and looks at key issues such as ownership, concluding that 
this kind of challenge is best solved with suitable and customized mechanisms 
within family businesses.  
 
Securing financing for family businesses in China is also a critical issue. SMEs 
have had difficulties in financing. The shadow banking is an alternative way for 
firms but comes with huge risks. Although shadow banking is not a main theme 
to this research, the financing issue is often crucial for family businesses, 
therefore, the discussion is kept brief in Chapter 6. To avoid damages caused 
by shadow banking, some of the communist party members have suggested to 




Chapter 2 Historical Analysis and Literature Review 
 
2.1 The Significance of Business History 
 
The paramount scholar in the arena of business history, deemed the “founding 
father”17 was Chandler, who developed findings based on individual cases in 
both global and comparative contexts. The research that historians achieved 
was gained from existing cases, either from oral or written sources. Chandler 
also raised the importance of individual case analysis from which to develop 
generalizations, in order to build further frameworks and theories in this field. He 
raised this assertion to outline the generalization and concepts that come from 
individual cases in a particular business context and period that can be applied 
to other periods and places. Therefore, this can be used in other periods as a 
tool to predict future trends and build new theories.  
  
Although it may be difficult to generalize individual cases in the field of family 
businesses, the characteristics, history and management theory are distinctly 
different. Nevertheless, generalizations are subsequently becoming a leading 
approach in the study of family businesses. In addition, as Colli emphasised, 
“this search of generalization is what makes historical research different from 
pure descriptive archeological effort, which is necessary as the basis of the 
discipline (as said, based on primary sources), but is hardly complete in itself. 
Rather it is a step beyond the mere collection of facts. Moreover, it is this search 
                                            
17 Colli A, “Business history in family business studies: from neglect to cooperation?” (2011) 1 
(1), Journal of Family Business Management, 14-25. 
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for generalization that can make historical analysis appealing for other scholars 
who build theories about business firms and organisations.”18 This statement 
indicates that developing markets mirror those of advanced markets, more 
particularly, corporate governance mechanisms from the UK and transplant to 
China with Chinese characteristics is possible. 
 
2.2 The Study of Business History – a Combination of History 
(including Legal Developments) and Business Study 
 
The function of business history research is highly commended. It has been 
developed slowly as an independent field from economic history as more 
business historians confirmed such findings.19 Moreover, it contributes a lot to 
management studies, specifically the family businesses. 
 
As Colli pointed out, the signpost for business history research was the 
publication in 2008 – the Handbook of Business History. Thus, we can say that 
the business history research is still in the early stage of development, although 
it has never been as a new discipline, it has always been a subject in economic 
history but waited to be discovered and developed.20 Also as Norman S. B. 
Gras, the first professor of business history in the world, wrote that “every 
particular study has some reference to a general pattern of behavior or 
development. In each instance, we should learn how the particular firm being 
studied fits into the larger whole. It may be that the study will illustrate the 
                                            




general; or it may qualify or redefine the general; indeed, it may actually point to 
errors in previous concepts”.21 To conclude, many business historians started 
to look at the research of business history as a separate research field and 
believed that researching business history would enhance theoretical 
development. The examination of the culture of a country, as well as its historical 
development helps to illuminate its general background in a comparative 
context. For instance, a country like China, with just less than five thousand 
years of history, it is important to understand its culture and development. This 
also raises issues in terms of path dependency theory as a determinant of 
corporate governance.22 
 
Many historians are not from the discipline of business history, but from other 
fields such as marketing, and finance.23  Therefore, there are a number of 
arguments about the function of business history: First, history is a longitudinal 
approach; Secondly, history represents scenarios without seeing them as new; 
Thirdly, historical study is useful in the context of international business and 
long-term economic growth research.24 Moreover, Peter Buckley concluded that 
subjects like business history or history in general, can be useful in building 
theories. Afterwards, Richard Whittington, another management scholar, held 
                                            
21 Gras N S B, “Are you writing a business history”, (1944) 18 (4) Bulletin of the Business 
Historical Society, 73-110, 104. 
22 Bebchuk L and Roe M J, “Towards a Theory of Path Dependency in Corporate Ownership 
and Governance” (1999) 52, Stanford Law Review, 127-170. 
23 Colli A, supra n 17, 16. 
24 Ibid. Buckley P, “Business history and international business”, (2009) 51 (3), Business 
History, 307-33. Jones G and Khanna T, “Bringing history (back) into international business”, 
(2006) 37 (4), Journal of International Business Studies, 453-68. Also, the important work of 
Acemoglu D and Robinson J A, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and 
Poverty (Profile Books 2013). 
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similar supportive opinions. Colli also pointed out the close relationships 
between business history and management.25   
 
2.3 The Study of Business History and Family Businesses 
 
Family business is a very important focus of study because family businesses 
are ubiquitous worldwide. It contains the elements of family and business, as 
well as the characteristics of family involvement with and in the business. 
Moreover, the culture, as well as the values of family business, need time to 
develop. In many jurisdictions, large numbers of corporate giants started their 
lives as small family businesses. Therefore, family business can be a crucial 
element in the study of business history. For instance, the succession issue is a 
part of family business theories and important in management studies, it also 
exists in the business and family history and is even reflected in case law 
examples of minority shareholder protection. This is one example of the close 
relationships between business history, management studies and 
legal/governance issues in family controlled companies. Other related theories, 
such as “family firm life cycle theory”, also reflects the relationship stated 
above.26  
 
Another example of the close relationship is management ownership, which is 
also one of the most crucial issues in the field of family business. The 
governance mechanisms are often critical for business performance and 
                                            
25 Colli A, supra n 17. 
26 Ibid. 18. 
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management. One advantage of doing research through the lens of historical 
studies is that family businesses would understand their governance 
mechanisms in real world terms through experience and practice and provide 
evidence for others with regards to corporate governance methods and their 
underlying theories.27 
 
Business historians often take the view that the best approach on studying family 
businesses is comparative research. Indeed, culture and values differ from 
country to country and region to region impacting family business. Therefore, 
conducting research by comparing different contexts is crucial.28 Colli discussed 
that history studies do not only provide the evidence and theories for developing 
family firms, but also provide an understanding of the culture and value of them. 
It is important to perform a comparative study for the reasons: 1) We need to 
understand the society, history, culture as well as ideology of the families that 
own the businesses at a horizontal level, in order to generalize the concepts and 
develop theories. He stated that the culture is not only the culture that family 
businesses are located in, but also the culture that families form and bring to the 
businesses. He further concluded, this culture is the advantages of the firms, 
which can make the firms be competitive in the general environment; 29  2) 
Generalizing the concepts and theories are helpful to plan strategy, as well as 
improve performance et cetera for family businesses in a global context. For 
instance, many family businesses consider or plan to be family businesses in 
the long term. This has been raised and recognized as one of the toughest 
                                            




choices, as well as one of the most important ones, which is highlighted in 
Carlock and Ward’s study.30 In this effect, conducting a comparative study, 
further to generalizing the concepts and theories also provides family 
businesses with a demanding suggestion, namely. 3) Transplant the advanced 
theories and practice to other certain contexts. Colli concluded that generally in 
the 19th century, Western family business practice was subject to their 
contextual culture, it affected their governance and succession issues.31 From 
my perspective, conducting comparative studies in family business and their 
governance practices is a potential route to breaking down the cultural and 
national barriers, to generalize existing successful cases, as well as providing 
guidelines for success in general. 
  
Furthermore, the study of family businesses has attracted business historians 
since the 1990s and it has become the favourite arena for business historians.32 
As stated by Colli, a huge amount of research towards family businesses has 
extended to international and comparative perspective regardless whether or 
not academics and experts have familiarity with foreign contexts.33 For instance, 
Spanish scholars Paloma Fernández Pérez, Nuria Pulgand and German scholar 
Hartmut Berghoff, all actively did research on Spanish family businesses and 
German family businesses concerning the nature, structure, competitive 
advantages and main features in their 2004, 2007 and 2006 studies. Some 
                                            
30 Carlock R S and Ward J L, Strategic Planning for the Family Business - Parallel Planning to 
Unify the Family and Business (PALGRAVE 2001). 
31 Colli A, supra n 17, 20. 
32 Jones G and Rose M B, “Family capitalism” (1993) 35 (4) Business History, 1-16.  
Rose MB, Family Business (Elgar 1995). 
Colli A and Rose M B, “Family business” in Jones G and Zeitlin J, (eds.) Handbook (OUP 
2008), 194-218. 
33 Colli A, supra n 17, 18. 
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based on the cases of single countries and some based on the comparative 
contexts.34 Nevertheless, the trend of the research in this field from national to 
international has proceeded apace. 
 
Although business history has advantages in the study of family business, 
business historians find that it is very difficult to be accurate, due to the relative 
lack of sources. First hand material and detailed analysis is important. However, 
it is very rare to obtain the documents from business families, since they see 
their documents as part of the family secret and privacy. Therefore, access to 
the records and documents is a problem. This is not only necessary for writing 
the business history, but also for the research of corporate governance, other 
management studies, as well as legal research. For instance, in the research of 
comparing family-owned firms with public companies and in the new modern 
developed or developing countries, scholars look at the records that can be 
accurate and accessible.35 Where companies have commissioned corporate 
histories these often provide a very useful starting point.36  
 
Historical study is not only beneficial for family businesses, but also for all 
organisations. 37  Such an approach can give insights into many different 
                                            
34 Colli A, Pérez P F and Rose M B, “National determinants of family firm development? 
Family firms in Britain, Spain, and Italy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries”, (2003) 4 (1) 
Enterprise and Society, 28-64. Colli A and Rose M B, “Family firms in comparative 
perspective”, in Amatory F and Jones G (eds.), Business History Around the World (CUP 
2003), 339-52. 
35 The reason that author chooses to do thesis and library based research is because the lack 
of the accurate sources and data. It is a limitation for this field in worldwide, especially in 
China. Although with the huge markets and continually developing economy, the transparency 
still needs to be solved, in this effect, it requires the legislative development and persistence 
on pursuing “rule by law” in a long term. However, with the needs of the legal frameworks, the 
policies that government develops, it is possible to achieve the goal. Colli A, supra n 17, 20. 
36 For example, Wilson C, The History of Unilever (Vols I-III) (Cassell and Company 1954-57).  
37 Ibid. 
 23 
aspects, for example, human capital and network of organisations. As stressed 
by Jones and Khanna, it includes but is not limited to “resources, competences, 
identity, knowledge and reputation building”38. These aspects of “immaterial 
capital” apply to other organisations apart from family businesses, especially in 
China.  
 
2.4 The Study of Business History and Development in the UK and 
China 
 
In terms of Chinese business and legal development, Chinese business history 
helps to offer insights since legal reform is associated with economic reform.  It 
is important to examine the history of a country, in order to understand family 
businesses in its national setting.  
 
2.4.1 Business History in the UK          
 
The history of the family business in the UK is a varied one. By medieval times 
guilds and companies formed by charter for the regulation first of general trading 
activities in the towns and later of specific trades and skills. Members of guilds 
traded on their own behalf and their businesses were largely family orientated. 
 
The objective of guilds was to regulate and control a particular branch of trade 
rather than to create any form of corporate trading association. England was 
                                            
38 Defined as “valued objects and qualities [y] that have been passed down from previous 
generations” (The New Oxford American Dictionary) in Colli A, supra n 17, 20.  
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slow to adopt Arabic numerals and double entry book keeping. This impacted 
on the development of both partnership and corporate law development. In 
England, the modern trading “company” has its origins more in canon law and 
historical institutions than in legal theory. The guilds were much more significant 
regulators of trade than states and rulers at this time – which is exactly why the 
nation-states eventually crushed them. The suppression of many guilds 
occurred along with that of the monasteries during the reign of Henry VIII. Even 
before the suppression of guilds the migration of landless peasants had led to 
small workshops, owned and managed by the more prosperous master 
craftsmen displacing the old guild organisations especially in cases where a 
measure of mass production for sale was economically feasible.39 
 
During the age of mercantilism, the development of the joint stock company 
proceeded apace with not only chartered corporate bodies but many without 
charters or statute. The South Sea Bubble saga and resulting legislation led to 
various forms of unincorporated joint stock companies and the further 
development of partnership law eventually codified in the Partnership Act 
1890.40 In the 19th Century the first Companies legislation was enacted. From 
a historical perspective, the corporations in the UK initially were public joint stock 
                                            
39 Hadden T, Company Law and Capitalism (2nd edn. Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1977) Chapter 
1. For a consideration of the social-cultural, political, religious and historical influences on the 
development of medieval Coventry’s guilds and governance see Kasabov E and Sundaram U, 
“An Institutional account of governance structures in early modern business history: the 
Coventry business history” (2014) 56 (4) Business History, 592-622.  
40 This aspect has been examined in detail in a number of books and articles, for example: 
Dubois A B, The English Business Company after the Bubble Act 1720-1800 (The 
Commonwealth Fund 1938). Butler H N, “General Incorporation in Nineteenth Century 
England: Interaction of Common Law and Legislative Process” (1986) 6 (1) International 
Review of Law and Economics, 169. Bubb R, “Choosing the Partnership: English Business 
Organization Law During the Industrial Revolution” (2015) 38 Seattle University Law Review, 
337-60. 
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companies as the Companies Acts presume them to be, then smaller 
companies took advantage of the legislation and increasingly used incorporation 
under the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 to operate many forms of 
businesses.41 Indeed as pointed out by Dignam and Lowry, had the House of 
Lords in Salomon v Salomon42 been able refer to the parliamentary reports 
(Hansard) they would have found that the requirement of seven members had 
been chosen to avoid its use by very small businesses.43 As Harris argued that, 
professionals who designed the Articles of Association did so in a flexible 
contractual way. Private and often smaller companies could adapt articles 
accordingly. Many articles of association had their roots in the terms of 
partnership agreements and trust deeds.44 This is one reason that the norm of 
corporations is the “contract” in the UK as well as the US.45 However, in the 
context of the UK the idea of self-ordering of both the private and public 
corporate regimes has been challenged. 46  In the Common Law system, 
Salomon v Salomon47 and the Companies Act 1907 sanctioned the concept of 
the private company.48  Moreover, scholars emphasised that often founding 
families in businesses existing a century or more ago have withdrawn from an 
active role in corporate governance. From the comparative study perspective, 
                                            
41 Harris R, “The Private Origins of the Private Company: Britain 1862-1907” (2009) available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1613206 (accessed 03 September 2010). 
42 [1897] AC 22, HL. 
43 Dignam A and Lowry J, Company Law (8th edn, OUP 2014) at para 2.23. It was not until the 
decision in Peppar v Hart [1993] AC 593 that the courts were able to take into account 
Parliamentary reports. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Wells H, “The Rise of the Close Corporation and the Making of Corporation Law”, (2008) 5, 
Berkeley Business Law Journal, Temple University Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2008-
65, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1119280 (accessed 02 September 2010). 
46 Moore M T, “Private Ordering and Public Policy: The Paradoxical Foundations of Corporate 
Contractarianism” (2014) 34 (4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 693-728. 
47 Salomon v Salomon, supra n 42. 
48 Johnson P, Making the Market: Victorian Origins of Corporate Capitalism (Cambridge 
Studies in Economic History – Second Series) (CUP 2010).  
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Franks, Mayer, and Rossi found that there was no difference between the 
companies set up in 1900 and 1960, as well as the growth of ownership.49  They 
concluded that “the forces that made founding families withdraw from corporate 
governance in the modern UK also operated a century ago”.50  
 
Chapman’s work on the nature of British merchants up to 1914 identifies how 
they developed into diversified business groups which he rather amorphously 
termed “investment groups”. He argued that their main function was financial 
and that they were primarily a device to maintain the growth and power of the 
family (or families) that contribute the particular business.51 In her original work 
on free standing companies Wilkins noted their lack of managerial hierarchies 
suggesting that they were fated for extinction over the long term.52 Chandler’s 
model also seeks to explain why Britain fell behind the US in the development 
of capital intensive manufacturing industries, particularly in the late 19th 
Century. In particular, Chandler pointed to the growth of large manufacturing 
firms managed by professional managers able to invest in mass manufacture 
and marketing. This “managerial capitalism” he contrasted with the “personal 
capitalism” preferred by the British in the form of atomistic firms owned and 
managed by families.53 Chapman applied Chandler’s critique in his study of 
                                            
49 Franks J, Mayer C and Rossi S, “Spending Less time with the Family: The Decline of 
Family Ownership in the United Kingdom” (2005) NBER Chapters, 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10628 (accessed 23 September 2016) in Morck R K (ed.) A 
History of Corporate Governance Around The World (The University of Chicago Press 2005), 
581-611. 
50 Morck R K and Steier L, “The Global History of Corporate Governance: An Introduction”, in 
Morck R K, supra n 49, 24-25. 
51 Chapman S, Merchant Enterprise in Britain (CUP 1992). 
52 Wilkins M, “The Free-Standing Company, 1870-1914: An Important Type of British Foreign 
Direct Investment” (1988) 41 Economic History Review, 259-85. Wilkins M and Schroeter H 
(eds.) The Free Standing Company in the World Economy 1830-1996 (OUP 1998). 
53 Chandler A D, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Harvard University 
Press 1994). 
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managerial competence in his “investment groups” He showed that his 
investment groups sometimes attained a formidable size running contrary to the 
Chandler’s view. However, in other ways he confirmed other aspects of 
Chandler’s view. For example, he was critical of the continuing influence of the 
family and the retention of the partnership form. These he argued often led to 
nepotism and failure. However, the importance of family control in Britain in 
terms of relative decline may have been over emphasised.54 Chandler himself 
went some way to conceding this point at a colloquium on Scale and Scope 
admitting that the critical difference between British, German and US firms was 
not the size of family holdings rather it was the stubborn continued practice of 
centralized decision making whereas their German and US counterparts were 
willing to cede authority to sophisticated managerial hierarchies.55  
 
Taking up the study of merchants Jones found that whilst joint stock companies 
were taken up for diversification, the partnership form remained widely used by 
many of the parent firms in the inter–war period and beyond.56 During the post–
war period waves of mergers culminating in the mid-1960s resulted in Britain’s 
economy becoming the most concentrated “big business” economy in Europe. 
As part of this process family influence and “personal capitalism” rapidly 
declined and was largely swept away. Public companies were increasingly used 
                                            
54 Church R, “The Limitations of the Personal Paradigm” (1990) 64 Business History, 703, 
706. Jones G “Great Britain: Big Business Management and Competitiveness in Twentieth-
Century Britain” in Chandler A D, Amatori F and Hikino T (eds.) Big Business and the Wealth 
of Nations (CUP 1997), 102, 108. 
55 Chandler A D, “Response to the Contributors to the Review Colloquium on Scale and 
Scope” (1990) 64 Business History Review, 736, 747. For a review of the research on 
“Personal capitalism” in Britain, Cheffins B R, Corporate Ownership and Control: British 
Business Transformed (OUP 2008), 11-17, 24 and 221-4.  
56 Jones G, Merchants to Multinationals: British Trading Companies in the Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Centuries (OUP 2000), 52. 
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to access capital even where the ultimate parent company remained family 
controlled. The requirement of the 1948 Companies Act that private companies 
had to disclose their financial details partly influenced this move.57 This did little 
to facilitate active monitoring as the provisions reflected a number of 
compromises, including a directors’ and industry lobby for reduced disclosure 
on the grounds of commercial secrecy.58   
 
By the 1980s the multinational enterprises which were the successors of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century British trading companies were alive and 
active as complex international business enterprises. Within two decades many 
ceased to exist, some had focused on becoming chemical or food companies 
and distribution networks. Many had ceased to be British owned. According to 
Jones it was the British capital markets that proved to be the final arbiter of the 
fate of many British trading companies. These capital markets had enabled the 
growth of the diversified trading company prior to 1914 but with the declining 
price of shares in the publicly quoted companies in the 1990s the capital markets 
proved to be the nemesis of the diversified trading companies. By way of 
contrast it was the family control of Hong Kong based firms such as Jardine 
Matheson and Swires that ensured their survival.59   
 
Whilst some of the largest trading companies had no family influence Jones 
concluded that family influence was a striking feature in the management of 
                                            
57 Ibid, in Chapter 5. Companies Act 1948, ss 147-158. 
58 Maltby J, “Was the 1948 Companies Act a Response to a National Crisis” (2000) 5 
Accounting History, 31-60. Toms S and Wright M, “Divergence and Convergence within 
Anglo-American Corporate Governance Systems; Evidence from the US and UK, 1950-2000” 
(2005) 47 (2) Business History, 267, 275. 
59 Jones, supra n 56, 341-2. 
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most trading companies. Indeed, provided family control could be combined with 
sufficient “outside” capital to provide for growth, Jones concluded that there was 
little evidence that family control was a disadvantage for trading companies. 
Family control provided an element of continuity to firms that engage in risky 
businesses and allowed them to “reinvent” themselves. Sustained ownership by 
a family could enhance their firm’s reputation for probity, competence and 
durability which were and remain an important “soft asset” for trading 
companies. Family ownership was an important factor after 1945 in the 
continued independence of firms. Of those trading/merchant firms that made the 
transition from family to managerial businesses few were successful in the 
longer term. When families sold their shares it often triggered a period of 
shareholder instability leading to acquisition or dissolution.60  
 
Manufacturing was also subject to mergers and nationalization. The US 
tendency to large divisionalised companies was only half-heartedly followed in 
the UK and the economies of scale achieved were less efficient. Many smaller 
innovative companies (often with an element of family block holding) were 
merged from the aero and car manufacturers to the chemical industry.61 At the 
same time the post war heavy taxation system, particularly in relation to close 
companies, with a correspondingly lighter regime for institutional investors 
encouraged many block holders to sell to the institutional investors, including 
pension funds.62 This further diluted family ownership of larger SMEs in the UK.  
                                            
60 Ibid. 352. 
61 Toms S and Wright M, supra n 58. 
62 Cheffins B R and Bank S A, “Corporate Ownership and Control in the UK: The Tax 
Dimension” (2007) 70 (5) Modern Law Review, 778-811. Foreman-Peck J and Hannah L 
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(2013) 55 (4) Business History, 543-564. Higgins D, Toms S and Filatotchev I, “Ownership, 
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According to Franks, Meyer and Rossi the landscape of corporate Britain had 
briefly resembled that of continental Europe during the 1950s and early 1960s. 
The development of an unregulated takeover market with the potential of 
acquiring control through the purchase of partial share stakes and discriminatory 
offers caused companies to respond in a number of ways. They introduced dual-
class shares and voting rights restrictions. Pyramid structures also developed 
as companies sought protection under the umbrella of others. However, both 
institutional investors and the London Stock Exchange (LSE) were concerned 
with the interference that managements’ ability to entrench itself behind 
takeover defenses and withdrawal of institutions’ voting rights had on the 
takeover process. Their opposition steadily led to the demise of dual-class 
shares and the introduction of the Takeover Code in 1967.63    
 
However, efficiencies of the larger combines were increasingly questioned and 
the result was a move towards a more tax efficient regime for demerging and 
management buyouts. 64  An important factor influencing the growth of 
management buyouts in the UK from 1981 was the relaxation of the law 
regarding financial assistance in the purchase of a company’s own shares.65 
This made it easier for buy-out financiers to take security. The period after 1980 
saw the re-emergence of flexible specialization and the resurgence of the 
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63 Franks J, Meyer C and Rossi S, supra n 49. 
64 For a consideration of the tax regime and methods of demerging see Lawton P, 
“Demergers: An Assessment” (1984) 5 Company Lawyer, 17. In terms of corporate 
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65 The relaxation of the financial assistance rules helped management buyouts but not 
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not until the Companies Act 2006 provisions that this problem was largely solve in the context 
of demergers.  
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smaller firm in Britain. In the UK, there had traditionally been a much closer link 
than in the US between the buy-out and venture capital markets.66 The influence 
of works like Schumacher’s Small is Beautiful67 and the growing recognition of 
the importance of small and family business was on the march and increasingly 
recognized as important by law reform bodies and politicians. This culminated 
in the “think small first” policy behind the Companies Act 2006. 
 
According to Toms and Wright the lack of opportunity to develop large scale 
industries forced British capital abroad. This left domestic entrepreneurs 
dependent on alliance and network style capitalism. They suggest that the 
British tended to perform badly when half-heartedly and partially importing US 
models of concentrated industry, productivity and managerial capitalism during 
the 1950s and 1960s. As a consequence of this, British firms were relatively well 
placed to exploit the return to shareholder capitalism in the 1980s.68  As a result 
of these various and complex forces (often external determinants of corporate 
governance) and the evolution of their interaction, the UK is not a typical country 
in terms of its corporate landscape. Unlike most countries, it does not have 
concentrated ownership nor does it have pyramid structures (one method by 
which families retain control) 69 . As a result, family ownership is of limited 
significance in traded and quoted companies whereas in most countries it is 
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quite extensive if not dominant. In addition, the UK is the only country with 
anything like a true market for corporate control. In many other countries, a 
market for corporate control is either stymied by anti-takeover mechanisms or is 
largely non-existent.70 Relatively recently, some aspects of these features of the 
UK corporate landscape, have been further accentuated by the activities of 
private equity and hedge funds.71 
 
The Institute of Family Business report in 2011 indicated the importance of the 
family business sector to the UK economy as a whole. That report indicates that 
there were circa 3 million family businesses in the UK, or two in three of all 
private sector firms. They provided 40% of all private sector jobs, a 35% of all 
private sector turnover. Family businesses were estimated to have contributed 
£81.7 billion to the UK Exchequer (14% of total government revenues) in 2010. 
At that time, almost 2 million family firms were estimated to be sole traders 
(66%), incorporate companies (24%) and partnerships (10%) made up the rest. 
The 2011 report did however note a small decline in the number of family firms. 
During the recession caused by the financial crisis of 2008 demand for credit 
rose but family firms were more successful in obtaining external finance and 
appeared to be less vulnerable to corporate dissolutions, possibly a reflection of 
stronger balance-sheet fundamentals prior to the recession. However, most of 
the loan capital was for operating costs rather than investment.72 
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In 2014 there were an estimate of 4.6 million family businesses in the UK, 
amounting to 87% of all private sector firms, up from 86% in 2013. They 
contributed an estimate £125 billion in tax in 2014 which was equivalent to 19% 
of all taxes collected by the UK Exchequer. Whilst most businesses were small 
firms (99.6%), medium-sized firms made up 0.3% of family firms. More than one 
in ten (10.9%) of large firms in the UK are family businesses. Family businesses 
employed an estimate 11.9 million people in the UK in 2014 (47% of all private 
sector employment). Family business remains very important if largely 
depending on the domestic market. However, Small Business Survey (SBS) 
definitional changes, survey sample changes and Oxford Economics 
methodological changes from year to year mean that the economic impact of 
family businesses is not perfectly comparable over time. Constant 
issues/problems in the reports include access to external finance (the need to 
raise external finance is often the main reason for dilution of family ownership). 
Access to external finance was often a critical impediment to success for family 
run businesses whilst the recent evidence on improvements in this regard is 
mixed. The issue of succession remains a challenge for many family firms. 
Institute of Family Business (IFB) reports almost 85,000 small and medium-
sized family firms are likely to be sold or gifted to new owners each year before 
2020 or 2021. Many have not prepared for the numerous difficult issues 
involved.73     
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The 2016 report on large family businesses in the UK also made some 
interesting and important points. The survey sample was comprised of the top 
1000 companies (by turnover). The proportion of family businesses identified 
was 20.1% (using > 25% criterion for family shareholding). Just over half of 
these family businesses (10.8%) were UK family owned. The survey also 
indicated that UK family owned subsidiaries were more prevalent than 
subsidiaries owned by non-UK families. The proportion of family businesses in 
the top 200 companies was rather low at 8.3%. The largest number of family 
firms (27.8%) was found in the ranking 801-1000. Overall it was concluded that 
there may be a higher proportion of family-owned firms beyond the cut-off point 
of 1000. A total of 21 private equity owners were found within the 984 (of the top 
1000 by turnover). Eight were identified as family businesses. Of these 4 were 
UK family owned. Family firms therefore have an important presence amongst 
the UK’s largest firms (if not in terms of being quoted on the stock exchange). 
Survival rates of family firms in the top 1000 was also good.74    
 
2.4.2 China’s Business History and Governance Factors 
 
China has a long history in terms of trade and business activity. As the Roman, 
Pliny the Elder observed in the first century AD, “by the lowest reckoning, India, 
China and the Arabian Peninsula take from our empire 100 million sesterces 
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every year – this is the sum which our luxuries and our women cost us”75. 
Chinese silk accounted for a quite sizeable proportion of this sum. Indeed, over 
the centuries the trade via the “silk route” varied depending on the rise and fall 
of empires and the disruption or security that they brought with them.76 From the 
earliest times trade via the silk-road and (from the 10th Century onwards) 
coastal and trade by sea77 encouraged economic activity in terms of production, 
trade and banking systems (often in the form of credit associations and 
pawnbrokers until the 19th Century.78 
 
There have been a number of debates and hypotheses concerning the driving 
forces and major institutional drivers of economic development in China as well 
as the nature of business forms and networks. One area of contention is the 
relative importance of the roles of Smithian dynamics of market expansion and 
labour specialization and its interaction with the Schumpeterian dynamic of the 
opportunities presented by new technologies and the creative destruction 
thereby unleashed.79   Throughout its history the Chinese state/government 
debated the extent to which it should engage in trade and commerce by say 
controlling salt and iron production and distribution and the extent to which it 
should leave it to merchants and the population at large to enrich themselves 
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through trade. 80  Nevertheless, the state influenced by Confucian and Neo-
Confucian principles did not like to see individuals or groups becoming too 
powerful and rich by control of markets or excessive landholdings.81 This was 
justified in terms of the ruler’s obligation to maintain harmony and frugality. 
Economic power independent of the state was viewed as ethically unacceptable, 
extravagant and punishable. Being lower than artisans or craftsmen in the 
Confucian hierarchy, and being unwilling to attract attention merchants sought 
to mask their wealth and thus seek to avoid official extractions and 
expropriations in a system which had no laws to provide redress.82 
 
With the family being the fundamental social and economic unit of Chinese 
society under Chinese law, business enterprises had no separate legal 
existence and remained wedded to the family institution. Property, for example, 
belonged to the household and not individuals. Business enterprises naturally 
took the form of family firms. Therefore, in order to pool capital and dilute risk 
from the Song Dynasty onwards various forms of partnership were created. 
According to Von Glahn because these arrangements lacked standing as legal 
entities they were governed by contracts.83  
 
A new boom in East-West trade was encouraged by the formation of the pan-
Asian Empire of Chinggis and the revival of the overland trade network but the 
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incorporation of the Southern Song into the Yuan realm during a period when 
internecine conflict had erupted among rival Mongol Khanates once again re-
orientated China’s foreign trade towards the maritime world.84  However, the rise 
of the Ming dynasty and the policies of the Hongwu emperor spurned the market 
economy developed since the Tang, Song and Yuan dynasties. His policies of 
social reform envisioned the restoration of a simple, village based agrarian 
society which rejected the extremes in wealth, ostentation and venality that had 
plagued the later Yuan dynasty. It would take a hundred years for markets to 
reassert themselves.85 
 
By 1500 the late imperial state possessed a complex range of policy options to 
influence economic activity. Behind these was the desire to raise revenues and 
support a stable social order. Whilst official policies fluctuated, two policy 
examples indicate the type of choices made. First the state could choose activist 
and interventionist approaches to control or direct economic activity. Examples 
include the regulation of mining and the exchange of vouchers for grain 
shipments for troops in the north. Secondly the state could monitor private sector 
efforts sometimes delegating responsibility or depend on others for the 
achievement of its goals. These approaches included market surveillance and 
reliance on elites for famine relief. In addition, and in between these two 
extremes of state control and an indirect monitoring there were many efforts to 
channel, redirect or limit private sector economic activity all influenced by 
Confucian and Neo-Confucian precepts.86 
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In terms of business organisation, the Song-Yuan-Ming transition saw the 
development of what were initially localized corporate lineages. These were 
originally based on ritual practice and group solidarity rather than common 
economic interests. The development of lineage institutions and especially the 
development of corporate lineages, provided the opportunity and the means to 
transform the family firm into a quasi-corporate institution. Also, long distance 
traders who settled or stayed for some time in distant cities formed co-operative 
alliances with other merchants from their home areas. This not only facilitated 
long distance trade both within and beyond China but led to the creation of 
considerable trading empires by some groups, in particular the Shanxi and 
Huizhou merchants.  
 
There also developed the concept of the “lineage trust” which was particularly 
useful in areas of economic activity requiring long term investment such as 
timber to which a more permanent quasi corporation like lineages were more 
suited. Whilst the purposes of lineage trusts were fundamentally ritual and moral 
ones such as sustaining the bonds of solidarity among kinsmen, maintaining the 
ancestral hall and gravesites, their resources were derived from the 
contributions of members. The members obtained income from their shares in 
such trusts but had no ownership rights and could not freely dispose of their 
shares. According to Faure the lineage trust was more akin to a holding 
corporation rather than a commercial partnership and their ritual character 
distinguished them from profit driven corporations87. However, many lineage 
trusts exhibited a strong interest in profit maximization. Nevertheless, kinship 
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and lineage bonds failed to shield lineage trusts from internecine conflicts. As 
McDermot observed, the main long-term problem faced by lineage trusts was 
the sustaining of control and cooperation among increasingly numerous and 
distantly related members.88 This often led to some entrepreneurs venturing out 
independently without being encumbered by family ties and obligations.89 
 
During the later Ming and Qing, it became more common to form partnerships 
with multiple investors in order to pool resources and reduce risk. This also 
allowed these partnerships to extend the geographical range of their commercial 
activities. Whilst many of these, especially the commenda type of partnership, 
were often short lived other new types of partnership institutionalized the 
enterprise as a more permanent corporation independent of its individual 
investors. Conclusive evidence for the development of joint-share partnerships 
evolving beyond the constraints and limitations of the family firm is available 
from the sixteenth century onwards. This helped the longevity of such firms 
because dividing a partnership into shares enabled investors to withdraw 
without jeopardizing the firm’s capital assets. It also allowed multiple heirs (note 
Imperial China’s legal principle of equal inheritance) to preserve their individual 
stakes. This type of partnership also allowed for managers who provided only 
their expertise and labour but no capital. The buying and selling of shares had 
developed by the 18th Century but being largely dependent on personal 
relationships and contacts it did not lead to the development of a stock market.  
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Partnerships (hehuo) could take a number of forms. These included first the 
commenda arrangement, secondly the joint-share partnership (heben or hegu) 
and thirdly the agency partnership. The commenda partnership usually only 
lasted for a single trading venture and took the form of one partner investing 
money whilst the active partner, in addition to his time, contributed his skills such 
as his knowledge of clients, shippers and brokers; his expertise in evaluating 
the quality and value of goods as well as his familiarity with trade routes and 
markets. Often profits were shared equally but since the investor took a greater 
risk by placing his capital at the disposal of the active partner he usually took 
the greater share of profit.90 However, there was no strict legal definition of a 
partnership in Imperial China and no body of civil law to govern their 
organisations and activities. Contracts were often the basis of partnerships91. 
Magistrates would enforce customary commercial practices contained in 
contracts as long as they did not conflict with the provisions of statutory law. 
Only households (not individuals) were recognized by imperial law as bearers 
of property rights and having liability for debts.92 This could produce some areas 
of ambiguity and most disputes were settled by private mediation rather than 
law courts. As an example, bankruptcy operated outside the formal legal system 
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through customary forms of negotiation. The magistrate would only intervene to 
punish fraud or to compel parties to cooperate in mediation.93 
 
It is important to note that many firms had the potential to assume a permanent 
corporate existence. Examples include the Wanquantang medicine shop 
founded in Beijing at the turn of the 18th Century and which lasted for 250 years 
despite going through changes in partnership membership. Others include the 
Tongrentang medicine shop founded in 1702. This business, unlike the 
Wanquantang partnership granted dividend shares to its managerial personnel. 
In 1820 the original founding Yue family regained control. The Yutang processed 
foods company founded in 1779 had evolved from a family business into a 
multiple partnership relying on professional managers. In 1905 one of the two 
principal investors, whose family had been investors dating back to 1807, 
bought out his partner and the common investors and reestablished the firm as 
a family firm remaining as such until it was nationalized in 1956. These examples 
demonstrate the flexibility of the Chinese business partnership form of 
enterprise for it allowed firms to expand their capital and recruit expert 
managers. In doing so it enabled the firm to develop a permanent existence that 
was independent of the skills, financial condition and interests of the founders 
and their heirs. Even so, this sometimes allowed either the founding family to 
regain control or one of the investors to do so thus re-characterizing the firm as 
a family firm.94     
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In the late Qing, a number of new banking and credit institutions developed 
which facilitated linkages between domestic markets and foreign trade, lowered 
the cost of credit and helped regulate commercial exchange. To a limited degree 
they borrowed from Western examples but in their essence, they largely 
consisted of adaptations of existing institutions which evolved to meet the 
diverse demands for commercial services. Early forms of these new types of 
financial institutions were the account agencies (Zhangju). These were chiefly 
located in Beijing and issued loans to commercial clients for up to one year. 
Whilst these were quite plentiful their individual operations remained quite small 
at roughly the size of a typical pawn brokerage in the capital. Native banks 
(Qianzhuang) were similar to account agencies but became active in foreign 
trade in the treaty port era. The demand for their services increased with the 
growth in foreign trade and since foreign firms had no access to the inland 
producers of silk and tea they relied increasingly on their “comprador” Chinese 
agents who established their own qianzhuang. This helped them to funnel 
finance from foreign firms to domestic clients. These institutions, in addition to 
accepting deposits, exchanging currency and making short term loans to 
merchants, issued various types of commercial paper similar to bills of exchange 
and promissory notes (zhuangpiao). In the second half of the 19th Century 
qianzhuang borrowed money from foreign firms using only their own notes as 
security which made them vulnerable to economic fluctuations so that financial 
crises in 1873 and 1883 bankrupted half of Shanghai’s qianzhuang. Success in 
the context of qianzhuang business relied very heavily on personal trust and 
connections. Native place ties based on familiarity underpinned the 
creditworthiness of partners, correspondents and clients sometimes dubbed 
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“fiduciary communities”.95 Nevertheless the qianzhuang were essentially local 
institutions. The Ning-Shao banking network provided a substratum for the 
practice of account transfers thus enabling merchants to settle debts without 
resorting to the exchange of hard currency. These linked-firm forms of business 
organisation helped to disperse risk and develop intimate personal relationships 
with clients, which was especially fundamental in the finance industry. Again, 
family involvement could be central. The Fang family of Ningbo owned over forty 
qianzhuang including twenty-five in Shanghai.  
 
Another form of banking institution was the piaohao bank, often called Shanxi 
banks. These initially focused on facilitating long- distance trade but eventually 
focused the majority of their business on government finance so that after 1870 
the Shanxi banks handled 30% of total government revenues. This huge 
infusion of capital allowed them not only to offer personal loans, make advances 
to government agencies but also to broker loans from foreign banks for major 
infrastructure work such as railway construction. They therefore mobilized 
capital on a considerably greater scale that the more local qianzhuang banks. 
However, the dependence of the piaohao on business with the imperial 
government meant that their survival was increasingly dependent on the fiscal 
health of the Qing state. In 1897 the Imperial Bank of China (IBC) was founded 
in Shanghai and in 1905 the Da Qing (Great Qing) bank based in Beijing 
replaced the IBC.  Amongst other objects it took over most of the remittances 
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from the piaohao banks. The fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911 forced the Da Qing 
to close its doors and within a few years almost half of the piaohao banks, 
including most of the largest ones had ceased to carry on business. As an 
institution, it largely disappeared. From amongst their managerial personnel 
came a considerable number of entrepreneurs who went on to found modern 
private banks in the early Republican era.96  
 
The Hanyeping Company, China’s first modern industrial cartel, was formed 
from the amalgamation of three enterprises. According to Liu Yun, from a firm 
specific perspective, this pioneer trial by the Chinese scholar-bureaucrat elites 
resulted in failure largely because the firm failed to establish effective corporate 
governance. This institutional deficiency closely correlated with the over-
stressing of the role of elites and a state led top-down approach taken by them.97   
Whilst government support was very important to the growth and survival of 
enterprises its deep and often heavy involvement sometimes had negative 
impacts which contributed to the eventual demise of some firms. One example 
is the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company. This prospered under the 
management of merchants but faltered when government officials gained 
control and management of its operations.98     
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Relatively modern family business development from 1872 to 1949 has recently 
been studied by McWatters et al. focusing on manufacturing businesses from 
the establishment of the first modern, family run manufacturing business in 
1872. They assert that Chinese family business has never been a homogenous 
form. Chinese family in other countries could be quite different from Chinese 
family businesses founded and operated in China. The context of colonialism, 
revolution, war, political turmoil and economic uncertainty provide a rich 
institutional context in which family firms were embedded. 99  Despite these 
challenging conditions studies by Chan indicate that Chinese textile firms, 
particularly in cotton spinning, were able to outperform their British counterparts 
despite the fact that the latter benefitted from more advance technology.100 The 
successful Chinese family businesses were able to develop managerial 
techniques borrowed from abroad and, taking into account the unique cultural 
and societal environment in China, to develop new forms of organisation and 
management.101 On the other hand, particularly in the war free zone, being small 
was critical to family firms because it gave them flexibility and allowed them to 
effectively and efficiently manage their workforce. Whilst such firms could 
purchase advanced equipment they often suffered from a lack of skilled 
management. This often resulted in lower efficiency and a higher operating cost 
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which in part explains the competitive disadvantage that many Chinese family 
firm shad face relative to foreign companies.102   
 
The various examples of better practice considered by McWatters include 
having sons and daughters educated abroad, particularly in the West, but with 
an expectation that they will return to work in the family business, teams of 
brothers founding and working in the management of the family business and 
examples where the managers were not always the controlling shareholders. As 
Kirby103 and Cochran104 emphasise Chinese family business had its roots in 
networks of family and other social ties.  The early 1904 company law of the 
dying days of the Qing dynasty was not a success because, according to Kirby, 
family business did not take to strangers being shareholders in the corporate 
business.  The early Chinese company law aimed to create an improved legal 
environment for private business and was modeled on laws in Japan and Britain. 
Its effect was marred by lack of a regulatory effort to support a capital market 
and did not bring about significant changes to family businesses. The law failed 
to protect shareholders or curb managerial power. There was no specific 
regulation on company reporting resulting in vague accounting and a lack of 
transparency, allowing family firms to extract private benefits.105 Self-regulation 
still dominated and guilds exercised authority in this regard. Guilds were the 
principal members of chambers of commerce and commercial disputes were 
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resolved within the chambers. Business organisations, in particular family 
businesses, continued to rely on guilds to regulate their transactions despite the 
development of the company law which was revised in 1929.106    
 
Several family businesses grew considerably in China prior to 1949. Examples 
include the Rong family business, which as a symbol of Chinese family business 
and enterprise may have received support from banks that were also run by 
Chinese businessmen. Unfortunately, what was hoping to be a golden age after 
1945 was marred by corrupt government. Members of the family were subject 
to extortion and abduction during the 1945-49 period being forced to pay 
significant sums of money in order to regain their freedom. Corruption therefore 
put a hold on the development of family business after the Sino-Japanese 
war.107 Indeed during the late Qing period only a fraction of family businesses 
registered with the Chinese government fearing that to do so would result in loss 
of management control and family wealth.108. A similar explanation has been put 
forward for the later low take up on the use of the corporations’ laws in early 
twentieth century China.109.  
 
After the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, most 
economic activity fell within the remit of state-owned firms. Three decades later 
the introduction of the open-door policy led to the reemergence of family owned 
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and managed enterprises in the PRC. Their numbers grew dramatically. This 
was especially noticeable in the Special Economic Zones and coastal plains. In 
the early 1990s stock exchanges were established in Shanghai and Shenzhen.  
A number of family firms were listed, some of them being cross listed on foreign 
stock exchanges. Family firms have therefore experienced a renaissance in 
China.110  
 
2.5 The Lessons of Business History 
 
In both the UK and China business history shows the importance of family 
business in historical and modern context. Whilst the institutional, economic and 
political contexts vary resulting in a relatively unique corporate landscape in the 
UK and the resurgence of family businesses in China. The contribution of family 
business to the economies of both jurisdictions remains of considerable 
importance after 1990s. In the UK, the emphasis on “think small first” has not 
really succeeded in delivering noticeable benefits following the Companies Act 
2006.111 Indeed there have been calls for a greater variety of legal vehicles for 
carrying on business.112 In China the historical record shows the importance of 
the family firm in carrying on entrepreneurial and business activities throughout 
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its history. The importance of Confucian culture and the legal emphasis on family 
in that context had an important part to play.  
 
Whilst it has been suggested that the recent upsurge in entrepreneurial activity 
in China is not a rebirth of an earlier tradition but may rather be attributed to 
reform an institutional change which have occurred post 1949 (before the 
introduction of economic reforms in 1978) and post the 1978 reforms. Atherton 
and Newman posit that these institutional reforms have been evolutionary 
adapting to as well as shaping emerging forms of economic activity. This 
includes entrepreneurship. They conclude that these developments produce 
“rule ambiguities” within the institutional framework that creates opportunities for 
entrepreneurs. At the same time these opportunities are vulnerable to continuing 
institutional change.113 However, in light of the historical context outlined above, 
the same comments could be made throughout China’s history to a greater or 
lesser extent in each period.  
 
McWatters et al. also point out that the history of the family business from 1872-
1949 might have important lessons for Chinese entrepreneurs at present. Just 
as in that period family firms have to compete with government, foreign firms 
and the consequences of “unequal” treaties a similar situation applies today. 
How the earlier firms coped and developed strategies to meet their challenges 
has lessons for family firms at present.114 
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The importance of the historical survey is that it shows the importance of family 
business in the context of both the UK and China. Although in the former, family 
control of large public corporations declined, in the latter family businesses have 




Chapter 3 Legal System and Legal Reform in China 
 
3.1 Legal Reform in China and Its Relationship with Economic and 
Political Reform 
 
Chinese legal reform has been tangled with economic reform and political 
reform in the last four decades. Zhu concluded, Chinese legal norms changed 
significantly and influenced by a series of changes, including “market economy, 
democratic politics, the harmonious society, ecological civilization, the 
construction of a legal system and globalization”115. The legal reform is basically 
a process of building the legal framework with socialist characteristics combined 
with socialist market economy characteristics. It is consistent with Central 
Communist Party’s (CCP, or Communist Party of China, “CPC”) goals in all 
meetings in the past four decades, with the aim of building a harmonious society 
and a unique Chinese market economy with socialist characteristics. In 1997, 
the CCP raised the mission of “formulating a socialist legal system with Chinese 
characteristics by the year 2010”116, it shows that legal reform of China has been 
planned by the central government, along with the economic and political 
reform. There are several scholars commented the legal reform and economic 
reform as influencing and reflecting the government’s monopoly on political 
power.117 Regardless it is right or wrong, as Zhu Jingwen stated, Chinese legal 
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system now is structured as a socialist legal system with Chinese 
characteristics, the Constitution is the core and various branches of law are the 
basis.118 To understand the legal reform process, it is necessary to learn how 
the legal reform started with the economic and political reforms. 119  The 
examples of CCP reforms economy and law as political tasks can be found in 
Appendix 1. 
 
China’s economy has grown rapidly in the past four decades. Seeing the failure 
of Soviet Union, CCP realised China needs to go through a different socialist 
development. After the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) completely destroyed 
legal institutions, government determined to change the situation. The new 
leadership under Deng Xiaoping from 1978, decided to create a unique and 
independent development for modern China – Open Door Policy (or opening up) 
– a big economic reform decision in China’s economic history. The leadership 
was determined to change Mao Zedong’s radicalism, and this was when the 
economic reform started. However, this economic reform was the result of 
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political reform. In fact, the period of reform including economic, political and 
legal reforms can be generally divided into 1978-1989, 1989-2003, 2003-2012, 
2012 onwards.120  
 
The first political reform came under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership. Since 1978, 
Deng Xiaoping’s aim was to bring stability to the party and party’s 
governance. 121  He raised the slogan of “Black Cats White Cat”. 122  New 
government officials were promoted and elderly officials retired.123 It seemed to 
be a clearing house action, but it helped China to survive from what Soviet Union 
did not in the 1980s.124 Along with this political reform, the economic reform 
started. In 1992, Deng Xiaoping visited the Special Economic Zones125 and 
modernized industries. Deng Xiaoping believed that it was necessary to 
welcome and attract foreign investors to China and invest in China but also 
maintain China’s socialism. Later in the year, Deng Xiaoping announced a 
“socialist market economy” is the key task for China in 1990s on the 14th 
National Communist Party Congress. 
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The results of economic reform improved China rapidly, the agriculture sector 
developed, market incentives came into China, rural areas grew richer, and 
township and village enterprises started to grow strongly. With both political and 
economic reform proceeding apace, legal reform was an important goal during 
this period. Legal changes were made to adapt with economic development. In 
general, the regulations were more business and market oriented. In the mid-
1980s, with the development of the joint ventures format becoming the most 
common model, the regulations of trading became less strict; and sole 
ownership by foreign investors in the Chinese market was legalized. Along with 
the foreign new models of business activities stimulated domestic commercial 
activators, relevant laws and regulations came into force, private entrepreneurs 
were hugely encouraged in the 1980s. By the time of late 1980s, rapid growing 
private business activities had become a wide range of providers who offered 
more options for the Chinese public than ever in its history.126 Government 
bodies came out with hundreds of laws and regulations in a reasonably 
comprehensive manner, such as criminal law, civil law and commercial law.127 
Law became a profession again after Mao’s rule. 
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Economic reform in China is a double-edged sword, it brought opportunities for 
China as well as problems and challenges. Legal reform is one of the 
challenges. In terms of Company Law, the principles of foreign trade and 
managerial issues were new to China and there was a lack of regulation to cover 
all aspects; From other perspectives, more corruption and commercial crimes 
were committed under the attraction of making money, and mostly using 
connections and networks guanxi to obtain benefits for personal purposes.    
 
After the ten years of huge changes in China, the CCP had a huge crisis in 
governing the country in 1989 because of the student democracy movement.128 
The crisis made the Party to further conduct political reform to maintain the 
CCP’s governance and contain central power. The reform was continued but 
with a very comprehensive level of interference in business activities from the 
government. Deng Xiaoping’s decisions of putting more elderly CCP leaders to 
retirement and pointed successors for the next decades gave China a chance 
to prevent what happened in Soviet Union. 129  Jiang Zemin took over the 
leadership in 1989 along with Deng Xiaoping’s policies in politics helped to 
stabilize the Party’s central control for almost two decades.130  
 
After 1990, the CCP stabilised the central control, but sought more control over 
all levels of local governments. Political stability boosted economy of China. 
Jiang Zemin and the leadership followed Deng Xiaoping’s guidance to 
continually develop economy in building modern China. Further economic 





reform continued in 1992. Employment in more varied entities, private housing 
grew and less state control over these sectors.131 Graduates flooded into all type 
of enterprises and many joined private sector and foreign capital involved firms. 
Central government made legal reform to a very impressive level by 1999. The 
Company Act was established in 1993, which was the beginning of China’s 
corporate governance. It was then amended in 1999 and more recently in 2014. 
 
The Party continued to encourage economic development, further actions such 
as joining WTO in 2001 and allowing wealthy entrepreneurs to join the CCP in 
2002 showed the flexibility and new trend of the Party’s developing policies. 
However, in fact, the Party was trying to maintain its control by earning people’s 
faith as the economy developed, by giving more power to the public and allowing 
a few legal channels for public to monitor local governments. For instance, 
members of the public could only complain about local government through 
xinfang departments (a division in government departments to deal with 
people’s complaints against officials), courts (it is limited and courts mostly 
supported local government’s reputation so the complaints could not be solved 
with justice or the results were biased) or village officials (elected officials 
mediate mainly to deal with conflicts in very low-level villages or towns)132. CCP 
developed law and litigation very much in 1990s including the Company Act in 
1993. Furthermore, “rule of law” was raised by CCP as a new slogan in 1997. 
The central government later then amended Constitutional Law to add “rule of 
law” in 1999. 
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By 2000, the economy continued to grow and more foreign social and cultural 
influences impacted in China. Many Media outlets changed from speaking for 
government to seeking more objective facts and truth as some Western media 
did. Reports of government officials abusing powers and consequential 
complaints from members of the public came to light. As a result, more people 
sought media exposure in terms of their filed complaints to government officials. 
The pressure from public exposure pushed central government to tighten its 
control over the media and restrict the flood of foreign cultural impacts over the 
Chinese public. For instance, China’s government sought greater control over 
the internet and introduced its “Great Firewall of China” to control information 
from crossing borders.133 However, the control did not help with the domestic 
situations much. Because of the political stabilizing process in the 1990s, many 
Han nation Chinese were sent to varied locations in China to maintain control of 
the CCP, which produced the further tension with Tibet and Xinjiang.134 In 2008, 
a huge tragedy happened in the capital Urumqi.135 The tragedy led to a massive 
arrest actions and severe legal punishments. In my opinion, that shook the 
control of CCP in the early 21st century and then government decided to develop 
West area such as Xinjiang and Tibet, including improving the financial situation 
locally and develop infrastructure programs to connect Western and Eastern 
China. At the same time, in Eastern China, the economy continued to grow, but 
the government’s policies and regulations were falling behind the general 
business and economic environment. For instance, most of the economic 
development was situated in urban areas, whilst the township and village 





enterprises which were an engine of economic development in the 1980s were 
facing decline, which seriously affected employment in rural areas. Meanwhile, 
government jobs attracted more graduates to join compared with the private 
sector in the last decade due to their stability and guanxi network building 
opportunities that brought more “grey income”. The situation in rural areas 
created the huge Yi Min Chao (migrant moving wave) to urban cities for work 
opportunities. Many rural areas only residents were the elderly and young 
children.  
 
In the 1990s, the development of SOEs was dramatic in terms of their financial 
situation and political advantages. By the middle of 2000s, the central 
government set policies and publicly promoted SOEs to strengthen their position 
in competition with foreign companies.136  However, the strong support and 
promotion led to corruption and overwhelming power for some SOEs managers 
and government officials. The situation in general was getting out of control and 
causing instability for CCP’s leadership in governing China. As a result, the CCP 
examined the situation carefully. Premier Wen Jiabao raised the development 
path in China in 2007, China was “unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated, and 
ultimately unsustainable.” 137  Thereafter, the Party determined to alleviate 
poverty in rural areas, tried to balance the disparity in terms of economic 
development between Western and Eastern China and control/counter 
corruption to restore more order to economic and social development, and most 
importantly to strengthen CCP’s central power.  
 




In the early second decade of 21st century, the political situation became more 
dramatic. Xi Jinping, the President, became the first president since Mao 
Zedong to control both military and political power at the same time. Since the 
commencement of his regime, the leadership changes within the CCP have 
been tremendous. Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang, for instance, were the high-
profile cases in political changes after Xi Jinping’s presidency. From central 
committee to local governments, all levels of government have been strictly 
investigated and watched since Xi Jinping’s regime. While the political changes 
happened inside the governments, the economic growth was very important for 
China as the CCP wanted to maintain the double-digit growth but it fell to 7.7 
per cent by 2012.138 Unlike many other parts of the world suffering from the 
effects of the financial crisis in 2008, the government put considerably more 
investment into development programs particularly in infrastructure projects. In 
the meantime, the mismatch between economic development and the 
enactment of appropriately updated laws and regulations brought more 
challenges. After amending the Company Act in 2005, the other important 
amendment in Company Act happened in 2013, it seemed to be that China 
aimed to build a foundation for Chinese company law to better connect with the 
corporate world and opened the market economy to a higher level. The changes 
showed the purposes of releasing responsibilities from authorities but giving 
more power to shareholders and individuals instead. Although the changes of 
legal reform can be helpful, the potential risks and challenges exist. It is not 
impossible to regulate or guide legal entities by authorities in the future, but there 
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is a need to have comprehensive levels of regulations and laws to solve the 
issues.  
 
3.2 Challenges During Legal Reform – Legal Framework and 
Economy 
 
China has developed to one of the largest emerging markets worldwide, and 
has greater political and cultural impact in the region. 139  Moreover, with 
developments in other parts of Asia the region has become a global player.140 
However, the developments such as the stock market and private ownership 
have not achieved complete acceptance by the Chinese public since 1990s,141 
despite encouragement from government and financial institutions. Scholars 
such as Chen and Coffee demonstrated that in the early stage of economic 
reforming process, when the capital market first developed, the absence of legal 
frameworks in the area was obvious and lagging behind. 142  The legal 
development was made after government and institutions realised the problems 
and tried to regulate economic activities in stock markets, although China did 
not have the correct and clear image about it. The judiciary did not have much 
experience about securities law (also corporate and commercial/business law 
generally) and this remains an ongoing issue today. 143  This situation is 
consistent with Coffee’s hypothesis - the “crash-then-law”.144 It explains the 
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legal development in China was pushed by the environment and the needs of 
having legal frameworks from relevant parties. Lawmakers started to realise the 
absence of the law in economic and financial area, as well as the urgent need 
to have a legal framework for practitioners. It is an example of the correlation 
between politics, economy and law sectors, as well as China’s development 
tending to be one of “crash-then-law” in line with the hypothesis of Coffee. 
Understanding the process is an important way to discover and explore the legal 
development at present and in future.  
 
As some academics explored, law does matter for economic and market 
development in the law and economics literature.145 For instance, in 1990s the 
economy and finance pushed the development of the legal framework, 
thereafter, the law and regulations have been developed and helped the 
economic and financial development. In contrast, some academics held different 
opinions. For instance, Thakur raises a discussion of comparing China’s 
situation and India’s, demonstrating that law does not matter that much for the 
economic growth and market development, on the basis that India has a better 
institutional infrastructure.146 The discussion is based on the theory of “law-then-
growth”.147 Considering the situation in China, it is not like India which is the 
largest democratic country in the world, nor a “rule of law” country (the “rule of 
law” is very new for China and still set as a goal to achieve in long term), but it 
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has been developing more rapidly than India.148 Another example, Indonesia, 
has also developed less rapidly under the “rule of law”.149  
 
As concluded by Black and Bell, it is hard to prove the link between the “rule of 
law” and some economic developments, although people know there is.150 The 
“law and development” movement was the driving force for many Asian 
countries developing their legal systems, in the belief that it would aid the 
economic development of the region.151 In considering the link between law and 
economic development, it is the situation that a developing economy needs law 
and vice versa in my view. The situation of market development pushing legal 
changes also happened in the US.152 It is important to examine the economic 
development (in particular business development) and legal development, and 
vice versa in China’s case. Thus, it is necessary to look at the economic 
developments of China and how the legal reform and development has been 
since China’s “opening up”. Although law is not the drive for developing the 
economy, it is important for economy to continue grow once development has 
reached a reasonably complex level.153 In China’s case, law was developed by 
political planning (planned by CCP) along with reform of the economy. 
 
Accordingly, as scholars discuss from different perspectives and hold different 
opinions, the relationship between law and economy (as in which is the cause 
and effect) is not clear. For instance, as mentioned above, Coffee raised the 
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theory of Chinese legal system is shown as “crash-then-law” characteristic. 154 
Chen agreed with Coffee’s theory and showed the consistence between the 
theory and China’s recent reform experience (mainly focused on the capital 
market experience) in the research. 155  Meanwhile, Chen pointed out that 
constituency of investors drove force behind such legal reform progress.156   
 
3.3 Chinese Legal System – The Socialist Characteristics of Chinese 
Legal System 
 
Ancient Chinese laws could be generally divided into rites and punishments. In 
the words of the ancient philosopher Xunzi, “The fundamental principles of 
governance consist of rites and punishments.”157 
 
 
Since 18th and 19th centuries, the movement of diversifying the law to different 
groups occurred and as the initial and immature model of modern legal system, 
it developed to cover constitutional law, administrative law, criminal law, civil 
law, commercial law and civil and criminal procedural law. During the 
Republican period, government incorporated a law collection, named Liu Fa 
Quan Shu (The Complete Compendium of the Six Codes of Law)158. This 
collection was made by the adoption that China made in accordance with the 
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continental legal system, included constitutional law, civil law, commercial law, 
criminal law, and civil and criminal procedural law.159  
 
Entering to the 20th century, branches of law became more complex. The 
change happened with the various developments, such as social, cultural, 
economic, financial et cetera. The influences from state intervention and the 
political socialism society was happening in the legal field, further it caused 
changes in all branches of law. For instance, public law mixed and showed the 
nature of privatization, further to merge the private law and public law. 
Meanwhile, private law absorbed public law elements and was publicized.160 
The consequences are: 1) the laws are more diversified; 2) the need of more 
laws and regulations, which included the needs of private parties, such as 
shareholders and business investors; also including the need of keeping the 
political power from government. Under the circumstances of China, the 
business activities (private parties) and political interfere (government political 
interests) could not be separated as government (central government and local 
governments) tries to maintain political power and ensure the order of business 
activities. Thus, the branches of law show the interacted relations among each 
other. As Zhu concluded,  
National interests, society’s interests and private interests interpenetrate one another; 
public power and private rights influence each other; procedural and substantive law 
interact; and even international and national law are transformed into one another, so 
that a large number of new fields sharing the characteristics of different branches of law 
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have emerged. Classic examples of this are economic law, environmental law and 
social law.161 
 
Nevertheless, taking civil and commercial law as the examples, commonly 
recognized as the private law field, they have been subject to interference by 
state power. By way of contrast, in Western countries, capitalism developed 
through various stages from relatively free markets to monopoly, then public law 
and private law separated from each other in the 19th century; in China, the 
separation appeared to happen during the period of economic transformation 
from planned to market economy.162 
 
3.4 Chinese Legal System – Socialist and Centralised Political 
Characteristics 
 
Chinese legal system has the unique socialist characteristics along with the 
socialist characteristics economy, and law changes with the market economy. 
In Western countries, along with the long history of business, economic, finance 
and social cultural developments, the legal system has been developing through 
various degrees of sophistication for centuries. The new branches of law that 
emerged relatively recently in the Chinese legal system, such as economic law, 
social law and environmental law which have been taken shape in many 
Western countries for over a hundred years. In contrast, the PRC is merely in 
the sixth decade, and the Cultural Revolution completely damaged the economy 
and academic development of China especially its legal framework. Zhu 
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commented that one distinct differences between Western legal system and 
Chinese legal system (the socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics) is 
that: 1) Chinese legal system developed as the political missions for central 
government, it was planned by steps, one step at a time. 2) Chinese legal 
system was planned in advance by government, from the committee meetings 
that government held, and set as part of the overall tasks that government set 
every five years. Central government has been putting considerable effort into 
planning the legal reform and development.163 Chinese legislation was planned 
from the very beginning of building the modern legal system – planned first then 
operated by steps. Thus, Chinese legal system with socialist and Chinese 
characteristics has been mainly dependant on the CCP.  
 
As stated above, the planning and missions of legal reform process were 
conducted by National People’s Congress (NPC), these political meetings have 
always been important and countries around the world watch these meetings 
closely when they are held. The NPC of the PRC, is the supreme body of the 
state power. The permanent body of NPC is the Standing Committee.164 The 
NPC meeting are held as sessions once a year.165  Only the NPC and its 
Standing Committee can enact and amend basic laws governing criminal 
offences, civil affairs, state organs and other matters, which means conducting 
changes in law.166 
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Since 1980s, after the Cultural Revolution, the Party has set series of missions 
to build up the socialist legal system with unique Chinese characteristics in all 
plans that Committee made. Deng Xiaoping raised the “Reform and Opening 
Up” policy and the government led China to a different role in the world stage. 
The government also raised the principles of “rule of law” at Plenary Session of 
CPC Meeting. This type of planning for legislation changes is not happening 
everywhere and anytime in history, but it does show that the differences China 
has in terms of legal reform from other countries in legislative history. As Zhu 
commented, “China’s legislative activities were carried out in a purposeful and 
planned way, greatly promoting the formation of the socialist legal system with 
Chinese characteristics.”167 After meetings were held in 1980s, the reform of law 
and economy put into place and the leadership determinate to pursue economy 
changes and development. China entered into a period of exciting economic 
development, along with noticeable corruption and connections of bureaucrats 
and business individuals appeared (guanxi with government officials to gain 
personal favours and financial gains). During the period 1990 to 1999, China 
experienced rapid changes and economic reform especially following Deng 
Xiaoping’s much publicised trip in Southern China. The government established 
the “program of the national economy and society development decade” to 
develop the economy, progress institutional reform and establish a Socialist 
Market Economy System. This included fostering the establishment of private 
enterprises. By the end of 1990s, government saw economic reform and 
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progress with quite astonishing results. The government set the goal of 
establishing new rural towns to spread the benefit of development beyond the 
major coastal cities and towns, in order to further reform SOEs the modern 
enterprise system was introduced in 1999. China, then under the leadership of 
Zhu Rongji (the Premier of PRC then), continued the economic double-digit 
growth rate, set the “modernization, opening up and technological progress” as 
the basic goals. From 2001, the government raised the importance of 
developing economic and legal reform. In 2003, the initial step of building the 
socialist legal system was taking shape. The Party also called for a regulatory 
regime to foster private enterprises168 and placed stress on the harmonious 
society and “building of democratic rule of law, justice, sincerity, amity, vitality, 
stability and order”169. Since 2007, the task of improving the Chinese legal 
system had been emphasised. In 2008, the fundamental format of the Chinese 
socialist legal system was outlined by formal announcement by Wu Bangguo 
(Chinese chief legislator)170 in the Central Committee. It appeared to be an 
important step in the history of the modern Chinese legal system’s development. 
The rural reform and development goals for rural reform by 2020 were also 
delivered by Hu Jintao, especially in agriculture sector and labour in agriculture 
sector. Thereafter, a series of laws and regulations came into force to foster the 
development of the agricultural sector of the economy. These developments 
                                            
168 CPC People official website, in Chinese language, 中国共产党历次全国代表大会数据库. 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64569/ (accessed 17 November 2013). Jiang 
Zemin’s full report on the 16th CPC Central Committee meeting, which published by XinHua 
News, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2002-11/17/content_693542.htm (accessed 17 
November 2013). 
169 Ibid. 
170 Wu Bangguo (born July 1941) was a high-ranking politician in the PRC. He was the 
Chairman and Party secretary of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, 
a position that makes him China's chief legislator. He is also ranked second in official rankings 
of state and party leaders according to his qualifications in the Party. 
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indicate that legislative development and changes mostly follow on from the 
changing political goals and trends. 
 
The current paramount leadership has been aiming to maintain and develop the 
economy and modernization of China since 2013. Furthermore, to improve the 
Party’s work and government administration efforts to simplify and encourage a 
level of decentralization have been made. However, China is such a huge 
country and with multiple levels of government, from central, provincial, city, 
town and village difficulties arise in relation to policy implementation and, for 
example controlling the occurrence of corruption especially at the lower level of 
local governments. Therefore, decentralization is hard to implement. It may be 
argued that decentralization requires solid legal principles, administrative fiat 
and other regulatory support which implements and complies with the CPC’s 
aim – “rule of law” – as it is variously understood in China. Indeed, China may 
need to transplant many regulations or laws from other countries and adapt them 
to meet its needs, but there are limitations on to what extent and to what level 
transplantation can work as with the two tier board system and the introduction 
of the independent non-executive director.171 In addition, as Ho et al. discussed, 
there must be a change in terms of control of the economy from the government 
if China is to successfully operate its decentralization.172 I think China will have 
to encourage or foster companies more than other aspects which goes along 
with the huge demand of growth in economy and government support. It has 
shown this through government’s policies and goals set at each central meeting 
                                            
171 Chen A, “The development theory of law and market in contemporary China” in Wang G 
and Wei Z (eds.), Legal developments in China: Market economy and the law (Sweet & 
Maxwell 1996), 3-20. 
172 Ho D, Lau A and Young A, supra n 117. 
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in recent decades.  
 
The difficulty in changing in this way is a big challenge in relation to government 
intervention. Ho and Xu stated, “the change will not be straightforward because 
the government currently has embedded interests in many Chinese 
companies”,173 and Ho et al. concluded that a major change China has to make 
for decentralization and privatization is to remove the direct intervention that 
government has to SOEs.174 Indeed government intervention in the SOEs has 
existed for a long time and there are issues in this matter. The reason that the 
government made the goal of decentralization is to continually be building the 
modern China, learning and transplanting the experiences that advanced 
countries which mostly are market economy have. It is uncertain as to what the 
current leadership will do to achieve the goal, releasing control over SOEs is 
difficult to imagine and the solution is unsure. However, it might be a good 
solution to implement the regulations that local governments put into practise 
during decentralization. However, it also means that lower level governments 
will have more power, therefore, the potential issues would be seen with the 
development, such as corruptions, or local governments would push local 
enterprises (regardless their size) on taxation to achieve better political 
performance. It will remain a challenge until China develops further on the legal 
reform and changes and what steps the government takes to decentralize 
remains very much uncertain. 
 
                                            
173 Ho S and Xu H, “Corporate governance in People’s Republic of China” in Keong L C (ed.), 
Corporate governance: An Asia-Pacific critique (Sweet & Maxwell 2002), 269-302. 
174 You J, China’s enterprise reform: Changing state/society relations after Mao (Routledge 
1998).  
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The NPC meetings indicate how and what the planning is for the economic and 
legal reform along with maintaining the political organs. The political planning is 
a crucial governing aspect for China. Since 22th to 27th June 2017, at the 28th 
Session of the 12th NPC Standing Committee Meeting, Standing Committee 
members reviewed the amendment of promoting SMEs particularly through the 
taxation incentives. According to the meeting reports, summary and government 
published news, some committee members pointed out that taxation incentive 
is an important way of encouraging SMEs. Therefore, the draft after review 
added some benefits for small and micro enterprises such as tax deductions, 
corporate tax exemption and VAT etc.; Higher Education Institution graduates 
and former military officers who found small to micro enterprises could enjoy 
special taxation benefits or be relieved of certain charges; There are also 
benefits for technology start-ups to encourage technology innovation. 175  
 
The main debates on the draft include the following factors:176 First, Standing 
Committee members pointed out that there is lack of legal consequences in the 
draft for SMEs since the draft mainly focuses on encouragement but does not 
list legal responsibilities. It potentially causes lack of legal aid methods if the 
rights of SMEs are violated. Second, defining SMEs is a priority for the draft. 
There have been conflicted definitions of small to micro-sized enterprises in 
several departments of State Council already. Therefore, a unified definition of 
                                            
175 Chen Y (ed.) “中小企业促进法修订草案进入二审明确相关税收优惠措施” (Draft of Small and 
Medium-sized Enterprises Promotion Amendment Clarify Relevant Tax Incentives Measures) 
2017年 6月 22日 (22nd June 2017) http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/lfgz/2017-
06/23/content_2024079.htm (accessed 28 July 2017).  
176 Wang W, “中小企业促进法不能只有鼓励和促进”(It Needs More Than Just Encouragement 
and Promotion for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises Promotion Amendment), 2017年 7月
4日(4th July 2017), http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/cwhhy/12jcwh/2017-
07/04/content_2025490.htm (accessed 3 August 2017). 
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small to micro-sized enterprises is needed in this draft. Third, whether the draft 
should be serving SMEs or small to micro-sized enterprises is under debate as 
well. Fourth, the monitoring bodies shall be clarified in the draft. There are varied 
government bodies in different provinces, which potentially cause confusions 
and conflicts in monitoring SMEs. Fifth, SMEs’ funding problem. To help solving 
the funds problem, the draft added regulations of banking monitoring and 
supervising bodies should reasonably increase bad debts tolerance of small to 
micro-sized enterprises; Encourage and guide financial institutions to increase 
the funding amount and percentage; Large banks shall set special division to 
provide financial services to small to micro-sized enterprises. Some members 
hold doubtful opinions towards the draft as it seems to be impractical but only a 
formality. More details in how to implement is a challenge. Sixth, many members 
pointed out the needs of building a good legal environment for SMEs, and the 
importance of having systematic risk control mechanism for SMEs, such as 
mandatory legal counsels within the enterprises, establish mechanisms to 
review and monitor important activities, establish corporate contract 
management mechanisms, enhance legal training et cetera. There are many 
issues in need of review and corrected in the draft, and a lot of work and 
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3.5 Chinese Legal System and Corporate Governance in China 
 
Salama and Putnam’s research shows that the corporate financial outcomes are 
affected by the efficiency of governance mechanisms.178 Their hypothesis was 
evidenced by the sample of annual observations from 2002 to 2006 of 5,985 
firms, which proved that in the level of global diversification, the more efficient 
corporate governance mechanisms that companies have, the better financial 
outcomes and corporate investments that companies will achieve.179  However, 
China has not operated corporate governance for a reasonably lengthy period, 
the laws and regulations are relatively recent and require professional 
practitioners and experience lawmakers in the field to monitor and improve the 
laws and regulations, as well as developing practice guidance. Improvements 
have been taking place, however, the challenges have not been overcome. 
 
For one challenge of corporate governance in China is the legal system. The 
Party aims to build a legal system with Chinese socialist characteristics, 
combined with China’s fast-growing economy in the context of its political 
environment and social/cultural customs. Bernhardt and Huang commented that 
Chinese law was much in the codes and model case records, thus scholars have 
examined China’s laws for its unique Chinese characteristics.180 However, not 
                                            
178 Salama F M and Putnam K, “The Impact of Corporate Governance on the Financial 
Outcomes of Global Diversification”, (2013) 48, The International Journal of Accounting, 364-
389. 
179 Ibid.  
180 The civil matters here as Bernhardt and Huang discussed, as the civil law regulated 
matters in contemporary Chinese law, “minshi” (民事), in contrast with “xingshi” （刑事）, 
regulating the matters between equal private parties, or people’s matters. The term had 
different scope of the matters: In the Republican civil code, followed by the general principles, 
there were four sections: obligations, ownership rights, family, and inheritance; In the Qing 
code, it was named as “minor matters” (xishi), which was similar to the Republican civil code 
term “people’s matters”. Mainly was included in the “household law”, and in the categories of 
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much guidance or laws has been written about regulating the practical 
operations. The corporate governance is written in law but practice is not as 
operated in other advanced countries, the reason is often because China’s laws 
are influenced by several factors, such as social and cultural ideology, historical 
development, custom et cetera.  
 
In terms of operating the corporate governance properly by laws and the 
importance to the business activities in China, there is a major factor that we 
cannot omit – the social history impacts. The Chinese public have been used to 
obey the ruling authority for over two thousand years of history, it requires 
adaptions to the new and modern influences from democracy and freewill. With 
the new economic reform and legal reform, as well as fast changing social 
customs, there has been the development of more issues. The social and 
cultural impacts are the factors that need to be considered in operating efficient 
corporate governance in practice. Without considering these factors, corporate 
governance operation might be adapted in a way as an old Chinese idiom “上有
政策 下有对策” (which the direct translation is “policies given from the higher 
level, a plan created from the lower level” saying that there must be a way to go 
around policies). What could happen is, people find the policies hard to adapt, 
then they might appear to act according to the laws because they have to, but 
not necessarily apply it in practice in the true spirit of the underlying policy. The 
corporate governance rules in China currently are transplanted from other 
                                            
debt, markets, land and houses; marriage, succession and family divisions. The term was 
defined in a similar way in the Qing code and the Republican civil code. Bernhardt K and 
Huang P C C (eds.) “Civil Law in Qing and Republican China: The Issues” in Civil Law in Qing 
and Republican China (Stanford University Press 1994). 
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countries and combined with the Chinese Company Act, leading to a learning 
process in the context of Chinese culture and adaptation. Thus, from academic 
perspective, research on the experience and effectiveness of corporate 
governance in advanced countries is useful in terms of formulating Chinese laws 
and requirements for now. But the need for a deeper investigation into what 
works best for the Chinese business and corporate sector and then making 
appropriate laws, regulations and guidelines remains a challenge. 
 
The social issues existing in society are the matters that laws and regulations 
were created for. The importance of social relationships in Chinese society is a 
fundamental aspect to understanding Chinese laws. The social relationship 
practice is an important cultural factor that lawmakers consider during the 
process of making laws and regulations. For instance, Inheritance Law regulates 
the inheritance matters, which is an enormously important social relation in 
Chinese society. Meanwhile, the inheritance matter, such as succession issue, 
is a very crucial aspect in family business study therefore also important for the 
theories of corporate governance. For the better purposes that laws served, 
understanding the social and cultural contexts is crucial to lawmakers. Another 
example is the shareholder protection issue, as another important aspect in 
corporate governance, and even as one of the reflections of corporate 
governance principles – transparency, is difficult to be operated without creating 
laws which consider relevant social aspect. It may be for the social reasons as 
follows: 1) in the case of the large enterprises, one social custom is diulian 
(“losing face”), so they would not like the negative effects when such incidents 
happen to damage their reputation, therefore they normally bury the conflicts; 2) 
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in the case of the small to medium-sized companies, it is very common to lack 
transparency, the closed nature of such firms is the issue. As Ho et al. stated, 
that Chinese business people (here may be referring to private businesses from 
the content of the article) see secrecy as “a competitive edge, becoming 
completely transparent in business dealings may be initially challenging in the 
Chinese context”.181 Particularly in the family businesses, this issue has been a 
barrier to operating the transparency principle of corporate governance. 
Transparency is an existing value in many societies that operating by the “rule 
of law”. Maybe for the above reasons, transparency has always been an 
important requirement in the regulations of corporate governance.   
 
3.5.1 Rule of Man and Rule of Law 
 
Shi argues that China has been ruled under the “rule of man” for more than 
2,000 years.182 To be specific, people have always grown with the Confucianism 
notion.183 It sometimes the case that Confucian norms could be prioritised above 
the laws. In contrast, many countries operate based on the “rule of law”184, which 
                                            
181 Ho D, Lau A and Young A, supra n 117, 577. 
182 Shi C, “International corporate governance developments: The path for China” (2005) 7 
(1), The Australian Journal of Asian Law, 60-94. 
183 Confucian notion of the ‘virtuous man’ whereby loyalty is highly prized, especially within the 
family businesses. 
184 “Rule of law refers to a system in which law is able to impose meaningful restraints on the 
state and individual members of the fulling elite, as captured in the … notions of a government 
of laws, the supremacy of the law, and equality of all before the law.” Wang raised the point of 
being in the context of the contemporary China, it would be socialist ‘rule of law’ that China 
develops. “...socialist rule of law is embedded in a socialist market economy (in which public 
ownership plays a leading role in the markets); a non-democratic system of governance in 
which the CCP monopolises political power; and a rights protection regime which puts social 
stability above individual rights, and subsistence above civil and political rights.” Peerenboom 
R, China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law (CUP 2002) in Black E A and Bell G F (eds.), 
supra n 119, 25. Nevertheless, it is noticeable that different countries may apply different 
definitions of “rule of law”, such as Singapore, that it is not the version based on the liberal 
democratic model but by efficient and incorrupt government. 
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is a common practice for other countries. It requires people to control their 
misbehaviours and the law should be prioritised when the moral notion is 
conflicted with the law (when people tend to or have broken the law, should be 
following the law not the human moral rules). Although, politically planned by 
the CPC central leadership that China is aiming to achieve “rule of law”, it seems 
to be a long way to achieve it,185 as commented by Ho et al., “it is unrealistic to 
expect China to quickly apply the Rule of Law.”186 
 
Apart from the social rooted reasons and the priority of economic reform from 
government, which are the factors that prevent China operate “rule of law”.187 
Zhu also raised another important fact – legal procedure. “It is absolutely 
necessary for China to stress the role of procedural law in the course of 
establishing the rule of law because emphasising the rule of law means 
                                            
185 In my opinion, it is going to be a long way to achieve “rule of law” due to “rule of man” 
rooted deeply in tradition and culture in China. As defined by Black and Bell, “Custom, as 
norms that formed naturally in a culture over time…”. Custom is also recognised as a source 
of law, particularly for commercial and civil disputes in China. Black E A and Bell G F (eds.), 
supra n 119, 10. At the meantime, because China has not achieved a high level of legalism, it 
is difficult to apply ‘rule of law’ until economic development, corruption control and other 
aspects get under controlled to a certain level. 
186 Ho D, Lau A and Young A supra n 117. Although it is commented as unrealistic, the nation 
of China is positive and determinate to achieve “rule of law”. Peerenboom R, supra n 184, 24-
61. 
187 Black E A and Bell G F (eds.), supra n 119, 21. They have indicated that the trend of China 
progressing towards legal reform through modernization and Westernisation, in which judicial 
independence, supremacy of the rule of law, judicial reform and political and civil rights are 
promoted. However, the consequences would be to reduce the Communist Party’s authority 
and legitimacy. Chinese prominent leaders have tried to keep the trend under their control to 
avoid that consequence. As former President Hu Jintao announced in 2007, with the “Three 
Supremes”, that “…from now on, judicial reform must adhere to the leadership of the 
Communist Party of China; be conducted within the boundaries of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics; accord with the developmental stage of Chinese society; and ensure that 
there is effective coordination between organs of bureaucracy and levels of government. Any 
reform must comply with existing laws, and foreign elements are to be borrowed with caution 
to ensure they fit with China’s indigenous conditions.” On the other hand, some positive 
moves, such as legalising open trials, are developed as part of the legal reform. Thus, the 
conclusion is the Party is trying to develop a legal system with Chinese characteristics for 
modern China. It can be seen as a balance act between legal reform and the role of the 
Communist Party. 
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emphasising legal procedure.” 188  He further stated that procedure must be 
emphasised if the “rule of law” is raised and noticed, and the procedural law is 
a milestone of the legal reform achievements. Legal reform is a reflection of all 
the reforms that happen in economy, social and cultural, even political aspects 
for China. Meanwhile, the level of emphasising procedural law is also important. 
The procedural law may have the down sides of influencing the substantial 
rights. One issue that should be raised here - one of the obstacle factors of 
adopting the foreign governance laws is the judicial precedents that China does 
not recognize. It is important at this juncture to understand that concepts of the 
rule of law in China are not quite the same as in many developed countries. 
Indeed, in the early years of reform there was a debate between rule through or 
by law in contrast to “rule of law”189 In reality, China’s court system has a low 
political status. The courts lack the status and authority of Western legal 
institutions. For example, they do not have the capacity to enforce awards or 
compel the production of evidence. The courts, especially local courts, often 
take a very parochial view in that they often resist enforcement of judicial awards 
from outside their jurisdiction. This is a reflection of traditions of localism and 
also the importance of personal relations as the basis for behaviour. As part of 
this attitude, the judicial process of ascertaining facts both through internal 
process and informally as well as the decisions made leave parties to legal 
proceedings vulnerable to the political connections of their adversaries and 
abuse of power. 
 
In addition to this, the CCP still plays a dominant if not central role in the courts’ 
                                            
188 Zhu J W, supra n 115, 102. 
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processes through the Adjudication Committees attached to each court. Despite 
official directions ordering the limitation of this committee’s intervention they 
continue to review and approve (or otherwise) judicial decisions.190 Usually 
chaired by the Party Secretary for the court where they sit and with a 
membership of senior judges almost all of whom are Party members subject to 
Party discipline they usually work closely with local Party political-legal 
committees. Another factor is the local funding of the courts system leaving them 
potentially subservient to local political imperatives. In such an overall scenario, 
judicial corruption is often a serious problem.191 
 
The arguments marshalled in ideological conflict in relation to the rule of law in 
China are used both to subvert and legitimise the state sanctioned ideology 
often by using seemingly paradoxical arguments. In the context of China many 
of the arguments relating to the rule of law are perhaps better understood in 
terms of their intended and actual effects – a pragmatic and to some extent 
ideological approach – rather than viewing them as logical propositions and 
good faith arguments.192  One key aspect of the rule of law in China is the 
separation of the Party and the State. In this context, it has been argued that 
such a separation in the organisational sense is not possible in a foreseeable 
future.193  Such a view is arguably reinforced by the notorious “Document 9” 
(Communique on the current state of the ideological sphere) which was widely 
circulated among government party officials in 2013. It warns against several 
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Western liberal values including civil society, media freedom and independence 
of the judiciary. The document makes it clear that one party rule by the CCP 
remains paramount. In the light of the above discussion corporate governance, 
particularly in the family business will be largely influenced by political and 
personal connections to an extent greater than any legal framework or soft 
code.194 
  
3.5.2 Corporate Governance and China’s Reality  
 
Corporate governance, contains different understandings. Narrowly, it can be 
understood as the way that a company is directed and navigated195; Broadly, it 
can be “characterized as a system of checks and balances to ensure decision 
makers are accountable to stakeholders”. 196  Many theories have been 
developed in the field, and as Ho et al. summarised other scholars’ 
comments197,  
Several theories have emerged from an array of disciplines churning out diverse 
prescriptions for governance 198 . They are shaped by contextual considerations 
entrenched in different cultural and regulatory environments199. 
There were insufficient laws and regulations to catch up with the speed of 
economic development when China started the reform of its economy. 
                                            
194 Document 9 translated into English is available on the Chinafile website: 
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“Companies” were mainly restructured SOEs that were compelled to reform. 
Transplanting laws from Western jurisdictions that were experienced and 
advanced was considered to be the best solution. Nevertheless, there were 
problems during the process of the transplantation into Chinese communist 
society and culture. For instance, Western laws have generally been operated 
in a market economy whereas China was just opening up and on the path of 
developing a socialist economy with Chinese characteristics. Under these 
complex circumstances, to adapt Western laws with capitalism elements (even 
models based on Germany’s communitarian capitalist corporate law) into 
socialist society and with underlying Asian cultural elements would be 
completely different and challenging. Given the differences between the 
countries and legal systems, transplantation caused issues for China and the 
market characterized with Chinese factors. For instance, shareholders’ rights 
protection, as Ho et al. commented, there are more questions raised for 
shareholders than there were answers during the transplant process.200 
 
As the result of the economic reform, laws and regulations were rushed into 
force in order to implement and regulate rapid economic changes, especially in 
restructuring the SOEs that underperformed, and the rapid raise of private 
enterprises. Lawmakers in China dedicated efforts on such regulations. For 
instance, the Company Law that came into force on 1st July 1994, was the 
principal national law to regulate limited companies. The Company Law 
regulates limited liability companies and joint stock companies. According to Ho 
et al., 1.2 million limited liability companies and 10 thousand joint stock 
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companies existed by the end of 2004.201 Thereafter, the first major amendment 
entered into force on 1st January 2006, and the second major amendment 
became effective on 28th December 2013, on the day that the Standing 
Committee published it. 
 
3.5.3 Chinese Enterprises Development  
 
Period Missions or Achievements 
Late 1950s 
The goal of Chinese leadership was to develop 
economy, as the economy was declining and the 
creditability was threatened for Chinese leadership. 
In 1960s 
Series of complex plans was set out to foster 
miserable economy situation. The industries were 
inefficient and lack of developing abilities. 
 





Individual enterprises (those individual 
proprietorships and small household businesses, 
which having less than seven workers) grew with 
an outstanding rate, estimated 300 in 1978 to 
21,866 in 1994. 
Private enterprises (those employing more than 
seven workers) were estimated from 41,000 in 
1978, increased to 432,000 in 1994. An economist 
commented the situation, that the non-stated sector 
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was an important role for Chinese economy after 
15 years of hard work on developing the economy. 
By the late 1970s 
The priority for China and the Party was 
modernizing economy. 
In early 1980s 
To improve the efficiency and profitability of State-
owned enterprises, government allowed 
consolidating enterprises. 
The government encouraged more co-operations 
between enterprises (joint ventures with foreign 
firms was encouraged as well at the time). 
Decentralization and relaxing policies on State-
owned enterprises decision-making powers. 
In 1988 
The government recognised the importance of 
private enterprises. In addition, it was written into 
the Constitution as “the private enterprise is a 
necessary and beneficial addition in modernizing 
the economy” 
In 1990 and 1991 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges market 
opened. 
Legal reforms began to process quickly. More 
corporations got involved to the development. 
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In 2001 
China joined the WTO, which was crucial to evident 
the economic liberalization of China. 
 
At a micro economic level, Chinese companies have faced challenges before 
2001, mainly because of the SOEs reform. According to Wang, the managers 
working in SOEs had to change from obeying the guideline from the government 
to operating independently, they also had to represent shareholders’ interests 
instead of the interests of the government (though often the government was a 
major shareholder). 202  In contrast, at the macro level, SOEs were 
underperforming compared with the private sector. Based on the data from the 
Asian Development Bank, between 1993 to 2001, private enterprises grew with 
a rate of 32 per cent, however, the jobs they provided were 24 million which was 
only 26 per cent of the market.203 At that time, Company Law and relevant 
regulations only could protect equal parties such as individuals or legal persons 
but not the interests of public against the nation’s assets.  
 
The growth of private enterprises and the economic growth as well as the 
benefits for public were obvious. Apart from the contribution and importance of 
private enterprises, one issue for private enterprises is the investment. Money 
has always been an issue for private enterprises in China compared with SOEs, 
during and after the reform. Government-owned banks provide sufficient funds 
to SOEs. Under the strict standard procedures from the banks, private 
enterprises had to choose to access funds from different sources, which 
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sometimes were not always regulated by the regulations and laws but not illegal 
either. Research indicated that the issue was partially caused by the weak 
governance of the enterprises, and also the property rights (it did not exist until 
Property Law came effective on the 1st October 2007). Maramuto concluded that 
the lack of growth for private enterprises was because of the absence of legal 
guarantees. 204  Chen also commented that the legal reform was hardly 
contributing to stimulate this matter for further growth.205 
 
SOEs were the main and initial change that China made for economic reform, it 
was also the main focus for Chinese corporate governance. Indeed, as 
discussed by Tam and Ho et al., SOEs privatization strongly influenced Chinese 
corporate governance.206 One key issue concerned access to capital through 
banks and the stock market. Tam pointed out the importance of having an 
outsider as a protection for minority shareholders in Anglo-American model.207 
However, Chinese SOEs had many scandals of fraud and abusing companies’ 
assets for personal purposes that committed by directors and managers in most 
listed SOEs in China by 2001.208 In Chinese historical and social customs, 
corruption was not only committed by directors and managers, it was highly 
possible that other government officials were involved. On the 7th Plenary 
Session in 2007 of 16th CCP Central Committee Meeting, Du Shicheng, who 
was the former Mayer of Qingdao and the Party deputy secretary in Shandong 
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province, was found guilty of bribery (6.3 million yuan from 2000 to 2006)209. 
Qingdao is an important city with rapid economy development and an important 
port for China, Du was expelled from the Party for alleged corruption. Although 
the details of the accusation are lack of records, being expelled from the Party 
is so-called “internal punishment” in China. Being a member of the Communist 
Party has a privilege of reducing legal sentences when political status was 
removed if party members make mistakes (such as corruptions). Being expelled 
from the Communist Party is a very shameful punishment but not a legal 
punishment.  Some party members made mistakes and were expelled from the 
party with lower legal sentences within the lawful range. It is hard to prove how 
and what exactly the process is, but the situation exists. Corruption involving 
government officials was more controlled and the situation improved since Hu 
Jintao’s governing time.210 Moreover, the former manager of the China National 
Nuclear Corporation Kang Rixin was expelled from the Party for corruption and 
graft during the 5th Plenary Session of the 17th CPC Central Committee Meeting 
in 2010. It was disclosed that the corruption involved central Party officials and 
the weakness of the social factors. The plenary further explored the weakness 
of the operation of corporate governance in China.  
 
Corporate governance challenge in China is not a simple legal, managerial issue 
in my view, it is rather a complex result of the society and culture change, rapid 
economic growth and legal reform. As the central government mostly put efforts 
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in SOEs for the corporate governance issue, the private sector was neglected, 
which led private enterprises to mostly adopt other solutions for survival, such 
as using guanxi for business operations. The statement made by Tomasic and 
Fu strongly indicates this: 
All of these laws have reflected a considerable degree of central government control 
and have had limited impact on the organization of business activity in China. 
Historically, Chinese governments have not encouraged commerce, perhaps due to 
the long-standing policy of national isolation and what some have described as a 
Confucian disdain for the world of business. This meant that the state provided 
minimal protection for private business, so that, by default, the family and the 
relationships of trust became a more secure basis for business activity than formal 
bodies of law, such as company law.211 
 
Therefore, as we can understand, historical custom of guanxi has been used to 
protect relevant parties’ interests rather than using legal actions. This is the 
reason for and also the result of China’s social context, culture, law and 
economy general environment. Further discussion about guanxi will be made in 
the thesis. 
 
3.6 Chinese Company Law 
 
Chen stated that the stock market and consumer product markets contributed 
to legal changes.212 Under the impacts from market and consumer product 
markets, the legislation in company law has formed in 20th century in China. 
Although Chinese Company Law was transplanted mainly from Japan and 
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Europe, influenced by Taiwan, US, the modern Company Law has some 
strengths from the legal perspective. For instance, the regulations of 
shareholders’ rights appear to be strong. In contrast with many scholars’ views, 
Ho et al. concluded after examining 35 works of leading scholars in China that 
were written before and after the central government amended the Company 
law, they found that China did adapt the Anglo-American model, and the 
shareholders’ rights are more advanced than some of the Common Law system 
countries, obviously China does realize that the shareholders’ rights need to be 
strengthened, demonstrated from two points:  
Shareholders decide business policies. Shareholders can inspect board decisions.213  
 
The two demonstrations can be found as Article 34 in Company Act 2005 which 
is the Article 33 in new Company Act 2013, and Article 38 in Company Act 2005 
which is the Article 37 in new Company Act 2013. This Article was seen as the 
unique Chinese regulation that is quite different from other common law 
regulations considering that Western common law systems do not encourage 
shareholders’ interference in board decisions. 214  Ho et al. discussed the 
separation of ownership and management control as Berle and Means’ model 
was the proof of the concept in common law system.215 In family businesses, 
especially in the context of China, the owners always are the ones retaining 
control of the firms.  
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Article 33 allows shareholders to examine board decisions. 216  There are 
different explanations or assumptions from scholars regarding to the reason of 
having this article. Some argue that being aware of the decisions of the board is 
a responsibility of shareholders since they are the ones that decide business 
policies.217 Some argue that as the owners of the companies, it is common that 
they should be informed (including informed and updated).218 It is very much in 
the centre of the debates. First, do shareholders of limited liability companies 
(LLCs) have the rights to inspect the board decisions? Also, what level of 
shareholders might have the rights to do so? Second, if the information of the 
LLCs and boards safe to be inspected? What about issues of confidentiality? 
Third, if the shareholders have inspections, would they have enough knowledge 
to void the decisions? Fourth, what about the efficiency of the business 
operations if the shareholders inspect too much of the board decisions? Legal 
theories do not provide suggestions on the challenges. However, most 
shareholders do not have much interest in relation to the business policies 
unless some serious incidents happen, and board decisions mostly are 
undertaken by those who are the controlling seats.  
 
To summarise, China has a blended socialist and market economy which is 
unique in the world. That has created a unique legal system, with many rules 
adapted from other jurisdictions. China needs to complete the legal reform 
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217 Zhang C S, Explanations of the Chinese company law (Chang Chun Press 2005) and Xu A 
B, Chinese company law explanations (Village Reading Materials Press 2005) in Ho D, Lau A 
and Young A, supra n 117. 
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process to achieve “rule of law” in future. The improvements are continually 
made to better serve the objectives with each amendment. The legislation of 
Company Law 2005 indicates the Chinese government’s desire to attract 
investment and foreign investors. These investors interests have been the drive 
for China’s legal reform. The cycle of demand and serve really has challenged 
the traditional Chinese legal culture.219 The newest amendment in 2013 further 
shows the central government aims to prepare Chinese Company Act to 
develop to a level and similarity with other Company Acts in more advanced 
countries.  
 
The newest amendment took place at the 6th meeting of the 12th Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress on the 28th December 2013. This 
amendment was not planned in advance as part of the annual legal reform 
scheme, but was drafted and reviewed in a very short time frame. This showed 
the new government’s determination to conduct a revolution of capital 
registration for companies, especially for small companies, as they are the major 
objects of the big changes.220 For the details of the changes, please refer to 
Appendix 2. 
 
The new amendment is another major change in 20 years since the last big 
change, there are 12 changes in this amendment and the order of articles has 
adjustments as well.221 In summary, the major changes include:  
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1) Sub-article 1 in Article 26, sub-article 1 in Article 81: The amendment 
removed the requirement of paying registered capital in full within 2 years 
(general companies) and 5 years (investment companies) and the minimum 
amount of the registered capital of a company with limited liability has been 
removed as well.222 
2) Sub-article 1 in Article 59: The amendment removed the requirements of the 
minimum amount of the registered capital 100,000 Chinese Yuan and shall 
make the capital contributions in one lump sum as stipulated by the articles 
of association of a one-person company with limited liability.223 
3) Sub-article 3 in Article 27: The amendment removed “The amount of capital 
contributions made by all of the shareholders in currency shall not be less 
than 30 per cent of the registered capital of a company with limited liability.” 
It benefits the investors or shareholders who might invest with intellectual 
property instead of paying actual cash to a certain percentage.224   
4) Impacts over foreign investment enterprises: This amendment leads to 
whether remove the existing the Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, the Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on Sino-Foreign Joint Cooperative Ventures, the 
Law of the People’s Republic of China on Wholly Foreign-owned Enterprises 
in China, amend these laws and ensuring the consistency of the laws with 
current amendments will be eventually carried out. But the current complex 
of different authorities with power over foreign related rules will remain 
unchanged until further amendments to be carried out in future. Foreign 





involved capital registration will be stricter compared with the ones without 
foreign capital involvement.225 
 
The new amendment shows that capital contribution will not be required to be 
recorded as a part of company’s registration, and authority will not assess the 
initial registered capital. There is no need to record the company business 
license. However, shareholders must still contribute capital according to the 
company's articles of association. Potentially, the change might lead to the 
problems of forged capital contribution and the general investing public’s lack of 
knowledge and experience in recognizing such forgeries. To resolve this, 
reliance on local authorities to regulate or use credit check platforms for the 
investing public to check the companies’ actual capital. The credit check of the 
companies will help would be investors or potential trade partners to prevent any 
forgery, but it still requires companies to build up their own credits. The change 
is a significant movement putting the responsibility on the public and companies 
to build up the credits and actively check the companies’ credits by themselves 
instead of authorities regulating companies’ capital by laws and regulations. 
Until recently the investing public used to focus very much on the claimed 
registered capital amount. On the other hand, the change gives company’s 
articles of association strong legal bond for shareholders. It potentially gives 
shareholders power to supervise each other according to their agreements.226 
 
However, amendments in sub-article 2 in Article 26 and sub-article in Article 81 
clearly state exceptions by laws, “The provisions otherwise prescribed by laws, 
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administrative regulations and the decisions of the State Council on the actual 
payment of registered capital and the minimum registered capital of a limited 
liability company shall prevail.” It reserves the right of regulating minimum 
registered capitals from State Council in future.227 
 
The change of removing minimum registered capital requirements may 
encourage a lot more one-person limited liability companies and limited liability 
companies by shares entering into the market. Currently, the limited liability 
companies by shares are more recognized by public as bigger companies, 
therefore it needs to be corrected and adjusted because how companies 
perform has no relation to the registered capital.228 
 
The changes of registered capital simplify the procedures of company 
incorporation as well as capital increase. It makes the incorporation and 
changes easier for the companies. The new amendment follows the trend of 
advanced countries’ Companies Acts, by lowering the standard of incorporation, 
reducing the liability of the shareholders and investors. This development goes 
a long way towards encouraging investment and entrepreneurs.229  
 
China’s corporate governance and law reform face great challenges in China’s 
in the context of its social and cultural inheritance, economic development and 
its political system mixture. Since the central government aims to build a market 
economy with Chinese and socialist characteristics, and the legal system must 





reflect those socialist characteristics, it is arguable that it is not possible to simply 
transplant laws and regulations from well-established countries anymore. China 
needs to develop a different legal system and find a unique path. From now on 
and in future, China may be able to develop a legal system and become an 
example as Zhu commented, “the formation of the socialist legal system with 
Chinese characteristics has laid the practical foundations for studying the 
structure, features and trends of China’s legal system.”230 But only by examining 
the legal system and making law with a better understanding of the Chinese 
structures and features, social and cultural context will this prove possible. The 
analysis that researchers obtained from studying the Chinese legal system 
would be beneficial for understanding and exploring the revolution in legal 
systems.  
 
Meanwhile, China’s reform is an example of a developing legal system and 
adapting the system along with unique market and economic situations. It 
indicates that the laws and regulations are possible to adapt to different 
situations despites the challenges. Examining the case of China offers legal 
professionals a different perspective of legal systems, and the importance of 





As the largest governing party in control of one of the largest countries in the 
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world, CCP needs to protect its political control whilst protecting its people. For 
the reason that China has been and has fought hard to be a socialist country, 
CCP did not want to repeat what happened in the Soviet Union nor change into 
a capitalist country. Therefore, a unique reform in its economy and society has 
happened. Opportunists took advantages by connecting with government 
officials or SOEs managers for personal favours, such as purchasing some parts 
of SOEs’ businesses for a very cheap price then operating them to gain huge 
profits during the reform of SOEs. The government officials gained financial 
favour in the process. They formed a good relationship to use political 
connection to benefit both at the same time, whereas the state’s assets were 
damaged. It is still going on at present, but the forms of “connecting” have 
changed.  
 
Corruption has been a core aspect for China during its thousands of years of 
history. Since Imperial times to the present, the governing bodies try hard to 
control or prevent it from happening. However, corruption comes wherever 
guanxi exists, political power is a very useful and strong guanxi connection for 
gaining huge benefits in all aspects. All Chinese businesses desire to work with 
government for financial security. Guanxi is considered to be very useful in this 
regard. This has always been the case in history. Although dynasties have risen 
and fallen, guanxi has always existed for the Chinese, regardless of whether 
they are carrying on business in or outside of China.  
 
Since CCP started opening up the country and reforming, the legal system has 
been developed politically and very differently from other countries. To some 
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extent, the social development is not as fast as those in the spheres of economic 
and the legal reform. This kind of imbalance would cause a decline of ideology 
and in some senses a temporary mess. Therefore, amidst the rapid economic 
development, corruptions and various forms misbehaviours occurred. As a 
result, the central government has tried to take control of the direction of 
development as stated by an idiom “having a driver on the driver seat of a high-
speed car” to keep it on the path. This includes strictly punishing corrupted 
government officials. Apparently, China has initially achieved the system in 
decades that Western legal system has had for hundreds of years, as Zhu 
commented that “it is absolutely beyond the power of Maine’s”.231 In the past 
twenty years, there have been many Communist Party members who were 
expelled or sentenced for their corrupt behaviour, especially in the last five years 
since Xi Jinping became the leader of CCP. 
 
The details of guanxi will be discussed later in the thesis as a separate chapter. 
The purpose of briefly discussing here is mainly to discuss the legal system and 
guanxi. In brief, although legislation is formulated, guanxi is still commonly used. 
“it is the key to everything: securing a business license, landing a distribution 
deal, even finding that coveted colonial villa in Shanghai”, as Balfour stated.232 
In a normal development process, naturally things will have a normal cycle, but 
guanxi has not declined nor disappeared after thousand years but continue to 
develop into new forms. It even has impacts over the foreign businesses 
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expanding into China. No one could neglect the power of guanxi, and it has been 
recognized as one of the most important social customs for conducting business 
activities in China. Taiwanese call capitalism as “guanxi capitalism”233 and in 
post-socialist Russia 234 . The loose translation of guanxi into English is 
“connections” but this does not do justice as to how guanxi is used in the 
Chinese context. It exists in various forms everywhere in the world, but Chinese 
use it to a more unimaginable extent. The reason that guanxi is so important for 
Chinese might be because it has the power that operates beyond many other 
social customs in my view. It sometimes operates above the law is one.  
 
When corruption involves the ordinary people, the law will punish based on the 
crime they committed, however, when it comes to the government officials who 
are the Party members, the punishment is slightly different. The first punishment 
would be CCP internal punishment, which is the “expel from the Party” if the 
corruption is severe. Then, it would be the punishment according to the law. 
However, the sentences at the latter stage would be lighter in most cases 
considering they have been expelled from the Party, which is a very “harsh” 
punishment. It might be hard to understand, but it is a fact. Unless, there are 
political reasons for not lowering the sentences, or during the time of yanda “严
打” (it is a period of time during which the central government orders all legal 
departments to punish criminals with heavier sentences). However, the 
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sentencing process within the Party of making decisions is not open, so it does 
cause debates and doubts in media and among public in some cases. 
Ho et al. expressed the view that Chinese legislation does act to lessen 
guanxi,235 as one of the purposes of legal reform and a step of achieving China’s 
“rule of law” goal. However, it is still doubtful when “rule of law” will be achieved. 
In thousand years, China has always been a “relation-based”236 country. From 
the research and evidences that scholars examined and discussed, China will 
not change the governance mechanism for a long term, even if China tries to 
change. In my view, it is the consequence that legal reform is imbalanced with 
the rapid economy and social changes. To balance up the process, finding a 
suitable social and cultural ideology is needed. Lessening the impact of guanxi 
and achieving the aim of “rule of law” requires changes in ideology and culture 
of the Chinese. This is not going to be easy for this strong historically rooted 
custom. The challenges for legal system are also deeply rooted in the social and 
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Chapter 4 Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Analysis  
 
4.1 Vulnerability of Small Businesses 
 
The global financial crises have occurred over the last couple of centuries and 
more recently in 2008. They have highlighted the vulnerability of small 
businesses in economic downturns, particularly in relation to their ability to raise 
capital, especially loan capital.237 In this environment, small businesses face 
difficulties, particularly during the times of economic crisis and the recovery 
period. The instability in the market and the uncertainties that are caused by 
financial crises and their aftermath make small businesses vulnerable.238 There 
are various national and international economic, financial and business research 
publications which have focused on the impact that financial crisis has on small 
businesses.239 However, analyses through the lens of law and regulation are not 
so common. 240  Finance and other support for small businesses could be 
accessed through legal frameworks.241 As most research has been focusing on 
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the role of small businesses in the context of the economic environment rather 
than on legal aspects, it could be beneficial for small businesses if the research 
concentrated more on enhancing their financial access based on the market 
changes. Creating potentially better legal vehicles could help small businesses 
to survive, to respond to changes in the business environment more flexibly and 
adapt to varying market conditions and environments. However, some argue 
that a tailored legal vehicle for small businesses (in the UK context) is a 
misconceived idea as existing forms are more than sufficient and much depends 
on the entrepreneur’s desire to build and enlarge the business or remain 
small.242 Indeed, some commentators have argued, by analogy to eco-systems, 
that a greater number of flora and fauna, in this context legal business vehicles, 
will ensure a greater survival and development rate as economic circumstances 
change. They define the role of organisational law as “establishing the rights 
and responsibilities of all stakeholders concerning an organisation in order to 
mitigate uncertainty for those stakeholders”.243 
 
4.2 Overview of Corporate Governance and Circumstances in China 
 
UK corporate governance system is a well-developed one, others include the 
US, Germany and Japan244. According to some commentators the US system 
of corporate governance is one where large investors often take a more active 
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involvement with long-term interests in businesses. 245  Though the Anglo-
American system, often based on suggestions arising out of Agency theory is 
regularly criticised for its short termism other theories are also influential. 
Whereas, China is one of the East Asian countries having a relationship-based 
corporate governance system.246 Moreover, China has been seen as a country 
with a “bad corporate governance operation”, although China is recognised as 
the second largest economy in the world.247 The reason might be the culture, 
society and history of China itself.248 Furthermore, as Thomsen and Conyon 
commented, corporate governance in China has undergone dramatic changes 
since the 1980s, arguably because of the capital market reforming process.249 
Since 1978 China’s “open door” policy achievement, the economy has grown 
rapidly, the GDP growth rate as an assessment of overall trade increased from 
approximately 8% in 1977 to 35% in 1999, and has continually grown until the 
worldwide financial crisis in 2008. 250  Whilst China had transplanted some 
aspects of Western corporate laws, the changes in corporate governance did 
not follow the path of other major common law systems such as the US.251 The 
reason might be that China has discovered the importance of corporate 
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governance and has attempted to some extent to apply its theories and 
regulations in practice but under the governance of the CPC, whose ideological 
aim is to develop the market as “a market economy with unique Chinese socialist 
characteristic”252. Therefore, corporate governance in China is at a relatively 
immature stage but does not necessarily deserve the label “bad”, but rather the 
label “unique” as it follows its own path dependency.  
 
The legislature obviously needs to have a deeper understanding of corporate 
governance theories and regulations, and properly consider Chinese cultural 
and historical ideology in order to form a clearer guidance for enterprises with 
better standards of practice. During the process, it requires a cautious approach 
rather than control enterprises in a heavy-handed manner. I would submit that 
in order to apply corporate governance theories, CPC and all levels of 
government need to enhance their knowledge and understanding of businesses.  
 
Since the early 2000s, there have been various legal reforms in China.253 The 
purpose was for corporate governance arrangements to improve, for investors 
to have sufficient confidence to invest and to show that China has been aiming 
to balance the political and economic influences254. Thomsen and Conyon argue 
that the recent corporate governance innovations have increased transparency 
and strengthened owners’ rights at certain points.255 However, ownership is still 
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largely in the concentrated form in China, which means the rights of minority 
shareholders will continually be an issue to consider.256  
 
Based on the current situation, applying good corporate governance practice is 
still very difficult, especially in the case of SOEs, the unique characteristic of 
government that controls the ownership, often presents most of the challenges. 
However, based on the situation that even the SOEs are applying corporate 
governance into the businesses, it appears that government has noticed the 
importance of having a good corporate governance system in businesses of all 
sizes, improving their performance and developing the economy. This chapter 
aims to examine small and medium-sized businesses, which in China mainly 
are family businesses. Therefore, the SOEs are not included in the discussions. 
The real problem is the attitude of officials to the private sector. 
 
The current trend for extending and developing businesses worldwide is 
attracting investment. Including foreign direct investment. With globalisation, it 
is important for businesses to attract investment. This is especially so in the case 
of China. The general direction of business development in China is adapting to 
the modern global economy to stabilise the market and enhance investor 
confidence 257 . Thus, applying corporate governance and improving it is a 
necessary step to reach the goal.  
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4.2.1 Corporate Governance and Firms 
 
Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
 
In general, and from all the aspects of the literature, corporate governance has 
been applied to practice and believed to be good for improving firm performance. 
There are different ways of applying corporate governance to solve the issues 
existing in firms based on individual cases and circumstances.258  
 
In many jurisdictions across the globe the majority of firms are family-controlled 
regardless of their size. From Canada to Hong Kong many listed companies are 
under family control. The research of File and Prince indicates that “Regardless 
of the definitions used, it is likely that family businesses represent the most 
prevalent form of enterprise in the United States…a significant proportion of the 
purchasing power in the U.S. market.”259 According to many prior studies, a 
significant proportion of the businesses in Asia and Europe are publicly listed 
family-controlled firms.260 Also Anderson and Reed concluded that one-third of 
publicly held firms in the US were classified as family controlled.261 Apart from 
these powerful and wealthy large family firms, small and medium-sized 
                                            
258 Business Roundtable, “Corporate Governance and American Competitiveness” (1990) 46 
Business Law, 241. Lawton P, “Berle and Means, Corporate Governance and the Chinese 
Family Firm” (1996) 6 Australian Journal of Corporate Law, 348, 349-350. 
259 File K M and Prince R A, “A Psychographic Segmentation of Industrial Family Business”, 
(1996) 25 (3), Industrial Marketing Management, 223-234, 224. Hall P D, “A Historical 
Overview of Family Business in the United States” (1988) I Family Business Review 193. 
Astrachan J H and Shanker M C, “Family Businesses’ Contribution to the US Economy: A 
Closer Look” (2003) XVI (3) Family Business Review, 211. 
260 Anderson R C and Reeb D M “Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: 
Evidence from the S&P 500”, (2003) 53, Journal of Finance, 1301-1328. Wong Y J, Chang S 
C and Chen L Y, “Does a Family-controlled Firm Perform Better in Corporate Venturing?” 
(2010) 18 (3), Corporate Governance: An International Review, 175-192. 
261 Anderson R C and Reeb D M, “Who Monitors the Family?” (2003) 5, available at SSRN: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=369620. (accessed 11 March 2014). 
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companies are mostly all family controlled, and they are the research subjects 
of this thesis.  
 
Furthermore, in relationship to firm performance and corporate governance, in 
general, Thomsen and Conyon find that group control rights have a negative 
impact on the performance. Ownership control mechanisms, derived mainly 
from pyramid ownership structures in China, enabling the owners to prioritise 
their interests before those of the shareholders.262 As discussed in Chapter 2 
pyramid ownership structures in family controlled firms were largely done away 
with in the UK under the influence of the stock exchange and institutional 
investors. 
 
They point out that it is important to note that the “underlying economic 
requirements to identify causal relationships are often difficult to isolate”263. This 
point reflects the view of some commentators, that corporate governance in 
China is mainly a “relationship based governance” system.264 In China, one of 
the key issues is the bureaucrat’s role impacting on enterprises. Politically 
connected CEOs in China can affect performance for the better or worse.265 
Private Chinese firms adopt a variety of corporate political strategies.266 There 
is research regarding the relationship between CEO turnover, firm performance 
and corporate governance. Research indicates that “poor performance in 
                                            
262 Ibid. Original statement was “enable the dominant owners to expropriate the value from 
minority shareholders or tunnel corporate resources for their own interest”. 
263 Thomsen S and Conyon M, supra n 249, 279. 
264 Ruskola T, supra n 246. 
265 Thomsen S and Conyon M, supra n 249, 279.  
266 For example, Ma H, Lin S and Liang N, Corporate Political Strategies of Private Chinese 
Firms (Routledge 2013). Shi C, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance in China 
(Routledge 2013). 
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China’s firms leads to greater than expected CEO turnover. This provides 
evidence that the proposed corporate governance reforms are effective”267. 
 
For instance, the research that Kato and Long did targeting circa 600 firms 
between 1998 and 2002, examined Chinese CEO turnover in a pooled cross-
section of data. 268  Their result did not show the correlation between CEO 
turnover and firm performance. Meanwhile, it also shows the importance of 
corporate governance arrangements. In conclusion, the evidence indicates that 
the internal governance of firms (in other words, the internal mechanisms of 
corporate governance) affect performance in a positive way.269 
 
In the debates of firm performance, the board of directors have a very crucial 
role in management. There have been managerial considerations of corporate 
governance in the 20th century focused very much on organisation theories and 
strategic management, as well as management of finance, marketing and 
operations, but relatively little on the role of the board. 270  As Bob Tricker 
commented on the importance of the board, “yet the board of directors of a 
company, indeed the governing body of every corporate entity, is ultimately 
responsible for that organisation’s decisions and its performance. It is the board 
that is accountable to the owners, members, and other legitimate stakeholders. 
The directors should be providing direction and supervising the work of 
executive management.”271 
                                            
267 Ibid. 
268 Kato T K and Long C X “Executive turnover and firm performance in China”, (2006) 96 (2), 
American Economic Review, 363-367. 
269 Thomsen S and Conyon M, supra n 249, 290. 
270 Tricker B, Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies, and Practices (OUP 2009), 7. 
271 Ibid. 
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Controlling Families and Corporate Governance Theories 
 
It is a commonly held view that in most emerging countries, a controlling family 
normally is the largest shareholder, and it controls the ownership of a firm.272 
Agency theory is one of the most important theories in the centre of corporate 
governance. Agency theory mainly exists in larger size of firms where the 
ownership and control are separated. The theory suggests the separation of 
ownership and control in public firms actually raises the potential conflicts of 
interests.273 In this sense, there are possibilities of personal interests being 
pursued at the expense of other constituencies in the company, for example, 
managers might pursue their own interests on the expenses of the interests of 
shareholders. 274  The reason that Agency theory has been examined so 
intensively and exclusively is largely because it widely applies in large firms, 
usually in the Anglo-American context. This is because their multinational 
companies are powerful and important in many economies worldwide. Other 
viable theories such as Coase’s theory of the firm and Richardson’s hybrid 
model appear to have been partially eclipsed in this regard.275 In recent years a 
number of theoretical perspectives have been developed in relation to family 
business ranging from Agency theory and Behavioural theory to combinations 
                                            
272 Claessens S, Djankov S and Lang H P, “The Separation of Ownership and Control in East 
Asian Corporations”, (2000) 58, Journal of Fianancial Economics, 81-112. Morck R, Wlfenzon 
D and Yeung B, “Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment and Growth”, (2005) 43, 
Journal of Economic Literature, 655-720. Wong, Chang and Chen, supra n 260. 
273 Jensen M C and Meckling W H “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, 
and Ownership Structure”, (1976) 3, Journal of Financial Economics, 305-360, in Wong, 
Chang and Chen, supra n 260. 
274 The studies show this opinion included Morck R, Shleifer A and Vishny R W, “Management 
Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis”, (1988) 20, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 293-315. Anderson R and Reeb D supra n 260 and 261. 
275 Coase R H, “The Nature of the Firm” (1937) 4 Economica (new series), 386-405. 
Richardson G B, “The Organisation of Industry” (1972) 82 (327) Economic Journal, 883-896. 
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thereof (for example, Behavioural Agency theory) to Kinship and Gender 
theories.276 More recent empirically based research examines whether Agency 
or Stewardship is the more effective form of managerial governance in family 
firms. The results indicated the greater effectiveness of stewardship over 
agency governance irrespective of a manager’s family affiliations.277  
 
In the case of family businesses (mainly in SMEs), the prior literature has 
suggested that family businesses might provide the solution for the agency 
problem.278 The major studies suggested that in family businesses, the large 
shareholders are normally the controlling families, and they have enough power 
and incentive that can monitor managerial decisions on daily basis. The 
controlling families are commonly involved with daily business management, 
therefore they are normally the force that efficiently reduce the conflicts between 
managers and shareholders.279 In this case, possibly larger firms could learn 
some operations that small and medium-sized businesses have, to adapt and 
apply to their own, to improve their business performance. Specifically, the 
studies show that family ownership may affect corporate venturing in a positive 
way.280 It might be because, commonly, family shareholders in the family firms, 
expect or at least have the intention to let their children inherit the businesses, 
                                            
276 For an overview of these theoretical approaches, Nordqvist M et al., supra n 6.  
277 James A E, Jennings J E and Jennings P D, “Is it Better to Govern Managers via Agency 
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Shleifer A and Vishny R W, supra n 244. 
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therefore, family firms invest more efficiently. Also, with the high family 
involvement in managerial decisions, they are more patient and cautious on 
making investment to business opportunities.281 There remains the problem of 
“tunneling” or the expropriation of value out of minority shareholders’ 
holdings.282 
 
Corporate Governance and Chinese Firms 
 
Thomsen and Conyon, examined the quality and consequences of corporate 
governance practices in the Fortune 100 largest listed Chinese firms in 2004, in 
regard to the aspects of the aggregate quality of corporate governance and 
disclosure practice, as measured by reference to the revised OECD Principles 
of Corporate Governance Index (CGI). The index is assembled as 90 questions 
probing the transparency, disclosure and rights of shareholders.283 The result 
they find is the differences in corporate governance quality and the firm 
performance – higher performance for better governance.  
 
In contrast, an important finding of Thomen and Conyon is that they found 
Chinese firms that listed overseas have better corporate governance, disclosure 
                                            
281 Westhead P and Cowling M, “Family Firm Research: The Need for a Methodological 
Rethinks”, (1998) 23, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 31-56; James H, “Owner as 
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Expropriation (Edward Elgar 2005). 
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and transparency compared with the Chinese firms that are not listed overseas. 
Nevertheless, they pointed out that the good performance was not necessarily 
caused by good corporate governance. They concluded that although Chinese 
corporate governance may have been improving, it has not brought up the 
Chinese companies’ market valuation.284  
 
Other Organisational Forms 
 
There are other substantial parts of corporate governance that are commonly 
raised in international contexts. Such as not-for-profit firms, government 
organisations, cooperatives, associations, mutual and foreign subsidiary firms. 
Some of these forms are large and listed, also play important roles in corporate 
governance. They exist globally, but research examining their governance is 
much less common. The reason that academic started to paying attention to is 
because the disclosure requirement that some of these public firms tended to 
meet, just over the last two decades.285 With the time, the research will be 
covering more parts of these forms in corporate governance subject.  
 
Of particular note one relatively unique organisational form in China – Township 
and Village-owned Enterprises – this organisational form does not exist 
elsewhere, and has attracted interest from scholars worldwide.  
 
                                            
284 Ibid. 
285 Ibid. 68. 
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The Nature of Township and Village-Owned Enterprises “乡镇企业” (xiangzhen 
qiye) 
 
Township and Village-owned enterprises in China are controlled by local 
governments (town and village level), but owned by local citizens.286 The reason 
for creating this type of ownership is because, 1) the governments can provide 
the security and resources to ensure the success of these enterprises; 2) solving 
the problem of local citizens’ low income and poor living conditions.287 This form 
has grown rapidly since the late 1970s, in 1993 only, these enterprises have 
produced about 40 per cent of the nation’s total industrial product and the 
employment of 112 million.288 In 1995, the sector has grown at the annual rate 
of more than 30 per cent, and produced 30 per cent of total GDP.289 In 2012, 
the development has reached to RMB 60 trillion in total, increased 9 per cent 
compared with the previous year, and provided 1.64 billion employment.290 
Therefore, the importance and the contribution of township and village-owned 
enterprises are significant. 
 
This structure in the enterprises has benefits for all relevant parties. The 
government, the controlling party, shares the benefits with citizens who are the 
                                            
286 Chang C and Wang Y J, “The Nature of the Township-Village Enterprise”, (1994) 19, 
Journal of Comparative Economics, 434-452. 
287 Ibid. 434. 
288 Ibid. 435. People’s Daily (Overseas Edition, 8th January 1994), 1.  
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 112 
owners of these enterprises. Local officials can enhance their political career by 
achieving economic growth locally and be recognised for their achievement by 
central government.291  Citizens win access to the key resources that other 
types of enterprises do not have, and improve their welfare. The control by local 
government is the main feature distinguishing this type of enterprise from others. 





In the opinion of many commentators, township and village-owned enterprises 
are one of the most important factors in China’s rapid growth since the late 
1970s.292 The developmental steps of giving this enterprise form political and 
legal recognition were taken in the 1980s and 1990s. The property of township 
and village-owned enterprises were given protection by the government in 
1983.293 Government officially legalized private ownership in 1988.294 Finally in 
1996, the township and village-owned enterprises law was passed.295 Before 
mid-1990s, government sold some small township and village-owned 
enterprises to private owners and transformed some larger ones into join stock 
companies.296  
                                            
291 Murakami N, Liu D and Otsuka K, “Technical and allocative efficiency among socialist 
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The success of township and village-owned enterprises, which is the example 
of central planning and private workforce joint ownership, is in contrast with pre-
1989 Eastern European unsuccessful public ownership reforms.297 Meanwhile, 
it indicates that private ownership is an important element in encouraging 




In township and village-owned enterprises (TVOEs), the typical structure is 
citizens in a town or village are owners, local government appoints managers, 
so they could report to local government and run businesses at the same time.299 
This operation is named as “the responsibility arrangement”. 300  Another 
operation is “the contracting arrangement”, which is the manager or managers 
sign their employment duration based on the contracts which are linked to their 
compensation with the enterprises’ performance.301 With the development of 
“the contracting arrangement”, in 1980s, local government and enterprises 
experimented with joint stock ownership. Some TVOEs were transformed by 
government, the equity holders could choose managers through the board of 
directors.302  The equity of the township and village-owned enterprises was 
divided into three parts: the citizens had a collective equity stake, and this was 
represented by the local government; the employees had a collective equity 
                                            
297 Kung K S and Lin Y M, “The Decline of Township-and-Village Enterprises in China’s 
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stake, which was controlled by the Employee Representative Meeting; Each 
employee had an individual stake, which was tied with the personal contribution. 
The selected board of directors has the right to make major decisions. 
 
Other forms, such as proprietorships and partnerships where allowing a small 
number of workers working together, were allowed for township and village-
owned enterprises since early 1980s. To sum up, there are responsibility (fu ze 
zhi), contracting (cheng bao zhi), leasing (zu lin), privately owned (si ying), 
partnership (he zuo zhi), auction off (pai mai) and joint stock ownership (gu fen 
zhi) in township and village-owned enterprises.303 
 
Family Enterprises in Township and Village-Owned Enterprises 
 
The rural township and village-owned enterprises exist in a specific background, 
and they are a form of community economy.304 The most common and powerful 
organisation in a community economy is the family form.305 Because there are 
township and village-owned enterprises transformed into family enterprises, the 
family regime in township and village-owned enterprises is an important factor 
and will continue to exist for a long time.306 
 
                                            
303 The forms were stated in Chang C, McCall B P, and Wang Y J, supra n 289, 419. 
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The township and village-owned enterprises build on the basis of “家庭联产承
包责任制”(jiating lianchan chengbao zeren zhi), means it is a household contract 
responsibility system with remuneration linked to output. 307  Regardless of 
whether it is group-owned or individually-owned, they all have family regime 
involved at certain levels. 308  Therefore, an examination of the family 
organisation in this type of enterprises would benefit the research on township 
and village-owned enterprises. Family enterprises are and will be one of the 
most important forms in all organisations in China. This factor has made 
township and village-owned enterprises a complex entity.  
 
The family enterprises mentioned here mainly are the ones that transformed 
from “集体企业” (jiti qiye) “collectively-owned enterprises”.309 This type of family 
enterprises might have family members and relatives who work for local 
government. Thus, this type of enterprises is complex also because of its 
political connections. The family enterprises will be examined in the next 
chapter. 
 
Township and Village-Owned Enterprises and Corporate Governance 
 
There are some large township and village-owned enterprises existing in China, 
and there are unclear issues of corporate governance in the enterprises.310 The 




310 Fan G and Chen Y, “过渡性杂种：中国乡镇企业的发展及制度转型” (guoduqi zazhong: 
zhongguo xiangzhen qiye de fazhan ji zhidu zhuanxing) “Transitional Hybrids: Development of 
TVEs and Institutional Transition in China”, (July 2005) 4 (4), China Economic Quarterly, 937-
952 
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unclear property rights might cause the issues.311 However, the development of 
markets and the increase of entrepreneurship in China will tend to redefine the 
relative ownership rights with local government and the enterprises. With the 
relatively recent enactment of property law, the issues will hopefully be solved 
in future. In order to operate the enterprises in a more market-oriented 
environment, changes will have to be made to improve its efficiency. 312 
However, these enterprises are only regulated under specific law and 
regulations, and heavily dependent on government policies and orders. The 
“Township and Village-Owned Enterprises Law of People’s Republic of China” 
(“中华人民共和国乡镇企业法”) (zhonghua renmin gongheguo xiangzhen qiye 
fa) was enacted on 1st January 1997313 indicating the government’s supports for 
this type of enterprise, but the regulations will have to be reviewed to coordinate 
with other regulations and market developments. 
 
4.3 Corporate Governance and Mechanisms  
 
4.3.1 Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Literature 
 
A survey of corporate governance, conducted by Shleifer and Vishny, found that 
most advanced market economies might be able to solve most of the corporate 
governance problems but not the corporate governance mechanisms issue.314 
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As they commented, corporate governance is a vast practical and important 
subject, even to advanced market economies. There are debates concerning 
existing governance mechanisms, and how effective or ineffective they are. In 
the context of the assessment of the US corporate governance system, Jensen 
expressed a different opinion compared with the Easterbrook and Fischel as 
well as Romano, Jensen held the opinion that the US corporate governance 
system is deeply flawed whereas the latter authors hold a very optimistic 
opinion. 315  For countries like the US, UK, Germany and Japan, corporate 
governance mechanisms are mature (but differ considerably). In contrast, less 
developed countries often lack corporate governance mechanisms.  As Shleifer 
and Vishny commented, Italian corporate governance mechanisms are not 
developed at all, and essentially result in firms being unable to gain capital from 
outsiders.316  
 
Mechanisms and Literature - Categories 
 
There is an underlying assumption in the relevant literature, that most corporate 
governance mechanisms will improve corporate economic performance.317 The 
                                            
firms, and actual repatriation of profits to the providers of finance. But this does not imply that 
they have solved the corporate governance problem perfectly, or that the corporate 
governance mechanisms cannot be improved.” Shleifer A and Vishny R W, supra n 244, 737. 
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problems associated with solving central governance issues are highly 
demanding and a number of governance mechanisms have been developed for 
this purpose. The underlying purpose for developing a good combination of 
corporate governance mechanisms is to find the optimum approach in the best 
interests of the individual firm. Good corporate governance essentially consists 
of tailoring these mechanisms to the individual firm. 
 
It has been proposed that mechanisms of corporate governance can be 
categorised into “social norms”, “trust and reputation”, “company law”, “large 
owners” 318 , “shareholder activism” 319 , “takeovers” 320 , “boards”, “incentive 
systems”, “creditors and capital structure”, “auditors”, “analysts”, 
“competition”321. 
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Among all the mechanisms of corporate governance, some are more important 
or prior to some others. As stated above, Bob Tricker had raised the importance 
of boards of directors, but prior to the 1980s not much was examined or 
discussed concerning the role of the boards in the context of governance. 
Thomsen and Conyon gave the example of the process of selecting CEOs and 
in that process, the ownership is prior to board structure, and is prior to 
incentives.322 However, all the processes would happen under the regulatory 
framework, therefore, apparently the regulation is the most prior feature to 
others. In other words, on this approach, law is the most important mechanisms 
in corporate governance.  
 
However, there are exceptions in practice. For instance, individual shareholders 
or board members are usually not influenced by laws and regulations, but 
ownership structure is. 323  Therefore, the shareholders are prior to board 
members, who are elected by shareholders; and then board members are prior 
to managers. In some Chinese corporations, which are applying corporate 
governance mechanisms for different reasons, such as being listed overseas, 
they would follow the logical priority as stated above. However, in other 
corporations, especially in SOEs, the Chinese managers and boards are mainly 
appointed by government, it would be completely different from the mechanisms 
priority above. Although not all the mechanisms are equally important,324 the 
identity of decision makers and the needs in governance system would choose 
the right ones to apply.   
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The relationship between “mechanisms” of corporate governance and corporate 
governance itself may be clarified, as follows “corporate governance is about 
finding the golden mean, that is, how a particular set of mechanisms create most 
value in a particular situation.”325 However, the combination of mechanisms has 
to be set under individual circumstances. In some companies, it might be better 
not to have a board, so, for example, that some companies might only need 
large owners.326 From a personal point of view, in small and medium-sized 
companies (family businesses), it is important to determine what mechanisms 
could be the best for them individually. This is also the part of the purpose of 
this research, that raising the issue of having proper legal forms, meanwhile 
considering the mechanisms for family businesses governance, in order to 
improve their performance and financial sustainability.   
 
There are social norms as a part of mechanisms, but corporate scandals 
underline the fact that people are immoral.327 The social norms are currently 
named as corporate social responsibility (CSR). Trust and reputation are 
amongst of the most important in informal governance mechanisms. For 
instance, before there was corporate governance or company law, the huge 
investment projects were financed from the general public based on the good 
faith and reputation.328 But this mechanism has also proved by scandals that it 
is not perfect at all. In the case of Chinese family businesses, from a historical 
perspective, reputation has always played an important role in business 
activities, from the earliest imperial periods to modern China, businessmen do 
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business based on their reputation, in this case, it is not only the firm reputation, 
it might mainly depend on the owners’ reputation. 
 
To summarise, there are different mechanisms in corporate governance that we 
can put in practice. However, they need to be based on the individual needs of 
each firm’s own weaknesses and strengths, but does not mean to use them 
individually each time.329 It can be chosen to use more than one mechanism at 
one time for their connections among them. 330  However, the governance 
problems are not solved completely by using all mechanisms at the same time 
altogether. Indeed, the classic mechanisms of Agency Theory, for example, 
such as independent non-executive directors, remuneration and audit 
committees et cetera may not be appropriate for many SMEs. 
 
The mechanisms of corporate governance or so called corporate governance 
systems change over time. This is demonstrated by examples of German and 
French cases, that demonstrated the changes have happened over time.331 The 
changes show the trend and debate of whether the corporate governance 
system is turning to the converging point. Indeed, with globalisation and 
international investment activities, more and more corporations apply corporate 
governance systems. Therefore, there might be a converging point, for the 
                                            
329 Thomsen S and Conyon M, supra n 249, 60. Thomsen and Conyon gave an example of 
personal ownership, it might be a good mechanism for a wise first generation owner, but not 
the second generation incapable son. 
330 Ibid. 61. They commented that the different mechanisms are not necessarily used one 
each time, they are actually commonly used more than one at the same time in practice.  
331 Ibid. 68. German banks tend to reduce the shareholdings in German companies and not as 
the major block holders anymore, which leads to the debate of whether Germany could be 
cited as a case of purely bank governance system. Also in the case of France, which was 
known for government ownership, has changed to privatization in many leading firms and they 
do not appear to be standard state-controlled firms.  
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reason of governments could reform and change the system. According to 
Shleifer and Vishny, “corporate governance mechanisms are economic and 
legal institutions that can be altered through the political process – sometimes 
for the better.” 332 Their research indicates that the question of governance 
reform is not necessary as the product market will be the force for corporations 
to adopt good governance mechanisms and practice. This will be in order to 
minimise the cost of competition.333  
 
The Definition of Mechanisms 
 
Corporate governance systems are different around the globe. The mechanisms 
are different as well and used to different levels in various countries. Therefore, 
researchers commonly use “corporate governance systems” instead of 
“corporate governance mechanisms”,334 as explained above. This circumstance 
may lead to the importance of discussing the definition of corporate governance 
mechanisms. 
 
The term “mechanism” in ordinary dictionary has been defined in the following 
meanings335: 1. an assembly of moving parts performing a complete functional 
motion, often being part of a large machine; linkage. 2. the agency or means by 
which an effect is produced or a purpose is accomplished. 3. machinery or 
mechanical appliances in general. 4. the structure or arrangement of parts of a 
                                            
332 Shleifer A and Vishny R W, supra n 244, 738. 
333 Ibid. 
334 Thomsen S and Conyon M, supra n 249, 68. 
335 Mechanism, Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/mechanism, 
(accessed 22 February 2014). 
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machine or similar device, or of anything analogous. 5. the mechanical part of 
something; any mechanical device: the mechanism of a clock.  
 
In Collins World English Dictionary, the term has been defined as336:  
1. a system or structure of moving parts that performs some function, esp 
in a machine 
2. something resembling a machine in the arrangement and working of its 
parts: the mechanism of the ear 
3. any form of mechanical device or any part of such a device 
4. a process or technique, especially of execution: the mechanism of novel 
writing 
5. philosophy 
a. the doctrine that human action can be explained in purely physical 
terms, whether mechanical or biological 
b. the explanation of phenomena in causal rather than teleological or 
essentialist terms 
c. the view that the task of science is to seek such explanations 
d. dynamism compare vitalism strict determinism 
6. Psychoanal 
a. the ways in which psychological forces interact and operate 
b. a structure having an influence on the behaviour of a person, such 
as a defence mechanism 
 
                                            
336 Mechanism. Dictionary.com. Collins English Dictionary - Complete & Unabridged 10th 
Edition. HarperCollins Publishers. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/mechanism 
(accessed 22 February 2014). 
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In the search of corporate governance mechanisms, it shows different 
definitions of the mechanisms. One of the definitions is the corporate 
governance mechanisms are the policies, guidelines, and controls to manage 
an organisation and reduce inefficiencies.337 According to the Thomsen and 
Conyon, they define a country’s corporate governance system as a set of 
governance mechanisms in use in a given country or context. The fact that they 
are used in combination indicates some degree of consistency and stability. 
They define “system” as “a set of practices, mechanisms, institutions and rules 
that remain stable over sufficiently long periods of time”.338 
 
From the understanding of the mechanisms of corporate governance, and the 
purpose of it serving, perhaps the mechanism is: a regulatory behaviour 
framework to regulate relevant parties in a corporation, to ensure the corporation 
operates and serve its purposes. 
 
Mechanism and Literature - Classifications  
 
Apart from the “categories” of mechanisms, there are generally three “types” of 
mechanisms: Internal mechanisms, external mechanisms and independent 
                                            
337 “What Are the Different Kinds of Corporate Governance Mechanisms?”, WiseGEEK, 
http://www.wisegeek.com/what-are-the-different-kinds-of-corporate-governance-
mechanisms.htm (accessed 22 February 2014). 
338 Thomsen S and Conyon M, supra n 249, 68. “In some countries, such as Germany or 
Japan, financial transactions between large companies and banks tend to be based on stable 
relationships rather than anonymous trades. There is a close relationship between firms and 
the suppliers of finance. In other economies, such as the US or the UK, corporate finance 
arrangements are more likely to be based on market-based contracting arrangements.” As 
mentioned before, that German mechanism or system is bank-based, but as here mentioned, 
Germany is cited in the category of “relation-based corporate governance”.  
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external mechanisms.339 Internal mechanism is obviously the control from inside 
of a corporation. It controls and monitors the activities inside of the organisation 
and takes action when any wrongful activities happen, which include owners, 
managers and employees. They include operations, reports and performance 
measurement systems. Internal mechanisms include oversight of management, 
independent internal audits, structure of the board of directors into levels of 
responsibility, segregation of control and policy development.340 
 
External control mechanism is the control from outside of the corporations, such 
as regulators, governments, trade unions and financial institutions. These 
objectives include adequate debt management and legal compliance. External 
mechanisms are often imposed on organisations by external stakeholders in the 
forms of union contracts or regulatory guidelines. External organisations, such 
as industry associations, may suggest guidelines for best practices, and 
businesses can choose to follow these guidelines or ignore them. Typically, 
companies report the status and compliance of external corporate governance 
mechanisms to external stakeholders.341 
 
There is also the independent external audit. An independent external audit of 
a corporation’s financial statements is part of the overall corporate governance 
structure. An audit of the company's financial statements serves internal and 
external stakeholders at the same time. An audited financial statement and the 
                                            
339 Davoren J, “Three types of corporate governance mechanisms”, 
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/three-types-corporate-governance-mechanisms-66711.html 




accompanying auditor’s report helps investors, employees, shareholders and 
regulators determine the financial performance of the corporation. This exercise 
gives a broad, but limited, view of the organisation’s internal working 
mechanisms and future prospects.342 
 
Mechanism and Literature - SMEs (Family Businesses) 
 
Corporate governance mechanisms may be applied to small and medium-sized 
businesses. And it might be easier to apply to such businesses. For small and 
medium-sized businesses, owners normally take place of monitoring the 
decisions and employees, which is the internal mechanism essentially. 
Meanwhile, when the businesses go to banks for loans, having external auditing 
service or other financial services, that would be external mechanisms and 
independent external mechanisms. Therefore, in all cases and all situations, 
small and medium-sized businesses have the involvement of mechanisms even 
without acknowledging them. 
 
The research of Wong, Chang and Chen demonstrated the mechanisms of 
corporate governance have impacts on family-controlled firms.343 Their study 
indicated that the external governance mechanism of institutional investors is 
particularly important for family-controlled businesses when internal governance 
mechanisms do not perform effectively. The finding was consistent with the 
                                            
342 Ibid. 
343 Wong, Chang and Chen, supra n 260, 24. 
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research of Wahal and McConnell, which is that institutional ownership can 
lessen the intensity in family control and corporate venturing.344  
 
4.4 Company Law  
 
The history of capitalism and corporations are deeply linked.345 In the US or in 
any other countries, the vast majority of SMEs are not listed firms.346 Also, these 
unlisted SMEs are the main drive for employment and economic growth in all 
nations. As scholars Guinnane et al. commented that enterprises existed relying 
on the legal framework which allowed the owners and investors to take 
responsibilities as well as to be protected to a certain extent.347 However, SMEs 
are not as described in the large-scale enterprises “system” 348 . Broadly 
speaking, SMEs are similar in the baseline of “closely held by founders or by 
families”349, and it has been assumed that limited liability is an ideal form for 
business organisations in general.350 
 
US corporations and those based in other common law jurisdictions have largely 
been created within Anglo-American style legal institutions, the support and 
protection this model provided (along with its inherent weaknesses such as 
                                            
344 Wahal S and McConnell J J, “Do Institutional Investors Exacerbate Managerial Myopia?”, 
(2000) 6, Journal of Corporate Finance, 307-329. In Wong, Chang and Chen, supra n 260. 
345 Guinnane T W, Harris R, Lamoreaux N R and Rosenthal J L, “Ownership and Control in 
the Entrepreneurial Firm: An International History of Private Limited Companies”, (2007) Yale 
University Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper, No. 959, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1071007 (accessed 23 January 2014). 
346 Thomsen S and Conyon M, supra n 249 
347 Guinnane, Harris, Lamoreaux, and Rosenthal, supra n 345, 3. 
348 As Steen Thomsen and Martin Conyon described that the system people characterize is 
tended to focus on the largest and most visible companies in a nation. Thomsen S and 
Conyon M, supra n 249, 68. 
349 Ibid. 
350 Guinnane, Harris, Lamoreaux, and Rosenthal, supra n 345, 3. 
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short-term tendencies) has been less influential in other countries, such as 
European countries.351 
 
The business law has strong impacts on economic changes, and vice versa.352 
From the legal perspective, as Reisberg commented, “an outdated, obscure 
legal structure can create costs for business ... in particular for small 
businesses”.353 The partnership was the only affordable company type for SMEs 
in Britain in the 19th century; most SME owners were subject to the 
disadvantage of corporations.354 When the private limited liability company form 
was introduced in Britain in 1907 it became popular quickly.355 Interestingly, the 
option of limited liability company came to the US much later, only after the mid-
twentieth century.356 The French and German limited partnership form is more 
flexible and adaptable for entrepreneurs than the British and American forms.357  
 
In summary, wherever the form is applied, the legal framework is important.358 
This matters more for SMEs as they need more of a supportive legal context, 
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352 Ibid.  
353 Reisberg A, supra n 111, 317. 
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355 Private limited liability company started in Germany in 1892, and France in 1925. 
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4.4.1 The United Kingdom Company Law 
 
UK is an advanced post-industrial economy and with an innovative legal system, 
further to be recognized as the origin of the common law.360 There was no 
statute for limited partnership until 1907, whereas the Companies Act of 1844 
as the general incorporation came into law a long time ago although limited 
liability was only introduced after a long debate over a decade later.361 
 
The Policy of “Think Small First” 
 
After the mid-nineteenth century, the general incorporation laws in the UK 
started to create the corporate form that was attractive to SMEs.362 With the 
enactment of the Limited Liability Act and Joint Stock Companies Acts, 
Company Law has developed into its modern form. 363 Traditionally, company 
law was written for public companies although the majority of companies in the 
UK are small.364 The origin of “limited liability” came from public companies, 
where they tended to attract investments from the public but with the limited 
corporate debts liability. The Limited Liability Act 1855 marked the time that 
legislation encouraged capital from private investors. 365 With time, in the early 
20th century, businessmen found that this model might be good to apply to 
family firms and other private businesses. Therefore, since early 2000, with the 
                                            
360 Ibid. 6. 
361 Ibid. 14. 
362 Ibid. 
363 Wild C and Weinstein S, Smith and Keenan’s Company Law, (16th edn. Pearson Education 
2013), 2. 
364 Reisberg A, supra n 111, 322. 
365 Wild C and Weinstein S, supra n 363, 4. 
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new limited liability vehicles were created, a culture of enterprise raised, and 
that resulted a trend of support for an easy path to limited liability forms.366 
According to Freedman, the UK Company Law Review examined ways of 
attracting small business owners in to the new form.367 At the time, they did not 
need to have the capital from public investors. However, these companies have 
become the prominent force for economic growth and employers.  This type of 
company is ubiquitous and numerous worldwide, and continually growing with 
their own advantages compared with public companies. Most importantly, they 
have been developed to attract investments from public all over the world and 
operate under company laws in different jurisdictions,368 The movement in UK 
changed as the Parliament and Board of Trade used to charter corporations, 
enacted legislation for general incorporation without limited liability in 1844, 
further enact limited liability in 1855-56. 369  The contractual nature of the 
corporation further emphasised in the 1862 Companies Act.370 The estimate 
showed that partnership form persistently existed, which with the trade 
partnerships were required registration in practice with 1872 the Committee on 
Partnerships.371 In 1885, by a conservative estimate, the number of important 
partnerships was about 100,000, whereas the limited liability companies 
(exclude one-person companies) at the most 5 to 10 per cent in the economy.372 
In general, the corporate form started to dominate after more than fifty years 
after the general incorporation was enacted.373 SMEs stayed safe in terms of 
                                            
366 Freedman J, “Limited Liability: Large Company Theory and Small Firms”, (2000) 63 (3), 
The Modern Law Review, 317-354. 
367 Ibid. 
368 Tricker B, supra n 270, 9. 
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the legal vehicle they were familiar with in that most of them were in the form of 
partnerships, while private limited liability company form was introduced into 
UK. 374  It appears that businessmen tended not to choose the corporation 
because they might find other forms better fitted their needs.375  
 
There are various policies underlying corporate law from enabling economic 
activity by providing a suitable legal vehicle and then to regulate corporate 
activities. 376  Meanwhile, Company Law is also the fundamental basis of  
corporate governance.377 This is the concept of the Company Law in the context 
of UK and other Western countries, where the conception of capitalism is in the 
free-market economies.378 Therefore, with the market develops, the Company 
Law was the part that worked by legislature in order to work with the market, to 
regulate, to protect, to limit all potential changes, including good or bad changes. 
But the reality is the company law appears to be designed for large enterprises. 
According to Guinnane et al., “the purpose of the law was to protect investors in 
publicly held companies, it raised the costs of organizing all types of 
corporations, whether they issued shares to the public or not”.379 They also 
provided that the German law in 1884 made the corporate form less attractive, 
especially to SMEs.380 In the UK circumstances finally forced Parliament to 
respond. The Loreburn Committee was set up in 1905 to consider changes to 
the law, thereafter, the amendment to the Companies Act in 1907 was enacted 
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378 Ibid. 9. Hadden wrote the comment in 1972 on British company law.  
379 Guinnane, Harris, Lamoreaux, and Rosenthal, supra n 345, 27. 
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to create the private limited company.381 Since then, the lawful private limited 
form became available. With the growth of the corporate form, there are 
concerns on the aspect of the accountability of managers to shareholders, 
therefore, the law has to reform the relevant area.382 After the Great Depression 
the Companies Act 1948 ensured “shareholder democracy” within the 
companies.383 The UK government’s Bullock Report in 1977 proposed to reform 
in order to allow employees to the selection of board of directors.384 A two-tier 
management structure therefore was suggested by the report385, which is also 
similar to China’s corporate governance structure. However, these reforms have 
never been implemented in the UK.386 Moreover, the Insolvency Act 1986 and 
the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 were regulating the directors’ 
misconduct.387 
 
In the modern UK, the Companies Act 2006 had the regulation for small and 
medium-sized companies, and the Act presents a “wholesale rethink” of 
corporate law.388 This Act is the most complex piece of corporate legislation that 
Parliament enacted, which contains 47 Parts (1,300 sections) and followed by 
16 Schedules, moreover, there are over 70 statutory instruments along with the 
Act.389 In addition, the Limited Liability Partnerships Regulations (Application of 
Companies Act 2006) Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/1804) represent the 
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completion of the application of the Companies Act 2006 to limited liability 
partnerships.390 This also repealed much of the Limited Liability Partnerships 
Regulations 2001 (SI 2001/1090), set out the detailed provisions for Limited 
Liability Partnership by applying the Companies Act 1985, the Insolvency Act 
1986 and other enactments in a considerable degree.391 There is the new Model 
Articles in the 2006 Act, replacing Table A as the template, which is a huge 
change from “one size fits all” to “think small first”.392 This Model Articles have 
provided a model for private companies limited by shares, limited by guarantee 
and public companies limited by shares.393  
 
Previous corporate legislations in UK hit on small businesses in a very brutal 
way.394 In contrast, this new Act is clearer and more understandable.395 During 
the reform progress, it has been proven that the Act 2006 emphasised and 
focused on small private companies more. For instance, the Strategic 
Framework in the Company Law Review written consultation documents series, 
which contained “small private companies are particularly important in job 
creation and need an optimal legal climate” as one of the arrangements as its 
missions.396 In addition, one of the key issues that was clearly raised as a priority 
for reform was the “problems of the small, or closely-held company”, seen as 
within of “the scope of company law”.397 Furthermore, one of the consultation 
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document Developing the Framework, contained corporate governance and the 
policies for small private companies’ legislative treatments.398 
 
Sections 381-384 in the Companies Act 2006 are divided for private companies 
(small companies including parent companies and groups), with the introduction 
of the accounting exemptions. 399  And the small companies are free from 
complying with many of the accounting standards from the Accounting 
Standards Board. 400  As regards other accounting standards, the Financial 
Reporting Standard for Smaller Entities (FRSSE) confirmed that small 
companies can ignore these standards.401 Sections 465-467 are divided for 
companies, parent companies and groups in the medium-sized range. 
 
Definitions of Small and Medium-Sized Companies 
 
In the Company Law, the definition of small companies is, 
A small company is one which has been within the limits of two of the 
following thresholds since incorporation or, if not within the limits at 
incorporation, then for the current financial year and the one before: 
Turnover £5.6 million or less 
Balance sheet total (i.e. total assets) £2.8 million or less 
Employees 50 (average) or less.402 
The definition of Medium-sized companies is, 
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A medium-sized company is one which has been within the limits of two 
of the following thresholds since incorporation or, if not within the limits at 
incorporation, then for the current financial year and the one before: 
Turnover £22.8 million or less 
Balance sheet total (i.e. total assets) £11.4 million or less 
Employees 250 (average) or less.403 
 
Nature of A Corporation 
 
“A corporation is a succession or collection of persons having at law an 
existence, rights and duties, separate and distinct from those of the persons who 
are from time to time its members.”404 In the sense of the classification of 
corporations, mainly is between corporations sole and aggregate. 405  And 
corporation aggregate includes chartered companies, statutory companies, 
registered companies (general), and registered companies (community interest 
companies).406 The classification is based on the ways of the creation, which is 
different from Chinese corporations in Chinese Company Law. 
 
The Community Interest Companies form, has been called a new form for 
registered companies, also regulated by company law. However, there are 
several requirements that the Community Interest Companies have to meet, and 
                                            
403 Ibid. The Companies Act 2006, s 465. 
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it is understandable that the form is specifically serving community purposes in 
an adapted corporate form. 
 
In sections 755-760 of the Companies Act 2006, these articles are intended for 
the smaller businesses (SMEs).407 They are governed under the Companies 
Acts and relevant case law, except the articles of association of the company.408 
In UK Company Law, the private companies are the companies which are not 
public companies.409 Under Company Law, the private companies are mainly 
designed for the smaller businesses, which may be founded by two or more 
persons. However, the Section 7 of the Companies Act 2006 permits single-
member private limited companies to form.410 In addition, as the regulations 
have been amended some relevant parts to associate to this form.411  The sole 
proprietor form has been considered an important development in company 
legislation. Some scholars believe that sole proprietor (one-man company) 
could be beyond the size of small businesses.412 Additionally, in terms of the 
liability that such companies take on, compared with the limited liability 
companies, the sole proprietor companies do not seem to have much 
advantages in practice. It does not commonly exist in all countries.413  
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Registration for Single-member Companies 
 
Although the registration documents are the same as multi-member companies, 
there are articles and amendments to company legislation. At present, a public 
single-member company requires to have the two directors and a secretary for 
the company, in total there can be one member but has to be three officers at 
least.414 In a private single-member company, the sole member can be the 
director and a company secretary is not the legal requirement.415 However, one 
member and one officer are needed in such a company, therefore, if a secretary 
is appointed then there would be have one member and two officers.416 Also, 
under the regulations, there are no re-registration requirements.417 There are no 
requirements of resolutions and no filing requirements at Companies House. But 
the statements of the changes of members must be entered to the Register of 





                                            
(limited liability company). There must be at least two shareholders (with a maximum of 50), 
and the starting capital requirement is lower than that of the SA. Société à Responsabilité 
Limitée (SARL): the SARL is a private limited liability company with at least two shareholders. 
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The Conflicts  
 
Historically, UK Company Laws were designed mainly for public companies.  
When private companies were formed, these laws could not directly resolve all 
issues they faced, and private owners and investors had concerns of the lack of 
protection in law. Some commentators have raised the need of having special 
articles for these companies, especially the single-member companies. The 
regulations that single-member companies shall follow carry the conflicts with 
the company’s structure of a single-member company.  
 
Apart from the articles’ conflicts that might need to be reviewed, I would suggest 
reviewing the forms of companies in legislation. For instance, is that necessary 
to have separate forms for sole proprietorship and single-member companies? 
Or rather to categorise them into one form and with detailed regulations to 
individual circumstances. 
 
As commented, there is little benefit in filing abbreviated accounts for medium-
sized companies in many circumstances. The Companies Act 2006 allows the 
filing of an abbreviated balance sheet only for small companies, whereas 
sections 465-467 allow medium-sized companies to modify only its profit and 
loss account, but other full accounts and reports must be filed.418 In the case of 
small businesses, they seem to have more reasonable reports than medium-
sized companies. The exemptions are debatable, so the reviews to the details 
of what information that medium-sized companies should disclose are 
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necessary. Currently all factors of the details of turnover profits and markets are 
required, although sometimes it is a disadvantage in the market.419 
 
Recent Changes in Company Law 
 
There are essential relevant legal forms in UK law as follows: 
• The unincorporated legal forms, which the feature is that they do not have 
separate legal personality: The Sole Trader, The Unincorporated 
Association, The Partnership, The Limited Partnership, Trust;420  
• Incorporated legal forms include: Limited Company [Company Limited by 
Shares – either a Private Limited Company (LTD) or a Public Limited 
Company (PLC), Company Limited by Guarantee], The Limited Liability 
Partnership (LLP);421  
• Community Interest Company (CIC);422  
• Charitable Incorporated Organisation (CIO).423 
 
One key principle of UK company law is the shareholder primacy, as also 
maintained in the Companies Act 2006.424 One of the main changes in company 
legislation is the Companies Act 2006 section 172 requires a director to “act in 
the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success 
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of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole”.425 Thus, there is a 
range of other interests, such as employees, the community and the 
environment which directors may take into account. 426  Previously in the 
Companies Act 1985 section 309 only simply stated the interests of the 
employees and members. Therefore, it is obvious that the duties of directors 
have expanded and are not limited to the company itself anymore.  
 
The importance of private companies (SMEs)427 is obvious for economic growth. 
Therefore, the Company Law has the section 246-249 for private companies 
regarding their accounting exemptions. UK Company Law considers the market 
has the disadvantages for small and medium-sized companies, thus the 
requirements of reports are less strict. The Companies Act 2006 has introduced 
some changes into the area, for instance, additional rules on the directors’ 
remuneration report, which is part of the annual reporting process.428 There are 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and the rules made by the Financial 
Services Authority (it existed between 2001 and 2013) regulate public limited 
companies, but there are changes towards to the SMEs.429 
 
In terms of small companies, they are subject to the “small companies regime” 
now, regulated in section 381. The Companies Act 2006 ss 382-384 defined 
whether the company is “small”, as stated above.430 And s 382(7), s 383(1) and 
s 383(3) regulate whether parent companies may qualify as small companies in 
                                            
425 Ibid. 6. 
426 Ibid. 
427 Wild C and Weinstein S, supra n 363. 
428 Ibid. 528. 
429 Ibid. 
430 Ibid. 529. 
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groups.431 In terms of medium-sized companies, ss 465-467 of the Companies 
Act 2006 regulate the different reporting regime.432 
 
4.4.2 Chinese Company Law 
 
Chinese Economic Environment  
 
After financial crisis, investments have become one of the most important and 
challenging projects for all economies in globally, including advanced economic 
countries. There has been an increase of privately financed companies, while 
most businesses are trying to attract foreign investments. China, as one of the 
most attractive economies for private equity deals, the funds and attention are 
from international and domestic levels.433
 
 The growth of private equity market 
in Mainland China has been considerable, and China has become the second 
largest private equity market just after the US (1st).434 In the near future, there 
will be a significant number of global private equity investors investing their funds 
in the China market 435, as informed investors recognized that the China’s 
market still has potential to grow. 
 
                                            
431 Ibid. 
432 Ibid.  
433 Aizenman J and Kendall J, “The Internationalization of Venture Capital and Private Equity”, 
(2008) NBER Working Papers 14344, available at SSRN: 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1275544 (accessed 12 March 2014). 
434 EMPEA, H1 2009, (2009), Emerging Markets Activity, http://www.altassets.com/private-
equity-knowledge-bank/surveys/ article/nz17133.html in Shen W, “When Private Equity Meets 
China: Clashes between Locked-In Transactional Models and the Chinese Regulatory 
Regime”, (2010) 28, Company and Securities Law Journal, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1826343 (accessed 24 February 2014). 
435 Emerging Markets Private Equity Association and Coller Capital, “Private Equity Investors 
Favour China, Brazil – Survey”, (2009), 





Chinese market and legal system is not the same as Western market and legal 
systems.436 However, the modern laws in China were mainly transplanted from 
the Western countries.437 The concepts of modern companies and relevant legal 
frameworks are mainly based on the Western influences and knowledge. The 
recent two amendments of Company Law have shown encouragement towards 
entrepreneurs in China. Until the Company Law 2005 was abolished438, the 
minimum initial capital had been RMB 30,000439 (equivalent to £2,936.46440); its 
intention was to protect creditors. 441  However, as proved by other major 
advanced economies, which did not employ a minimum initial capital, this was 
not a requirement, especially for SMEs. The newly amended Company Act 2013 
came into enforcement, and the minimum capital requirement in Article 26 and 
Article 81 in Company Act 2005 was removed. Please refer to the Chapter 3 for 
details. These changes exhibited that the central government moved fast to 
meet the level of advanced legal frameworks. The new amendment will benefit 
                                            
436 Chan G Y M, “Why Does China not Abolish the Minimum Capital Requirement for Limited 
Liability Companies?” (2009), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442791 
(accessed 3 March 2014). 
437 Chan A C K and Young A, “Chinese Corporate Governance Regime from a Historical-
Cultural Perspective: Rethinking Confucian System of Governance” (3 October 2012), 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2156300 (accessed 23 February 2014). 
438 Chan, G Y M, supra n 436. 
439 PRC Company Law, Art 26; PRC Company Law, Art 81. “The MRC is RMB30,000 
(US$4,411.76) in the case of a limited liability company”; RMB 5 million (US$735,294) in the 
case of a company limited by shares. A foreign-invested company limited by shares (FICLS) 
is an option for private equity to acquire “shares”. The regulations governing the FICLS do not 
expressly provide the mechanism for the creation of preferred shares. Besides, approval for 
such FICLS is managed on a centralized basis by the Ministry of Commerce in Beijing, which 
sets very high capital thresholds, including a minimum capital requirement of RMB 30 million 
(US$4.4 million), a very high target to meet for many start-up companies in China. Shen W, 
supra n 434. 
440 According to the currency rate on February 25, 2014, calculated on 
http://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/ (accessed 25 February 2014).  
441 Apart from the protection for creditors, Chan also comment another possibility as 
“preventing frivolous incorporation”, Chan G Y M, supra n 436, 1. 
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SMEs and micro enterprises, but it will also bring challenges for SMEs as they 
will have to develop and improve the implement of articles of associations, which 
is part of government policy – maximise the freedom of action and give away 
the monitoring power. 
 




The development of Chinese Company Acts, not taking into account the 1950s 
regulations regarding to the private enterprises, the first law that relates to the 
companies in the new PRC would be 1978 Foreign Equity Joint Ventures Law. 
Thereafter, the Private Enterprises Regulations 1988, the Regulation and 
Advisory for Limited Liability Company and Incorporated Company in 1990s, 
and the Company Act 1993 were the milestone for the history of modern 
Chinese Company Law.442 The recent amendments of Company Act 2005 and 
2013 are the further reform led by the central government in the newest Chinese 
context. Please refer to the discussion in Chapter 3 for further details of 
Company Acts. 
 
There were regulations for private enterprises (in Chinese, named as Siying 
Qiye)443, the regulations included 1992 and 2011. The 1992 regulation was a 
                                            
442 Jiang P, Zhao X D and Chen S,中国《公司法》的修改及价值 (Chinese “Company Law” 
Reform and Value), conference discussion in 2005, Article.chinalawinfo.com, accessed at 
http://article.chinalawinfo.com/Article_Detail.asp?ArticleId=31305, (accessed 26 February 
2014). 
443 The definition of Siying Qiye (private enterprises) in China was made by National Bureau 
of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国国家统计局 Zhonghua renmin 
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temporary regulation, which became redundant since the 2011 regulation came 
into force on 30th September 2011. Apart from replacing the 1992 temporary 
regulation, this 2011 regulation also had adjustments for the enacting in 1998 
The Regulation for Dividing Business Types Registration, extended the 
enterprises that investing by Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan investors444, also other 
foreign investors445.  
 
The Reform of Company Law and its Values 
 
This revision of Company Act in 2005 and 2013 are obviously very important. 
The Act 2005 could be the most important legal reforming movement in Chinese 
                                            
gongheguo guojia tongji ju), and State Administration of Industry and Commerce (国家工商行
政管理局 Guojia gongshang xingzheng guanli ju), which is in the Article 9 of the regulation
《关于划分企业登记注册类型的规定》(The regulation of business types registration division) 
(published as [2011] No.86.) The regulation has 22 Articles in total and was enacted from 30th 
September 2011. This regulation was the replacement of previous《关于经济类型划分的暂行
规定》(The temporary regulation of economic types division) in 1992. The Article 9 defines 
private enterprises are invested and established by natural person or controlled by natural 
person, in order to hire labors and profit economic organisation. According to the Company 
Law, Partnership Enterprises Law and Temporary Regulation for Private Enterprises, the 
private enterprises include registered private limited liability company (私营有限责任公司）, 
private joint stock limited company（私营股份有限公司）, private partnership company （私
营合伙企业）, and private individual proprietorship company （私营独资企业）. Furthermore, 
in the Article 9, the definitions of the four types have been given as: 1. The private individual 
proprietorship company is, according to the regulation, the company that invested and 
manage by one natural person, hiring labors, and the investor take unlimited liability to the 
company debts; 2. The private partnership company is the company that invested by more 
than two natural persons, based on the agreement, invest together, manage together, share 
profits and losses together, hiring labors, and take unlimited liability to company debts; 3. The 
private limited liability company is the limited liability company that invested by more than two 
natural persons or controlled by a sole natural person; 4. The private joint stock limited 
company is the corporate enterprise that invested more than five natural persons, or a sole 
natural person controls the share. 《关于划分企业登记注册类型的规定》(The regulation of 
business types registration division) 
http://nhs.saic.gov.cn:9080/wcms2/actsociety/normal/html/1216.htm, (accessed 12 March 
2014), http://www.stats.gov.cn/statsinfo/auto2073/201310/t20131031_450535.html (accessed 
12 March 2014). 
444 In the Article 2, added in Other into the enterprises that invested by Hong Kong, Macau, 
Taiwan investors; and increase 200 to 290 stated above enterprises. 
445 In the Article 2, added in Other into the foreign invested enterprises; and increase 300 to 
390 stated above enterprises. 
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legal history before the 2013 Act came into enforcement. Act 2005 had 219 
Articles, less than former amount of 230 Articles. Its purpose was to deal with 
the securities market’s growth and encourage better corporate governance for 
listed companies, and to adapt the private sector’s speedy development in 
China (the expansion of private limited liability companies).446  
 
Before Act 2005 came into enforcement, Company Act 1993 was a milestone 
for China’s legal system. Despite the limitations in the Company Act 1993 (for 
instance, it very much focused on the reform of SOEs, which led to many issues 
in practice), it was a very important Act for China when Professor Jiang Ping 
commented about the changes of China’s Company Acts. He also mentioned 
that, Qiu Xiaohua, the Deputy Director of the National Bureau of Statistics of the 
People’s Republic of China (NBS) then, praised the importance of Act 1993 for 
its contribution to the economy as the number of private enterprises 
increased,447 and the Act contributed at least 1-2 per cent to the 9% GDP rate 
of China. 448  The Company Act 2005 became a stepping stone for later 
development of the Chinese economy. Due to political debate, it took some 
years to revise. The 2013 Act is a new milestone for enterprises in China. It 
removes the official requirement of registration capital and leaves the right to 
shareholders by articles of association. 
 
                                            
446 Bath V, “The Company Law and Foreign Investment Enterprises in the People’s Republic 
of China: Parallel Systems of Chinese-Foreign Regulation”, (2007) 30 (3), University of New 
South Wales Law Journal, 774-785. Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 09/42, available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1410383 (accessed 23 February 2014). 
447 Ibid. 
448 Jiang P, Zhao X D and Chen S, supra n 442. 
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According to Law Professor Jiang Ping, the real beginning of Chinese Company 
Law was 1983, there were no enterprises with shares (no incorporated 
companies), and the main purpose of having a Company Law was to regulate 
SOEs. Concluded by Jiang Ping and other three scholars, it was the parallel 
thinking based on the prediction that there might be incorporated companies 
setting up in future, and most importantly it was for many SOEs.449 Therefore, 
we can summarise the progress of reforming Company Law was from 
“regulating State-Owned Enterprises, to reforming State-Owned Enterprises, 
further to encouraging investment” over the past 30 plus years. 
 
China is considered to have a “civil law” system. Regulations were written to 
govern and had to be obeyed. This ideology began to change when the market 
economy crept into China; its laws had to be friendly for businesses. The new 
Company Law is aiming to encourage investment and entrepreneurs. China is 
creating a friendly environment for innovation. The Company Law reflects the 
idea of “establishing enterprises then regulating them”450, rather than “having 
regulations but not encourage to establishing enterprises”. The latter apparently 
will not benefit the nation at all, and against the serving purpose of having law. 
Professor Zhao Xudong commented that the Company Act 2005 was a 
complete change and almost a new law-making process. The Company Act 
2005 changed almost all of the previous provisions so that only 24 of the 
previous articles remained unchanged. The content of the Company Act 2005 
was extended and covered a wide range of needs. The innovation and 
                                            
449 Ibid. 
450 Ibid. Jiang Ping expressed the idea of having new Company Law is valuable for economic 
growth, it is necessary to encourage enterprises establishment, then to regulate them.  
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underlying policy/ideology seemed to go beyond most predictions and 
expectations from many scholars in the field. In general, the Company Act 2005 
appeared to be a very successful achievement. The Company Act 2005 
referenced many of the most advanced Company Laws and regulations in other 
model countries, with the considerations from Chinese law makers they were 
adapted extensively to the need of China’s developing direction and ideology. 
Building on the progress of the 2005 Act, the Act 2013 further made significant 
changes on SMEs and micro enterprises. Please refer to the Chapter 3 for 
further details. 
 
From the comments of law scholars, the Company Law 2005 shows the new 
trend of adapting the market with unique Chinese socialist characteristics and 
future developing direction. Also, the Act details the types of companies that will 
fit to China’s economy; the options for companies, which is one of the 
improvements; the rules and regulations that companies have showing the 
integrity and the balance of taking responsibilities and rights, the safety and 
efficiency, the relationships among all parties, and the interference of 
government and companies’ self-control et cetera.    
 
The essential points of new Company Law 2005 were: 
§ Encouraging investment and entrepreneurships, which is one of the most 
important points; 
§ Deregulation (Fangsong Guanzhi), respect the will of the related parties; 
§ More focus on the balance of rights that related parties have within the 
companies. 
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The Company Law 2005 included the concepts of capital and the type of sole 
trader451 (yiren gongsi) company. In terms of capital it requires, since 1993, the 
capital required in the Company Law was one of the strictest worldwide. It 
showed by the high requirements on capital that invested to establishing 
companies, and the strict criminal responsibility in Criminal Law. But Act 2013 
removed the registration capital requirement, which gives flexibility to the 
enterprises themselves, and give shareholders rights to monitor each other. 
 
The previous Company Law mainly focused on the capital and had strict capital 
requirements for it was an underlying policy to protect creditors’ rights if 
companies went bankrupt. However, the disadvantage was that it limited 
investors’ investments and discouraged the establishment of companies. With 
time, scholars in China realized that other countries, such as US and Hong Kong 
(which until relatively recent, China was directly guided and influenced by the 
UK) have much lower capital requirements, but use other rules to protect 
creditors. Therefore, the removal of the capital registration requirement in the 
2013 revision changed the previous rules, even though its inclusion in Company 
Law was debated heavily. The revision brought significant opportunities to 
entrepreneurs, and led to growth in China’s national economy.452 
 
In more advanced countries, such as the US and the UK, there are requirements 
in laws that businesses need to meet, although the start-up requirements for 
companies are lower than in China. For instance, the taxation in the UK and the 
requirements in taxation are strict for companies in operation. 
                                            
451 As in UK Company Law, it might be more accurate to translate to sole proprietorship. 
452 Jiang P, Zhao X D and Chen S, supra n 442. 
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Minimum Registered Capital Requirement in Revised Company Law and 
Debates 
 
China made minimum registered capital in Company Law based on the 
consideration of some advanced countries’ company laws, such as some 
European countries have.453 In this sense, it is not difficult to recognise the 
Company Law in China has referenced and transplanted from other advanced 
countries, and adapted and improved based on the circumstances in China. 
That resulted in China having similar regulations but different from other 
contexts. Taking an example of the typical private equity, the model of acquiring 
preferred shares is difficult to apply in China, as the factors such as the concepts 
of shares, authorised capital and issued capital do not apply to limited liability 
companies under Chinese corporate law.454  
 
In Articles 26 and 81, the law ruled “not less than 20% or the minimum registered 
capital must be contributed upfront but the remainder can be made within two 
years from the date of establishment or five years in the case of an investment 
company either in the form of a limited liability company or a company limited 
by shares”.455 
 
                                            
453 For instance, Italy still requires a minimum initial capital investment of 10,000. Civil Code 
(Italy), Art 2463. Shen W, supra n 434. 
454 Ibid. 
455 PRC Company Law, Acts 26 and 81. Under the PRC Company Law 1993, capital 
contributions had to be made upfront. 
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Lau456 queried the reason for the capital requirement for a LLC in China was 
2,000 times of a private limited company in the UK.457 However, the answer was 
not immediately clear. Lau proposed that the figure of the minimum capital 
investment for registering a limited liability company is a “half-way house.”458 
According to Professor Lau, the high requirement of minimum capital in the old 
Company Law did not suit with the rapid growing China’s market so it should be 
reduced, the revised Company Law therefore fell into line with the trends in 
many other countries. 
 
This minimum capital requirement was interpreted as an integral part of the so-
called “legal capital system”.459 The “legal capital system” is from the origin of 
the continental European model of Company Law, especially German Company 
Law. Chinese legal system has always been categorized as a “Civil Law” 
system. Therefore, given its “communitarian capitalist” classification China’s 
copying of elements of the German model is not surprising. The idea of a 
minimum capital requirement had been adopted in order to protect creditors, in 
case of the potential abuse of limited liability by shareholders. Chan raised the 
question of the adoption and evolution of the legal capital system in China as it 
was an area of academic debater, but he did not find any work showing the 
explanation of how the figure RMB 30,000 for limited liability companies was 
confirmed.460 
 
                                            
456 Lau K L A, “Why are the initial paid-up capitals of private limited companies in China 2,000 
times bigger than those in the United Kingdom?” (2007) 28 (8) Company Lawyer, 248-252. 
457 Chan, G Y M supra n 436. 
458 Ibid. 
459 Ibid. 
460 Ibid. 3-4. 
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The figure of RMB 30,000 was not particularly designed to be 2000 times greater 
the UK requirement nor mysterious after all. As Professor Wang Yong, Jiang 
Ping, Zhao Xudong, and Chen Su (the latter three professors were the primary 
members in the team of revising Company Law) commented, the Chinese 
Company Law 1993 was not the most advanced company law in the world, but 
had the strictest registered capital requirements in the world. 461  The RMB 
30,000 requirement was not decided based on specific reasons. Informally, it 
might be the discussion of the legislature; officially, it might as some professors 
estimated, that it might be decided based on the risk and loss that entrepreneurs 
can take; or it might because of the income rates in most of regions, how much 
people will be willing to invest after the living expenses; or it might because the 
legislature suggested different amounts, and RMB 30,000 was a compromise, 
not too high nor too low.462 To sum up, the minimum registered capital figure did 
not have specific reason to be RMB 30,000 in China’s Company Act 2005. 
 
The removal of registered capital requirements in the Company Act 2013 
reflects the new changes of China’s context. The further action of attracting 
funds and entrepreneurs. Company Act 2013 could be deemed as same level 
as advanced countries’ legal framework in general despites the challenges in 
practice. China’s legal reform has entered to a complete new and higher level. 
 
                                            





There were issues in the Company Law 2005. For instance, the one-person 
limited liability company463 type was recognised, but with higher requirements 
compared with LLC when it was established. For instance, unlimited liability 
would apply when the acting director could not prove the capital of the company 
was separated from his own. He must provide auditing reports. In the LLC, it 
only requires more than two natural persons to set up, which is easier to 
establish and safer in liability. Therefore, there could be a possibility that the 
sole trader intends to register a second natural person to avoid unlimited liability. 
In China, it is highly possible that the second person could be family relatives, 
close friends et cetera, it is the guanxi mind-set. In this case, the second person 
might only show on the registration but not actually involved with the 
management or business activities. From the liability perspective, there may be 
more entrepreneurs preferring the limited liability company than sole trader 
company.  
 
In addition, there was a unique new change in the Company Law 2005, the term 
“manager” was introduced into the Company Law as the legal representative of 
a company. In accordance with Article 13, the legal representative of a company 
shall, according to the provisions of its articles of association, be assumed by 
the chairman of the board of directors, acting director or manager, and shall be 
registered according to law. If the legal representative of the company is 
                                            
463 According to the Article 58 in the Company Law 2005, the definition is "one-person limited 
liability company" as mentioned in this Law refers to a limited liability company with only one 
natural person shareholder or a juridical person shareholder”.
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changed, the company shall go through the formalities for modifying the 
registration.464 As commented by law scholars in China, this was mainly based 
on the consideration of SOEs. Some scholars disagreed with the Article. The 
underlying consideration is that the manager and the chairman of the board of 
directors are at the same administration level in SOEs, which is the unique rule 
in SOEs in China. 465  This scenario is only a political and administrative 
consideration in China’s case.466 From a normal and general legal perspective, 
a manager is bound with a contract and is an employee of the company.   
 
The Company Law is currently more adapted to the concept of contract, which 
is strongly influenced by western concept but also synthesises with the current 
state of the Chinese economy and general situation. The conflict between 
regulation enforcement and the contractual element has always been 
discussed, even in the late 1980s to early 1990s in the US. Professor Jiang Ping 
raised it at the conference around 2002. The concept has been considered and 
shown in the new Company Law revision.467 
 
 
                                            
464 Article 13 of the Company Law. 法律教育网 (Falv jiaoyu wang) China Law Education, 新版
《中华人民共和国公司法》（2005年修订, 2006年 1月 1日施行）英汉对照法律英语 [New 
Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (2005 revised, 1st Jan 2006 enacted) 
English-Chinese compare version], accessed at 
http://www.chinalawedu.com/new/23223a23228a2010/20101222shangf112139.shtml 
(accessed 26 February 2014). 
465 Jiang P, Zhao X D and Chen S, supra n 442. 
466 Chinese State-Owned Enterprises normally have the manager pointed by government, 
therefore, it is not as Western managers who hired by the company based on the contract 
terms.  
467 Jiang P, Zhao X D and Chen S, supra n 442. 
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Piercing Corporate Veil, Disregard of Corporate Personality 
 
The Company Law showed the balance that among all parties that relates to 
companies. The Company Law 1993 did not have the regulation regards the 
balance of the parties’ rights, therefore, there were issues in practice. The new 
revisions had corrected and many rules had shown the concept of maintaining 
balance among parties. For instance, the General Provisions of the Company 
Law, Article 20 “piercing corporate veil”. 
 
Article 20 stated that the shareholders of a company shall comply with the laws, 
administrative regulations and articles of association, and shall exercise the 
shareholder's rights according to law. None of them may injure any of the 
interests of the company or of other shareholders by abusing the shareholder's 
rights, or injure the interests of any creditor of the company by abusing the 
independent status of juridical person or the shareholder's limited liabilities. 
Where any of the shareholders of a company causes any loss to the company 
or to other shareholders by abusing the shareholder's rights, it shall be subject 
to compensation. Where any of the shareholders of a company evades the 
payment of its debts by abusing the independent status of juridical person or the 
shareholder's limited liabilities, and thus seriously damages the interests of any 
creditor, it shall bear joint liabilities for the debts of the company.468 Although 
                                            
468 Article 20, original description is “The shareholders of a company shall comply with the 
laws, administrative regulations and articles of association, and shall exercise the 
shareholder's rights according to law. None of them may injure any of the interests of the 
company or of other shareholders by abusing the shareholder's rights, or injure the interests 
of any creditor of the company by abusing the independent status of juridical person or the 
shareholder's limited liabilities. Where any of the shareholders of a company causes any loss 
to the company or to other shareholders by abusing the shareholder's rights, it shall be 
subject to compensation. Where any of the shareholders of a company evades the payment 
of its debts by abusing the independent status of juridical person or the shareholder's limited 
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many advanced countries have this “piercing corporate veil” existing in the legal 
systems, in both of the “civil law” and “common law” systems, most of the rules 
are in the case law or exceptional regulations. China’s Company Law has clearly 
written the concept into the general provision of the statutory law. 
 
4.4.3 Law in Emerging Market 
 
The Company Law shows several points that proved itself as a very advanced 
law in Chinese law scholars’ opinions. The deep reason is the legislature in 
China is moving from transplanting western laws to adapting laws into Chinese 
unique characteristics, and this trend will make more advanced laws for China 
in future. However, there are many issues exist in the progress. And 
transplanting process is not based on the economic, cultural and conceptual 
contexts, therefore, the similar regulations in Company legislation show different 
interpretations. 
 
Based on the general understanding, there are some differences but not limited 
to these occurred in Chinese Company Law and UK Company Law: 
                                            
liabilities, and thus seriously damages the interests of any creditor, it shall bear joint liabilities 
for the debts of the company.” 法律教育网 (Falv jiaoyu wang) China Law Education, 新版《中
华人民共和国公司法》（2005年修订, 2006年 1月 1日施行）英汉对照法律英语 [New 
Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (2005 revised, 1st Jan 2006 enacted) 
English-Chinese compare version], available online at 
http://www.chinalawedu.com/new/23223a23228a2010/20101222shangf112139.shtml 
(accessed 26 February 2014).  
Company Act 2005 revision and 2013 revision, China Law, 
http://search.chinalaw.gov.cn/law/detailSearchOne?LawID=333154&Query=%E5%85%AC%
E5%8F%B8%E6%B3%95&IsExact=&PageIndex=3,  and 
http://search.chinalaw.gov.cn/law/detailSearchOne?LawID=394865&Query=%E5%85%AC%
E5%8F%B8%E6%B3%95&IsExact=&PageIndex=3 (accessed 7 September 2017). 
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• The forms and categories are different: UK Company Law shows more 
specific and detailed categories compared with Chinese Company Law on 
the types of registered companies. It might be because these two countries 
are in completely different government governance systems and the legal 
systems.  
• The succession of a corporation is mentioned under UK Company Law, but 
not under Chinese Company Law. 
• The transferable nature (convention regulation) among company forms does 
not exist in China, the corporations may apply to the State Administration for 
Industry and Commerce of the PRC for certain changes, but not in the case 
of changing legal forms. 
• The classification of companies: Under UK Company Law, the private 
company is a company which is not a public company, this is not the same 
as under Chinese Company Law. Under UK Company Law, “there are no 
restrictions on the right to transfer the shares of the company or on the 
number of its members unless the articles contain such restrictions”.469  
• Single-member companies: Under the UK Company Law, the documents 
which are sent to Companies House are the same as those required for 
multi-member companies.470 However, the single-member company cannot 
have the sole director acts as the company secretary as well, based on the 
s 282 and s 283. In other words, there must be at least two officers in a 
single-member company.471 
                                            




• Company secretary: As stated above, that the sole director cannot be the 
company secretary at the same time. However, in Chinese Company Law 
there is no such position in companies in the regulations. 
• The accounting exemptions for private companies (SMEs), but the 
regulations show the opposite in China, which is that the smaller sizes 
companies are, the stricter on the assets assessments and auditing 
requirements. 
• The regulations of small and medium-sized company group: Under s 247A 
of UK Company Law, a company which has subsidiaries, i.e. it is a holding 
or parent company, although it satisfies the definition of a small or medium 
company, cannot be treated as one unless the group as a whole is small or 
medium within the definitions given below. Thus, if the parent company 
qualifies as a small company but the group is medium-sized, the parent 
would only be entitled to the exemptions available to a medium-sized 
company when preparing individual accounts. This article is not created in 




It has been found that there are differences between UK Company Law and 
China Company Law in regard to the legal forms and regulations. Although the 
Chinese legislature has transplanted Western terms and regulations in general, 
the ideology and understanding towards Company Law and businesses are 
omitted in China. The revised Chinese Company Law has made impact and 
support to entrepreneurs. However, the issues do exist and will appear because 
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of the lack of understanding and ideology. There are limitations in this thesis that 
cannot cover all differences in Company Law in the two jurisdictions, but there 
have been many scholars work on the matters. This chapter aims to examine 
the mechanisms of corporate governance, suggest to considering legal vehicle 
before establishing a business is crucial for entrepreneurs. Meanwhile, in terms 
of the research subject, family businesses, they shall review carefully before 
choosing legal vehicle, along with the consideration of proper mechanisms in 
the businesses. The business will perform well under such suggestion – the 
careful consideration of having a combination of proper legal vehicle and 
mechanisms of corporate governance from a very early stage, such as planning 
to establish a business.  
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The majority of businesses in worldwide are family businesses. 472  Family 
businesses have been seen as the first successful and most important type of 
firms, particularly important for short industrial history countries.473 As early as 
a paper that published in 1983, Richard Beckhard and W. Gibb Dyer, Jr., 
concluded that nearly 96 per cent (14.4 million out of 15 millions) of businesses 
in the US are family-controlled.474 Family businesses account for two thirds of 
all businesses around the world.475 85.4% of private enterprises are family 
owned in China.476 25% of the total UK GDP is generated by UK family firms.477 
Europe has 44.8% of the top 500 family businesses.478 Two decades later, the 
percentage is still high in globe. From the perspective of employment, family-
owned businesses provide most of the jobs in the market.479 Furthermore, in 
term of the contribution they make for economy of the country, 40 per cent of 
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the gross national product was made by family-owned businesses.480 Family-
owned businesses are one kind of businesses that survives longest in the history, 
and continually contribute to all economies in the world. 
 
The research that specifically focuses on the family businesses has been over 
three decades. It is widely recognised to be important subject to be researched 
on. There have been many studies conducted on family businesses, especially 
in management study. However, there are areas in family business study that 
have not been concentrated on, for instance, some scholars brought out the fact 
the “family variable” has not been examined in organisational research. 481 
According to some commentators, “not considering the family as a variable in 
organisational research can lead to incomplete and misleading findings.”482 
Family businesses are distinguishable and important to be further examined 
from different studies. It is also necessary to be studied at a comprehensive 
level. 
 
Some family businesses have hundreds of years of history, nevertheless, the 
challenges for family businesses are various globally. Contexts of different 
countries are so different that this seems to be a reason for the variety of forms 
of family businesses. However, with the development of research from varying 
perspectives and a deeper understanding of family business, many scholars 
have found and confirmed that all different family business have a certain 
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developing pattern, so named after the development of human beings - Life 
cycle.483 The theory is very crucial for obtaining a better understanding of family 
businesses, and transitions through the various stages have strong impacts on 
businesses and their governance. Therefore, the research of life cycle theory 
cannot be neglected in this thesis. 
 
5.2 Definition of Family Business 
 
Defining family businesses has been a challenge and difficult to define from a 
comprehensive level. The reason for scholars’ attempts to define family 
business is to distinguish this type of business from other types. Family 
businesses have many factors that makes them different from non-family 
businesses, for instance, their families are different from other businesses’ 
families.484 Distinguishing factors help to provide guidance to family businesses. 
Knowing the differences, families of family businesses could understand the 
features that make them different then manage the challenges arising in the 
businesses and in family affairs. 485  A family also needs to recognise the 
interests of the company and work as one in order to support the success of the 
company.486 Unity is a very crucial factor in overcoming difficulties. There are 
various conflicts in family businesses, which exist between family members or 
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between businesses and families.487 For instance, the workplace role conflict, 
which is not exactly systematically examined in family business research, but it 
is commonly recognised as happening among family members.488 Although 
there is lack of evidence and empirical work to prove these conflicts489, they 
affect family and business in family firms and become a great challenge.490 In 
addition, the conflicts are more obvious and vital compared with other forms of 
enterprises. These conflicts that arise between family and business can damage 
business performance and the family relationships,491 as well as give rise to 
long-term tensions in the business and family. Therefore, it requires a lot of effort 
to understand and overcome from business side and family side together to 
operate a successful family business. All in all, to distinguish family businesses 
from other business types will help family businesses to face existing and 
forthcoming challenges. 
 
Most definitions of family businesses include the “family” factor in definitions. 
Alternatively, some conclude a family business is simply a family with a business 
operation. According to Carr and Sequeira family businesses have the following 
characteristics, “…suggests that the family business plays a great role in the 
career choices of individual family members, and in particular the children of 
family members associated with the business. In fact, the attitudes and 
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490 Other conflicts include time-based conflict, strain-based conflict and behavior-based 
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491 Kellermanns F W and Eddleston K A, “A family perspective on when conflict benefits family 
firm performance”, (2007) 60 Journal of Business Research, 1048-1057. 
 163 
subjective norms related to this career choice may be reflective of this influence. 
Thus, the attitudinal and behavioural mechanisms within the family business can 
shape or influence subsequent entrepreneurial intent”.492 Beehr, Drexler Jr and 
Faulkner identified the following as relevant characteristics: “some people in 
such firms [family firms] are related to others through both work and non-work 
roles. These often include, for example, roles as employer and employee as well 
as mother or father and son or daughter”.493 Churchill and Hatten defined family 
businesses as follows: “family businesses are basically owner-managed 
enterprises with the family involved within the business”.494 In the research of 
Brenes et al., a family business is defined as a company which is mostly owned 
and managed by a single root family.495 Chua et al. define a family business as 
“family” plays an important role and supports business in its ownership, stated 
as “… a business governed and/or managed with the intention to shape and 
pursue the vision of the business held by a dominant coalition controlled by 
members of the same family or a small number of families in a manner that is 
potentially sustainable across generations of the family or families”.496  
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Some of definitions include the level of majority ownership and family control 
within the firm497, or the likelihood of family succession498, which existed since 
the early years of the literature. The researchers such as Berry499, Lansberg, 
Perrow and Rogolsky500, Burch501, Barnes and Hershon502 and Ward503 defined 
family businesses by ownership, ownership and management involvement of an 
owning family, and generational transfer.504 One of the commonly recognised is 
“family businesses are a business in which owners intend to pass ownership to 
one or more other family members and a business in which the owner and at 
least one other family member work.505 The advantage of these definitions is 
that it is easier to distinguish family businesses by defining them by family 
involvements since other business types sometimes do have different levels of 
family involvements. The disadvantage is that the definitions might put some 
small family businesses out of the circle. However, the definition of family 
businesses keeps developing, there are recent research is focusing more on the 
family business culture.506 
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It seems that in the literature, the trend of defining family businesses has 
become more specific with time. A research conducted by Astrachan, Klein and 
Smyrnios, developed the F-PEC scale, they commented that the relevant issue 
is not whether a business is a family business or non-family business, but that it 
is the family involvement and influence on the firm that matters. The F-PEC 
scale is an alternative way of assessing family influence on a continuous 
scale.507 The scale covers three features, which are power, experience and 
culture. The researchers chose three dimensions, power, experience and 
culture, as the subscales for F-PEC.508 From the power dimension of the scale, 
Astrachan, Klein and Smyrnios confirmed that the ownership can influence a 
business. In family business, it is the family that can influence the business.509 
However, ownership is only one aspect that affects family businesses. Other 
features, such as governance and management involvement, as well as legal, 
political and economic factors in different countries are all influencing the 
businesses.510 It appears that more alternative definitions are the trend in the 
research for defining family businesses. 
 
The above definitions are only a portion of varying discussions, there is still no 
universal definition of a family business. However, consider there is lack of 
mentioning the understanding, skills, family values and such factors that are 
valued most in family business ownership and operation from generations to 
                                            





generation511, it might be possible for businesses to meet criteria of family 
businesses and to be recognised as family businesses.  
 
The criteria of the definition shall consider what forms a family business takes 
rather than give a sentence or a paragraph. The possible consideration of 
criteria may include: 
• “family” as an important factor running through businesses; the leading 
roles of managing businesses are family members (founder’s family and 
relatives); 
• the ownership and supports are in the control of one root of family 
(surname, registration of households et cetera); 
• the behaviour of recruiting family members and relatives to work for 
businesses; 
• share same family values and norms, in certain cultural awareness; 
• have the intention of running through generations;512 
 
5.3 Corporate Ownership 
 
Ownership is an issue that is viewed as an independent mechanism from other 
governance mechanisms.513 It is an issue that relates to the life cycle theory, 
which shows the importance of the theory that will be discussed later in this 
chapter. Ownership and control is important to every corporation, including 
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family firms. There are debates about family business definitions because of the 
ownership issue and there are studies towards life cycle models for 
understanding ownership. The research shows that succession planning is to 
serve the purpose of keeping ownership within a family for family firms, as 
named as close corporations.514  
 
Ownership and management are clearly separated in publicly held and large 
corporations, whereas most closely held small and medium-sized enterprises 
may not.515 Most of closely held small and medium-sized enterprises are family 
firms. The estimation for family firms is from 42 to 95 per cent in the US.516 The 
same members or the members from a single root of family commonly constitute 
their ownership.517 Their ownership, governance and top management team 
have been examined in family business studies.518 The ownership of family 
businesses develops the definition of family firms. One of the definitions is 
defined by ownership, which is also the feature that is recognised to distinguish 
family firms from others.519 
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Small and medium-sized enterprises tend to operate locally and regionally 
before moving to internationalize their businesses. 520  Because different 
countries have different laws and regulations to comply with, the businesses that 
expanded in international environment would have to adapt to the local 
governance system. The ownership, governance and other mechanisms would 
have changed and localized to meet the governance mechanisms in each 
jurisdiction, where the cross-listing is often beneficial for improving 
governance.521  
 
The board structures and compositions include a one-level board system in the 
US and the most western countries. 522  The two-level system that a board 
member of management board or governance board member is not allowed to 
sit as a member of both boards at the same time, which is the situation in 
Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. 523  The corporate governance 
literature shows that concentrated corporate ownership structure exists in both 
developed and developing countries, but the US is with dispersed ownership 
structures.524 UK is also in the same ownership structures as the US.525 
 
The US has grown and matured in the 20th century, and formed a mixture of 
corporate ownership structures, named as a “Market Oriented Blockholder 
Model (MOBM)”. 526  This model primarily is the corporate public ownership 
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blockholder level,527 is a public corporate ownership model that shows the block 
holdings develop along with the market mechanisms.528 The performance of this 
model is good overall because it is a mechanism of corporate governance to 
monitor management function and develop liquid markets.529 This model is 
important for the reasons that it reflects the realities in the market, and it is a 
trend that the US ownership affects influences worldwide.530 In other words, US 
ownership structure has led and influenced other countries in terms of improving 
corporate governance, to further benefit economies in many parts of the 
world.531  
 
Historically, the trend was that US ownership developed from concentrated to 
dispersed during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.532 Organisations used 
the corporate form to raise funds from public investors, which resulted the 
dispersed ownership in public firms.533 This trend was also a beginning of the 
financial capitalism, opening a new era of equity investments.534 During that time, 
by the 1930s, the wealth and power was very much held by the largest 
corporations in the US because of the dispersed ownership in these firms.535 
However, Berle and Means did not significantly comment on the value of small 
and medium sized public companies much, but recognised the contribution 
made by listed firms.536 According to the study, there were 573 corporations 
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listed on the New York stock market on the day of 9th March 1929, there was 
81.7 per cent of the total assets was made from the largest 130 firms, whereas 
the rest of 18.3 per cent was made from 443 remaining firms.537 It appeared that 
the 443 non-large firms made up a very small portion of the total assets, however, 
Berle and Means showed that they were 77 per cent of all the listed firms.538 
They also discovered that the dispersed ownership level raise with the size of 
the firms, the larger size it is, the more dispersed ownership it has.539 The other 
trend came from the separation of the ownership and control, was the rapid 
growth of institutional investors in 1950s.540 That included mutual funds, pension 
funds and insurance companies.541 They were a characteristic for the largest 
public firms in the US.542  
 
After the period of 1960s, the ownership structure in the US was still commonly 
having dispersed ownership.543 Institutional investors continued to grow during 
1970s544, and were still increasingly important to global financial system.545 70 
per cent of the US and the European syndicated leveraged loan market was 
owned by institutional investors and hedge funds. 546 It was still continually 
transferring share ownership from individual investors to institutional investors 
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during that period. 547  Since 1960s, institutional investors had increasingly 
important roles in term of monitoring their portfolio companies.548 It had brought 
into the re-concentration of shareholdings situation in the capital markets 
because of the participation of institutional investors, according to Davies.549  
 
In the case of the UK, the tax rules and rates caused ownership stakes reduction 
and institutional investors’ growth at the same time according to Cheffins and 
Bank.550 In contrast, Pichhadze expressed that the taxation made the transfer 
from one block holder that owns the share to smaller block holders, such as the 
family investors transfer the share ownership to the institutional investors.551 
During the 1970s, institutional investors were continually in strong positions in 
the US securities market, but the holdings became less and concentrated in few 
large firms.552 Meanwhile, direct individual share ownership declined.553 The 
situation showed that the process of transformation from individual block holders 
to financial block holders had begun in earnest, and it has continued till the 
present.554 Institutional investors used shareholder rights and other legal tools 
to influence managements and boards of their public corporations.555 According 
to Strine, stockholders have influenced  corporate boards and corporate strategy 
over the past 30 years.556 
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The ownership of large companies is varied in different countries.557 Corporate 
governance exists in many large family-controlled corporations across the world, 
either rich or poor economies. Particularly, it is common to find in Israel, Hong 
Kong and Sweden.558 In the case of Britain, there is no controlling shareholder 
in all the largest corporations. In the US, rich families only control a few leading 
companies, whereas in Mexico, a few extreme rich families control the large 
corporate sector. In Argentine and Canada, most of the firms or many listed 
companies are controlled by wealthy families.  
 
MOBM is a self-regulatory mechanism, which is market-driven, it brought 
ownership to blockholders (especially institutional investors).559 There would be 
possibilities for family businesses to develop similar self-regulatory corporate 
governance mechanisms in order to overcome challenges. Just as with the 
strong position of institutions in their portfolio firms, large-sized family 
businesses could develop on its own and small and medium-sized family 
businesses could adapt and create individual model, which could well monitor 
the management and the ownership. The monitoring improvement could help 




                                            
557 La Porta R, López-de-Silanes F and Shleifer A, “Corporate Ownership around the World”, 
(1999) 54 (2), Journal of Finance, 471–517 and Morck and Steier, supra n 50, study reported 
so. 
558 Morck and Steier, supra, n 50, 2., La Porta et al., supra n 557.   
559 Pichhadze A, supra n 524, 79 
 173 
5.4 Corporate Ownership in China 
 
The liberalization and reform in China’s market brought rapid economic growth 
in China. Since the time that China started opening to foreign investors and 
privatizing corporate enterprises, China has faced many challenges. Ownership 
is one of the issues of concern existing from the early reform period.  
 
China started two major changes back then: the reform in state-owned 
enterprises with minority ownership shares; and stock markets.560 The action of 
issuing minority shares in ownership led to the recent years of legal and 
regulatory developments, which is seeking to protect minority shareholder 
rights.561  
 
In terms of corporate ownership in China562, a joint public-private ownership 
structure is one feature that stands out for modern Chinese enterprises, also it 
is a typical characteristic for some large state-owned enterprises in early period 
of reform.563 With time, the process of privatization is making progress, legal, 
political and economic developments are adapting to privatisation transition. 
Then the step is adapting successful privatization models and foreign models to 
nurture the private business sector.564 
 
                                            






One model considered by William Goetzmann and Elisabeth Köll is a model for 
capitalism with Chinese characteristics. 565  China has created one code of 
corporate governance for its own jurisdiction  last century.566 Today, in the most 
important strategic enterprises and sectors, they were reformed into public-
private enterprises.567 This capitalism model, in the understanding of western 
culture, is seen as a new model that with Chinese characteristics, is “China’s 
creation and adaption.”568 However, from the historical and cultural perspectives, 
China has always been under the impact of officials and supervised by officials. 
In imperial times, local officials were so called Fu Mu Guan (parental officials), 
in control of their local economy, public safety and businesses matters.   
 
Apart from the big scale of enterprises with public-private structure, the 
predominant form of business – family business – these private firms have 
existed since imperial period in China before the public-private structure was 
created.569 The family businesses were mostly successful operating mainly in 
imperial silk, salt, mines and such sectors that were closely controlled and 
supervised by government. Many would sparingly collaborate with government. 
This is not difficult to understand, in imperial times, all the wealth and land 
belong to the emperor, doing business was not easy for small businesses, 
therefore, the small businesses grew relying on their connections. Connections 
with other businesses locally, or with local officials, which meant that wealth 
came with the connection with governments. This situation is not necessarily an 
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example of corruption, but so called guanxi, which will be discussed and 
explained later in this thesis. Guanxi is not corruption but guanxi can be 
corruption if people cross lines. Such connections were crucial for family 
businesses, especially the successful ones operated locally and nationally.  
 
Another corporate structure models, which have strong Chinese cultural and 
social context, newly developed and adopted with Western models – the models 
with strong influence of kinship networks. 570  Agreeing with the findings of 
Faure571 and Choi572, Goetzmann and Köll find that Chinese families have 
strong influences over the businesses. It is very rare that family businesses have 
the control of equity and the separation of management. Therefore, corporate 
governance issues are often least applied to Chinese family businesses. 
 
In contrast with many advanced economic countries, on the aspect of minority 
shareholder protection issue, China has a weaker system. However, China has 
been enforcing better corporate transparency and shareholder accountability,573 
which is a developing process of corporate governance in the context of 
China.574 One important finding is that Chinese founders and their families did 
not establish their ownership in the enterprises through majority shareholding.575  
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5.5 Life Cycle Theory and Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
 
Corporate governance has been recognised as important for all enterprises 
increasingly, that includes the private sector.576 According to Brenes et al., 
“corporate governance is a guidance and management structure aligning and 
organizing ownership management and business management. Corporate 
governance comprises three different elements: the stockholders’ assembly, the 
board of directors and the top management team.” In the case of family 
businesses, the stockholders’ assembly, board composition and management 
team are different compared with other corporations. Therefore, the corporate 
governance structure will be different in individual cases of family businesses.  
 
Life cycle models have been examined to understand and analyse family 
business continuity. Essentially this literature helps family businesses to 
understand the business development process, planning strategies in order, for 
example, to process the succession progress smoothly. The main challenge for 
family businesses throughout its cycle of development is the communication 
among families and businesses. Therefore, a corporate governance structure 
and mechanisms for controlling and improving such purpose is desired.  
 
Brenes et al. conducted research on assessing several mechanisms in 22 family 
businesses to find out the impact of these mechanisms on family business 
performance.577 They identified that succession and equity control issues are 
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the key problems for family businesses.578 As families of these businesses are 
concerned about whom will be the suitable successor to continue the 
businesses. Furthermore, the related concern is how members in the families 
will inherit equity shares to partake in the ownership of the businesses.579 The 
research was conducted based on the fact that these family businesses tried to 
avoid or solve conflicts and created relevant mechanisms in the firms to ensure 
decisions and policies are made and implemented within families and 
businesses.580 According to Brenes et al., mechanisms of governance system 
aim to ensure the implementation of decisions and policies that family and 
business made, to improve the implementation of the strategy and to control the 
family and business transparency between all stockholders. The board of 
directors apparently is a key mechanism on keeping family business balance 
and continuity.581   
 
Apart from the recommendation of having the board of directors, which mainly 
was focused in the research of Brenes et al., there are other mechanisms that 
can be created by family businesses, the paper suggests that the businesses 
can make policies and protocols according to their own situations and conditions, 
be innovative on the matter. However, assessments for these mechanisms are 
crucial during the process of continuity, the relevant assessing tools need to be 
created relevantly. If as the impacts of corporate governance mechanisms are 
so important for family businesses, as the tools for family businesses continuity, 
                                            
578 Brenes E R, Madrigal K, Molina G, “Family business structure and succession: critical 
topics in Latin American experience”, (2006) 59 (3), Journal of Business Review, 372-374. 




there need to be criteria for these business mechanisms, in order to assess the 
direction and success of the businesses. These corporate governance 
mechanisms may or may not be the same as within other corporations, 
considering the purpose is to create transparency for stockholders, bridge 
families and businesses, prevent or solve conflicts, make decisions, strategies 
and policies for business performance et cetera. In addition, the assessments 
for these mechanisms can be variable to serve the purpose, for instance, have 
an assessment scheme for board members, regardless whether it is family 
board or non-family board, both of them need to join the assessment or appraisal 
annually (or a certain period of time), and based on the criteria such as their 
commitment and loyalty to the businesses, and their level of business 
knowledge business knowledge. It is important to measure the efficiency and 
reliability of the board members. 
 
Board composition is varying in individual cases, also it is different in varying 
contexts of culture and general environment.582 For instance, the US boards 
have the stockholders that own the largest number of shares on boards for 
public companies (control purposes), whereas in state-owned companies 
(mainly public companies) in China, the Communist Party members usually sit 
on boards (also for controlling purposes). Brenes et al. listed the factors such as 
political, historical, legal and economic factors as external aspects; and also the 
internal aspect such as business culture are fundamental for the board’s 
structure and the selection procedure.583 In the case of family businesses, there 
                                            
582 Ibid. 280. 
583 Ibid. 281. 
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are factors such as confidence, respect, power, and/or family links.584 Although 
individually for public companies the legal requirements in each country are 
varying, Boards in general include independent, non-executive members to 
meet objective independent requirement in many countries.585 
 
With globalisation, financial markets and the intention of investing globally have 
reduced the particularities in board composition locally and culturally. In the US, 
a convergence of a single board model is the trend and has become popular.586 
However, the scandals such as Enron and WorldCom have raised the 
awareness of the board’s failure to detect fraud.587 As Brenes et al. suggested, 
these failures raised the importance of the balance of power as the purpose of 
corporate governance serves. Therefore, the importance of complying with 
corporate governance has clarified again in practice and in theory. 
 
5.6 Life Cycle Theory and Succession in Family Business 
 
5.6.1 Life Cycle Theory in Family Business 
 
Business development has certain pattern, and in the case of family businesses, 
there are developing stages, which is named by scholars as “life cycle models”. 
Scholars believe that the growth of business is similar to human being, from birth 
to death. Business as a legal personality given by Company Law, has separated 
                                            
584 Ibid. 
585 Ibid. 
586 Ibid.  
587 Ibid. 
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personality, therefore, the birth of a company is starting up the company and 
register it according to the Company Law. The death of a company is 
announcement of its ending, complying with Insolvency Law. From birth to death, 
a business might experience several periods of growth, such as expand, reform, 
failure. 
 
Life cycle theory is used to analyse the developing stages of family businesses. 
It is not only a theory itself, it relates to several other important theories, and 
develops family business field of research. Through the research of life cycle 
theory, family business field has expanded and linked with other disciplines 
theories, finally connecting into an interdisciplinary net. For instance, life cycle 
theory provides the prediction of issues that would exist in next stages for family 
business founders and their successors, allowing them to understand which 
stage their businesses have reached, and what are the next steps for their 
businesses, when should they plan for the succession, when should they 
prepare for retire et cetera.  
 
Furthermore, life cycle theory analyses and shows family business developing 
stages, it leads to the discussion of succession planning, minority shareholder 
protection, apart from the ownership issue stated above in this chapter. Firstly, 
succession planning is caused from the stressing point between generations 
when the last generation passes ownership and control to the next generation. 
Secondly, succession is a transfer of power between generations and it is an 
option for families that do not seek to sell their businesses – “non-market 
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considerations”.588 Therefore, the key in succession planning is who is the right 
successor. Thus, analysis of life cycle models could help to plan succession in 
advance and prepare the success of succession planning. 
 
Life cycle models are the key aspect in life cycle theory, it closely relates to 
ownerships. Life cycle theory is essential for understanding developing stages 
of businesses, in between of the stages, tensions occur in family businesses. It 
could be the tension between generations, or between ownership and 
management. Succession issue as one of the most influential issues for family 
business is worthy to examine closely. 
 
Chinese Family Firms’ Life Cycles 
 
Wong Sui-lun found a classic model that can be applied to many large privately 
owned publicly listed companies.589 In his research, he introduced four stages 
in family business development, as emergent, centralized, segmented and 
disintegrative stages. At emergent stage, a business is built as a partnership 
type, and then grows into a business that owned by a founding family through 
varying changes in shared ownership, thereafter, it grows into a steady stage, 
eventually becomes unstable, as the last stage is the cousins confederation 
stage.590 Although the model has been an outstanding research result in life 
cycle theory, since opening up period in China, economic, legal and regulatory 
                                            
588 Churchill N C and Hatten K J, supra n 494. 
589 Wong S L, supra n 483. Lawton P, “Modeling the Chinese family firm and minority 
shareholder protection: The Hong Kong experience 1980-1995” (2007) 49 (5/6), Managerial 
Law, 249-271. 
590 Wong S L, supra n 483. 
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reforms started, and under the impact of Chinese modern social and cultural 
contexts, it is doubtful if the model still applies to most Chinese corporations. 
 
Other Life Cycle Models in Literature 
 
Other scholars have developed other life cycle models, in general, they 
recognised that family business and its ownership development is very similar 
to human beings’ development cycles. Gersick et al. raised the model based on 
such human beings’ cycles, and supported by Neubauer and Lank, “young 
business family”, “entering the business”, “working together” and “passing the 
baton”.591   
 
Compared with Wong’s model, this human beings’ model is obvious and easy 
to recognise and understand in terms of the developing process, therefore, the 
succession process is easy to perceive. Furthermore, there is a perceived 
weakness Wong’s model, since 1978 China started “opening up” policy, the 
rapid economic, legal and political developments, along with western knowledge 
and some elements of culture have flooded into China. Family business owners 
have learnt to apply western management techniques into their Chinese context, 
these developments might affect the adoption of the model. Overall, in life cycle 
literature, succession issue is prominent and exists through all stages in all life 
cycle models.  
 
                                            
591 Neubauer F and Lank A G, supra n 483, 27-55. Gersick K E, Davis J A, Hampton M M and 
Lansberg I, supra n 472. 
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Minority Shareholder Protection in Family Businesses 
 
Secondly, life cycle theory leads to an important issue in corporate governance 
– minority shareholder protection. The reason is life cycle theory provides 
analysis of stages and along with the changes between generation and 
ownership changes. During the changes, the minority shareholder protection 
becomes an obvious issue for corporations. The life cycle models indicate the 
likely stress points during which problems and stresses can occur and disputes 
between family members occur. 
 
Minority Shareholder Protection 
 
Large corporations, especially the public listed ones have easier access to the 
assets and cash from investors, who generally trust the governing body to 
increase firm performance. For the reason of complying with legal, disclosure 
and other transparency regulation requirements in different jurisdictions, 
shareholder rights are required to be protected. However, in countries that have 
weak legal protection for minority shareholders, excess cash premium is 
larger.592 Furthermore, as Frésard and Salva found, the insiders are able to take 
their own benefits out of the expense of minority shareholders in poor 
governance mechanisms.593 Where the countries have low level of minority 
shareholder protection, there is a large discount on the value that investors place 
on cash holding, but not in the countries that minority shareholders are protected 
                                            
592 Frésard L and Salva C, “The value of excess cash and corporate governance: Evidence 
from US cross-listings”, (2010) 98 Journal of Financial Economics, 359-384. 
593 Ibid. 
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effectively.594 Therefore, the protection of minority shareholders is an important 
issue for firms in all countries, but a difficult issue to solve. 
 
In term of family business and investors, Morck and Steier highlight the fact that 
in the countries where stock markets exist but with fewer investor protection 
legal regulations, majority of companies are family businesses, compared with 
the countries with no stock markets.595 Which means, minority shareholders’ 
rights could be continually in violation if the families of family businesses keep 
control conservatively, or over protect their control rights in the business. Since 
they find this kind of close control governance system is beneficial for their 
private benefits.596 As we can see from the US stock market, and its demanding 
legal disclosure requirement, there are solutions to encourage a better corporate 
governance operating environment. With developing economy and law in China, 
from the new code that combined international corporate experiences and 
Chinese business structure (including limited liability), the requirements of 
transparency and accountability, have laid the foundations for minority 




                                            
594 Ibid. Pinkowitz L, Stulz R and Williamson R, “Does the contribution of corporate cash 
holdings and dividends to firm value depend on governance? A cross-country analysis” (2006) 
61 (6), Journal of Finance, 2725-2751. 
595 Morck and Steier, supra n 50, 6.  
596 Ibid. 
597 Goetzmann W and Köll E, supra n 105. 
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Minority Shareholder Protection and Corporate Governance 
 
From the research results, investors’ value discounts as a result of large agency 
conflicts and insiders freely access to cash reserves.598 If the institutions are 
weak and/or exterior mechanisms are not effectively monitoring the controlling 
insiders, the risk is high with cash reserves.599 From the experience of cross-
listing in the US, which can provide potential solutions or effective methods to 
such issue – the potential private benefits associated with cash holdings and 
reduce or even end the discount investors place on their valuation.600 The 
research shows positive result that US cross-listing increases corporate 
governance standards. The corporate governance mechanisms also could 
protect minority shareholders’ rights, to prevent controlling insiders’ unlawful 




Shareholder disputes happen in throughout the world. In fact, the disputes can 
often be related to the life cycle models of family business. Taking an example 
of Re Yenidje Tobacco Co.,601 in the early stages of development in a family 
business, the dispute happened between partners, and that mostly happened 
among brothers or other family members. Also as the cases of Re Cuthbert 
Cooper & Sons Ltd., and Brady v Brady, all happened between inheritors.602 In 
                                            
598 Ibid. Evidence from Dittmar A and Mahrt-Smith J, “Corporate governance and the value of 
cash” (2007) 83 (3) Journal of Financial Economics, 599-634. 
599 Frésard L and Salva C, supra n 592. 
600 Ibid. 
601 Lawton, supra n 589, 250. 
602 These cases show the issue that how the business should be run and divided well 
between inheritors, furthermore, how to solve the more complicated situations, such as the 
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the case of Re Shiu Fook Co Ltd.603, a shareholder (the concubine of the 
deceased founder of the company) was in dispute but failed because she had 
not used other remedies. Many cases like these showed that the shareholder 
disputes are closely related to the life cycle model of Wong Sui-lun. Furthermore, 
these disputes need to be solved by constituting the corporate governance 
mechanisms in Chinese family businesses. The disputes of minority 
shareholders can be deemed as the result of the connection between life cycles 




Succession is one aspect of the ownership issue. Succession disputes are very 
common for Chinese family businesses. Take the example of Re Yenidje 
Tobacco Co.604, the last generation controlled the ownership, or not completely 
hand over the power in the second stage of life cycle. It is very common in 
succession planning, that the former generation has governing power and 
control over the firm, or they still get involved in the management of businesses 
after they retired. The case of Re H R Harmer Ltd.605 demonstrates the issue as 
well. The cases show several issues that are extant in succession procedure. 
Firstly, a good succession planning process is important since it is helpful to 
pass power and control successfully from the last generation to the next. 
Secondly, the psychology of the last generation and next generation is important 
                                            
problem of polygamy exists commonly in Hong Kong. Re Cuthbert Cooper & Sons Ltd. [1937] 
Ch 392, and Brady v Brady [1989] AC 755 HL in Lawton, supra n 589, 250. 
603 [1989] 2 HKC 342, in Lawton, supra n 589, 250. 
604 [1916] 2 Ch 426, in Lawton, supra n 589, 250.  
605 [1959] 1 WLR 62, [1958] 3 AII ER 689. 
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to be understood, in other words, the communication between two generations 
is important. Thirdly, the family and business, as two constituent parts of family 
business, play crucial roles in succession. At last, the institutions within family 
businesses play important roles as well during succession process. 
 
Thus, to examine the minority shareholder protection, as stated above, life cycle 
models can be helpful. The potential issues and stages that disputes and actions 
of minority shareholder could happen and arise in different stages; meanwhile, 
this issue connects to the succession issue. Therefore, the life cycle theory was 
discussed earlier in this chapter. 
 
Minority Shareholder Protection in China 
 
Violation of minority shareholders’ rights could happen during transitioning 
stages when controlling shareholders and listed companies are in play. Although 
there are several actions were taken in law by the government, which are the 
Company Law 1993, Company Law 2005 and Company Law 2013, it is still at 
the stage of improving and implementing minority shareholder protection. China 
put the Securities Law, the Ministry of Finance’s regulation (improving 
information disclosure) and others in to force to be a series of supplementary 
regulations to improve corporate governance matters. These regulations include 
shareholder voting rights (“one share, one vote”),606 fiduciary duties607, as well 
as the requirements of transparency, annual auditing reports, mid-year reports 
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and unaudited quarterly reports in the first corporate code608. The requirements 
for annual shareholders’ general meeting, legal and accountability reforms are 
all used to improve the protection issue in corporate governance. 
 
The solutions and new regulations to cover and eliminate the weaknesses in 
corporate governance are needed in China. As one of the main reason that 
government should make progress in legal reform, it is obvious that the 
government has been trying to create efficient laws in to enforcement, especially 
on the aspect of minority shareholders’ rights protection. However, the limited 
experiences of government make the progress difficult.609 This will be improved 
over time, the Company Law 2005 was an example, as more effective laws will 
be enacted and legislated in future. 
 
Minority Shareholders and Family Businesses 
 
The biggest threat to minority shareholders is the founding families in 
businesses, according to some research of international corporate ownership. 
Even some recent press reports also described that minority investors could be 
harmed by controlling families. The founders or founding families usually are the 
large shareholders in family businesses, their power and controlling position 
make them a threat to minority shareholders’ wealth. 610  According to the 
                                            
608 Goetzmann W and Köll E, supra n 105. 
609 Liu and Sun, supra n 607. 
610 La Porta, López de Silanes, and Shleifer, supra n 557, Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 
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Corporations”, (2002) 65 (3) Journal of Financial Economics, 365-395 discuss in their papers; 
Villalonga B and Amit R, “How are U.S. Family Firms Controlled?” (2009) 22 (8) Review of 
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research of the US, which is the country with the highest separated ownership, 
the founding families control is very high in a third of the 500 largest corporations 
and more than half of all public corporations.611 According to Faccio and Lang, 
“without vigilant oversight, large shareholders such as founding families are 
prone to exploit minority shareholder wealth”. 612  In addition, DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo documented, as Anderson and Reeb claimed that “large-
concentrated shareholders extract private rents through special dividends”.613 
There are other scholars holding similar opinions, the findings of Shleifer and 
Vishny 1986 and 1997 all reported and suggested that it was quite common that 
founding families did extract private benefits and harm other investors’ interests 
in large American public corporations. Minority shareholders are in a very 
vulnerable situation in the case of family controlled businesses.  
 
Founding families exploit private benefits from minority shareholders with many 
different methods in family businesses. Even in the US, the founding families 
could access to other shareholders’ wealth by using “their sheer stake through 
mechanisms such as dual-class stock, pyramidal ownership, and cross-
holdings”614. Excessive compensation schemes and related-party transactions 
are also used as common methods.615 For instance, Anderson and Reeb gave 
                                            
611 Anderson and Reeb, supra n 260 and 261, Villalonga B and Amit R, “How do Family 
Ownership, Control, and Management Affect Firm Value” (2006) 80 (2) Journal of Financial 
Economics, 385-417. 
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an example of, the founding Rigas family, as “Adelphia Communications” largest 
shareholder, using firm assets to their private benefit without interference from 
the board or other shareholder groups.616 
 
Thus, it is important to explore the solutions for such situation. It is hard to find 
a certain and proper solution to reduce founding families’ influences and control 
power in family businesses, meanwhile, some studies also mentioned that some 
traditional mechanisms of corporate governance, which supposed to use to 
reduce the control of founding families and solve the conflicts between 
leadership and shareholders, could not work effectively in the case of family 
businesses.617 Furthermore, according to some research, many issues such as 
corporate control, incentive compensation in family businesses, did not work as 
well as non-family businesses.618 Therefore, the minority shareholder protection 
has been a serious issue for family businesses and also has been recognized 
and widely criticized by researchers. 
 
The issue is difficult to solve because of the power and control of founding 
families in family businesses. After all, family businesses are built by founding 
families, the wealth of the businesses comes from their hard work, which could 
be one of the reasons that they do not consider about the rights of minority 
shareholders; Psychologically, founding families are in the powerful positions 
and they consider they own the business rather than see it as a separated legal 
identity, therefore, they would want to use the business assets for their private 
                                            
616 Anderson and Reeb, supra n 260 and 261. 
617 Ibid. 
618 Barclay and Holderness (1989), Shivdasani (1993), and Kole (1997) in Anderson and 
Reeb, supra n 260 and 261. 
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benefits. Therefore, a series of exterior and interior mechanisms need to be put 
into force to help the power balance. The experiences of the US could be 
beneficial for the solutions. 
 
Family Ownership and Family Control 
 
The situation and the reasons stated above could be some of the causes for the 
minority shareholder protection issue. There are also other issues that deeply 
affect the issue itself. The ownership and life cycle theory affect shareholder 
protection issue, according to the report of Martin De Holan and Sanz, “the 
mechanisms deployed to abuse the rights of minority stakeholders are multiple 
and quite well-known, and range from the internal consumption of profits to the 
transfer of assets at below-market prices (“tunneling”), and include other well-
known tricks such as manipulation of transfer prices within conglomerates 
among many others.”619 It seems that everything is controlled by the ownership 
of family businesses.  
 
However, does the ownership in family business specifically cause the violation 
for minority shareholder protection? Some of the evidence and research show 
that there is no significant difference between the better and weaker protection 
environments in terms of this.620 In other words, from the academic research, 
family ownership and control is not inefficient in protecting minority shareholders’ 
                                            
619 Martin De Holan P and Sanz L J, “Protected by the family? How closely-held family firms 
protect minority shareholders” (2006) Instituto de Empresa Business School Working Paper 
No. WP06-02, available at SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1019268 (accessed 28 
September 2016) 
620 Ibid. 1. 
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rights,621 which means, family ownership and control cannot be the only solution 
for minority shareholder protection, as the research of Martin De Holan and Sanz 
commented.622 
 
There are exceptions in practice, according to the empirical research of Martin 
De Holan and Sanz, there are some large and multinational family businesses 
performing well on the issue of minority shareholder protection.623 They protect 
their minority shareholders’ rights, moreover, they achieve this based on the 
relationship between their minority shareholders and their families rather than 
the requirements of law. This soft mechanism potentially has become one of the 
solutions to work in these businesses. In general cases, the behaviour that 
families have, which exploit private benefits from minority shareholders, is 
because families control the firms and they believe that they own all the assets 
of the firms. If minority shareholders want to get what they should be given, they 
tend to get close to the core families. In other words, if they are close to families, 
they can get the benefits through personal connection, where families in firms 
are willing to give. However, it is not fair to minority shareholder, as they invest 
in the firms, and they should not be the party that beg to get what they should 
get. The soft mechanism could be double-edged sword, for the shareholders 
who could have close relationship with the founding families, their rights could 
be protected, but in a hypothetical scenario.  
 





The Ownership Mechanisms of Family Businesses 
 
International corporate ownership literature suggests that founding families 
control the benefits of minority shareholders by using many different 
mechanisms.624 As stated above ownership mechanisms are crucial for the 
issue of minority shareholder protection apart from the soft mechanism that work 
in practice. There are several mechanisms of ownership that have been 
academically researched. However, dual-class stock is the one that has been 
widely examined.  
 
As an example of the agency problem, dual-class stock has been looked in the 
context of “insider holdings”625. However, as scholars reported that the party that 
gets major benefits is still founding families.626 Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick found 
that “the single most important determinant of dual-class status is having a 
person’s name in the firm’s name”627, the examples are like Wrigley, or Ford628, 
this is a very obvious sign or proxy of family control in family businesses. All of 
these scholars acknowledged, the separation of ownership and control activated 
by dual-class stock, caused the problem between large shareholders and 
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minority shareholders, because the large shareholders normally are families and 
minority or small shareholders are normally not from the controlling families.629  
 
In addition, founding families can improve their control through their position and 
power in the board of directors and leadership by using dual-class stock. It 
protects the controlling family shareholders but not the smaller shareholders 
which is non-family members mostly. 630  Meanwhile, they limit the public 
shareholders’ rights by governance supplying, and by using voting agreements 
and pyramids.631 They also pointed out that “privately held investment vehicles” 
are the way that founders and their families enhance their control of their 
businesses.632 Thus, the pyramids mechanism cannot be completely discussed 
in this situation since the publicly held companies are different from unlisted 
companies. Family businesses especially small and medium-sized family 
businesses would have difficulties to implement structures as other large-sized 
family businesses. Most family businesses especially with the name on the 
brand would prefer to have full control over all the business matters. 
 
The other important ownership is pyramids ownership. The pyramids 
mechanism in family-owned businesses does not commonly exist in the US, 
                                            
629 Ibid. 
630 Ibid. 
631 Ibid. 6. “the 21% incidence of dual-class firms that we find in our sample is considerably 
higher than the average of 17.61% reported by Faccio M and Lang L P H, supra n 610 for 
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even though the indirect ownership is common.633 The finding of La Porta, 
López de Silanes, and Shleifer showed the samples that, with one or more 
control-enhancing mechanisms, there is no sample company with “pyramids 
and cross-shareholdings” within the 20 largest US firms. However, the family 
votes are “only 19.65% which is lower than an average ownership stake that 
required to control 20% of the votes of only 19.65%, the second lowest among 
the 12 countries they classify as having high shareholder protection”. 634 
Furthermore, Morck’s research showed similar result of the pyramids 
mechanisms, which was found in the US based on arguments and historical 
evidences.635  
 
However, Gadhoum, Lang, and Young proved that pyramids mechanism 
disappeared in the 1930s from the US636, for the reason of “inter-corporate 
dividend taxation and other tax reforms that rendered them prohibitively 
costly”.637 In contrast, Villalonga and Amit found that pyramids mechanisms had 
really high rate in Europe.638 Controlling shareholders prefer to choose the 
mechanism of pyramids because it is an important way to separate cash flow 
ownership and their control rights, this mechanism can be used by controlling 
                                            
633 Meanwhile, they pointed out, “the dynamics of pyramiding via unlisted entities may be 
entirely different from pyramiding via public corporations” Villalonga and Amit, supra n 611, 
28. 
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shareholders to let present shareholders pay the costs but not share all of the 
benefits of a new venture. 639  Wolfenzon recommended this pyramids 
mechanism to the countries that with poor performance on minority shareholder 
protections.640 There is a trend for Asian family businesses especially the fast 
growing ones in the global environment to prefer to apply pyramidal structures. 
The richest families in Hong Kong apply indirect ownership to maintain a form 
of founding family ownership. This practice has further expanded to China’s 
wealthiest families which find these controlling ownership methods work well at 
present. 
 
Corporate governance legislations have different impacts because of the 
political determinants and cultural influences. Also, governance mechanisms of 
family businesses are taken to action in different countries. Therefore, combined 
with stated above discussions, depending on the different contexts in countries, 
the ownership mechanisms should be used individually and wisely. There 
should be careful and individual consideration for the firms. 
 
5.6.2 Succession  
 
Succession issue has been recognized in academia and practice as one of the 
most crucial issues in family business study and for family business operation. 
Succession relates closely with family controlled businesses in terms of 
business performance and longevity.  
                                            
639 As La Porta, López de Silanes, and Shleifer, supra n 557, 500 
640 Almeida H, and Wolfenzon D, “A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership and Family Business 
Groups” (2006) 61 Journal of Finance, 2637–2681.  
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Succession is a Complex Issue in Family Business Study 
 
Succession is a result of combining different aspects. From macroeconomic 
perspective, it is a product of social culture in a society; from microeconomic 
perspective, it is a product of mixing a family culture or tradition and an 
enterprise culture. Therefore, I think it is important to examine succession issue 
under the general social cultural environment, but also put it into every individual 
family business case, which contains a family and a business, to consider and 
apply succession planning based on individual culture. 
 
Succession and Corporate Governance 
 
Morck and Steier have indicated in their research that family businesses are 
commonly the ones that are more successful and more important enterprises 
compared with others, especially in the countries that grow rapidly.641 In the 
context of China, Faure, Choi and Morck and Steier proved that Chinese 
businesses are strongly influenced by their families. It is very rare to have 
separation between management and the control of equity, which means it is 
rare to apply corporate governance in the context of family businesses. 
Therefore, the disputes of succession and its solutions appear as a very urgent 
issue in such contexts. 
However, succession issue does not only have difficulties to apply because of 
the lack application of corporate governance, but also the impacts of internal 
and external influences, which are the family members in a family business and 
                                            
641 Morck R K and Steier L, supra n 50, 8. 
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the social contexts that a family business operates in. In other words, the family 
members who are in ownership for the moment (the “incumbents” in the 
research of Sharma, Chrisman, Pablo and Chua642), the successors themselves, 
other family members, and non-family members are all parts of the factors that 
internally effect succession process; Meanwhile, the family business operates 
in a social context, the country, the nation, the market, the policy and other 
economic, political and legal environments are the external influences for 
succession process.643  
 
Succession in Family Businesses and Non-Family Businesses 
 
Are family businesses different from non-family businesses? With the debates 
of family business definition, family businesses are different from non-family 
businesses has been discussed among scholars. Many researchers hold the 
opinion of there is no obvious difference between them; some agree that the 
differences might be on specific characteristics, such as firm growth644. However, 
Ibrahim et al. indicate that succession is seen as a fundamental distinguishing 
factor for family businesses and non-family businesses.645 Succession intention 
                                            
642 Sharma P, Chrisman J J and Chua J H, “Predictors of satisfaction with the succession 
process in family firms” (2003) 18 Journal of Business Venturing, 667-687, 668. 
643 Ibid. Sharma P, Chrisman J J, Pablo A L and Chua J H, ”Determinants of initial satisfaction 
with the succession process in family firms: A conceptual model” (2001) 25 (3) 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 17-36. They developed a model on succession 
satisfaction in family firms, and proposed there are five factors closely relates to the 
succession satisfaction, it is depending on the incumbents, the successors, the agreement 
among family members’ support, acceptance of their roles, and planning for succession. And 
they also pointed that different research has shown that many important factors are disagreed 
between incumbents and successors. In summary, that the main conflicts for succession 
process are in the internal environment of a family business that author mentioned above.  
644 Daily C M and Thomson S S, “Ownership structure, strategic posture, and firm growth: An 
empirical examination” (1994) 7 (3) Family Business Review, 237-249. 
645 Ibrahim N A, Angelidis J P and Parsa F, “Strategic Management of Family Businesses: 
Current Findings and Directions for Future Research”, (2008) 25 (1) International Journal of 
Management, 95-110. 
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is also seen as one of the factors that distinguish family business and non-family 
business by Chrisman et al.. 646  Others include but are not limited to the 
ownership 647 , management 648 , perceptions of environmental threats 649  and 
corporate governance 650 . Moreover, their research found that small family 
businesses consider succession issue more serious and more important, but 
not many of them have prepared for succession planning.651  
 
It might be worthy to consider, many small businesses are actually focusing on 
the business performance and profit margins, it is likely taking a long time for 
family founders and successors to realize the importance of having succession 
planning in early stage. From psychological perspective, it is not comfortable for 
incumbents to consider the absence of themselves. However, the importance of 
such process takes time to prepare, yet it is a lot of efforts for a family business. 
Therefore, it would be an educational matter for all family businesses, especially 
small ones. Also, considering succession as an interpersonal skill for 
entrepreneurs would be a possible solution for the awareness of having 
succession planning on board. 
 
                                            
646 James J. Chrisman, Jess H. Chua, and Lloyd P. Steier, “The influence of national culture 
and family involvement on entrepreneurial perceptions and performance at the state level” 
(2002) 26 Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, 113-130. Nabil A. Ibrahim, John P. 
Angelidis, and Faramarz Parsa, supra n 646. 
647 Ibid. 
648 Ibid. 
649 James J. Chrisman, Jess H. Chua, and Lloyd P. Steier, “An introduction to theories of 
family business”. (2003) 18 (4) Journal of Business Venturing, 441-448.  
650 Trond Randøy, Sanjay Goel, “Ownership structure, founder leadership, and performance in 
Norwegian SMEs: implications for financing entrepreneurial opportunities”, (2003) 18 Journal 
of Business Venturing, 619-637. 
651 Nabil A. Ibrahim, John P. Angelidis, and Faramarz Parsa, supra n 646.
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In order to maintain or gain the satisfaction of succession process, and with the 
consideration of the benefits that corporate governance mechanisms provide to 
a business, the trend of having certain mechanisms for ensuring succession 
planning succeed is implanting. With the family involvement in a family business, 
it is different from other corporation forms in terms of the governance structures. 
Neubauer and Lank raised the importance of having a governance structure for 
a family in family business652, family councils and committees are similar to the 
business corporate governance structure. From personal point of view, it is not 
easy to apply the governance structure within a family business, and it would be 
difficult to operate as strict as business structure in other corporations. Therefore, 
their applicability is possibly in doubt, though they are often suggested by family 
business advisors in the UK and used by their clients. 
 
For family businesses, successors should be strong and get ready to take over 
the business, meanwhile, the strong family involvements are needed, according 
to Neubauer and Lank.653 The reason could be, the nature of businesses comes 
from the owning families. As some researchers reported their studies, some 
factors of families would be helpful for businesses, such as the commitment 
among family members654. 
Furthermore, the effective ways in practice so far would be family institutions; 
they may prevent the conflicts of management in family businesses.655 In detail, 
                                            
652 Neubauer F and Lank A G, supra n 483. 
653 Ibid. 
654 This factor has been identified as the fundamental factor, other characteristics can be built 
base on this factor, reported by N. Stinnett and J. De Frain, Secrets of Strong Families, 
(Berkeley Books 1985). 
655 Many family businesses disappeared because of the conflict among family members, as 
the example of Fairfax family, which is one oldest and wealthiest business in Australia. It had 
147 years history but was destroyed within one year; the reason was the conflict among family 
members, Neubauer F and Lank A G, supra n 483, 78-80. 
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family institutions include: family meeting656, family assembly657, the family 
council658 and others659. In addition, for family businesses, the family statements 
should be paid more attention, which is crucial to avoid many disputes. It would 
be helpful for all family members to obey the rule. Neubauer and Lank provided 
the successful business case of Machine Tools S.A. (MTSA), to show how a 
multi-generational family business succeeds through succession process.660 
Although the case is rare, it can be an educational case study for other family 
businesses. The key of success is to have a right attempt and having the best 
interests of the family and the business as the goal. 
 
                                            
656 Family meeting is the most common institution type in family businesses. It was mostly 
built by controlling owners, as Neubauer and Lank supra n 483 introduced, in the controlling 
owner or entrepreneurial stage. The family meeting normally is not very formal, it builds the 
culture of family and their value system, and also it only includes founder and his family 
members to discuss affairs informally. However, even though it is not a very formal institution, 
family meeting put all agendas that family and business need on the table, it provides a 
chance that make everyone discuss the ownership or other issues of business, also it is a 
path that make potential successors learn business management and join the business. This 
family meeting could last for three or four generations according to Neubauer F and Lank A G, 
supra n 483, 81.  
657 With the development of family businesses, when there are more branches appeared, the 
family meeting change to “family assemblies” or “family forums”, Neubauer F and Lank A G, 
supra n 483, 81. This institution is very important for family businesses when they enter into 
the stage of cousins’ confederation. Neubauer F and Lank A G, supra n 483, 81. It used to 
avoid the negative forces, which could be from “larger shareholder group”, “multiple branches” 
and “active and non-active shareholders”, Neubauer F and Lank A G, supra n 483, 81. 
However, this type of institutions is not very common yet, it may more common in the US, but 
based on the report of Neubauer F and Lank A G, supra n 483, 81, it is becoming common in 
Europe, Australia, Latin America and other countries. Actually, the purpose of this institution is 
getting family members together and discuss issues they have. The business develops 
bigger, the separation of family members is not rare and surprising, thus, it is necessary to 
have a chance to get them all together. That is why normally the rule of family assembly will 
be held once or twice a year Neubauer F and Lank A G, supra n 483, 81. 
658 Family council can be called in different names, such as “family supervisory board”, “inner 
council” and “family executive committee”, Neubauer F and Lank A G, supra n 483, 83. 
659 There are various other family institutions, such as family shareholders committee, family 
nominating committee, family educational committee, family recreational committee, family 
offices that provide services, employment committee, family’s charitable trust or family 
foundation, and even the constitution committee Neubauer F and Lank A G, supra n 483, 85, 
actually there are many institutions created by families, it is not necessary to have specific 
institutions by rules, families can create as long as they need. Just as “the constitution 
committee” is the one that created by Bettys and Taylors, which is a British company with the 
third generation. Neubauer F and Lank A G, supra n 483, 85. 
660 Neubauer F and Lank A G, supra n 483, 137-142. 
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There has been intense attention paid to the cultural phenomenon of guanxi 
from academic research and practitioners in recent decades. Especially in the 
past decade due to the impact of the open Chinese economy, more attractive 
investment opportunities, economy politics and law reform in China. Regarding 
the interests from academia, it has been examined by many scholars in the fields 
of economics, sociology and history studies, due to its value as demonstrated 
in organisations, which is expressly stated by Yang and Wang in the institutional 
and economic contexts.661  
 
The chapter aims to discuss guanxi, as a soft mechanism in business operation 
in China; one important challenge in the society that family businesses face; a 
factor that relates to the performance of family businesses, needs to be 
overcome by setting up appropriate mechanisms within family businesses, 
especially small and medium-sized family businesses. Having guanxi as a soft 
mechanism in society along with the legal framework is not an excuse for not 
fostering good corporate governance norms. Although guanxi is a crucial aspect 
that influences the performance of firms, it does not significantly increase the 
internal operations of businesses. Therefore, to improve business performance 
internally and externally, it would be more beneficial for firms to use corporate 
                                            
661 Yang Z L and Wang C L, “Guanxi as a governance mechanism in business market: Its 
characteristics, relevant theories, and future research directions”, (2011) 40, Industrial 
Marketing Management, 492-495. 
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governance mechanisms systematically to maintain their performance in the 
long term. 
 
Due to the research on guanxi not being conceptualised in studies, and with the 
lack of evidence and sources in practice, the analysis is conducted based on 
personal experiences and literature research, the debates in this chapter are 
intended to lead to further studies in the future.  
 
6.2 Current Guanxi Research 
 
There are many debates concerning guanxi, due to its recognition as a crucial 
element in the Chinese context, as well as in stated in Western context and 
everywhere else.662 The debates are involved with its definition, its structure (or 
so named “guanxi model”).663 In the context of the origin of guanxi, it is directly 
interpreted from pronunciation in Chinese Mandarin, which is spelled as “guan 
xi” in Chinese pinyin, and is written as “guanxi” in English. In terms of its meaning, 
many scholars have tried to clarify in to English, but personally there is no equal 
phrase or term in English that could literally reflect its use in the Chinese context. 
This leads to more debates about its definitions. With the development of 
understanding this concept, it has been recognised as a particular term and 
used as guanxi in its English context. Some English terms, such as “network” 
have been widely used to reflect its meaning. From my perspective, which based 
                                            
662 Park S H and Luo Y D stated that guanxi is “an important cultural and social element in 
China”. Park S H and Luo Y D, “Guanxi and Organizational Dynamics: Organizational 
Networking in Chinese Firms”, (2001) 22 Strategic Management Journal, 455-477. Yang Z L 
and Wang C L, supra n 661.  
663 Fang T and Luo Y D name it as “guanxi model”. Luo Y D, Guanxi and Business, (World 
Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd 2000). 
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on the content of this chapter, the closest term in English would be 
“connections”664. Further discussions of debate will be presented in subsequent 
sections.  
 
Guanxi has developed from Chinese social and personal life to business, which 
was demonstrated by firms.665 It has been seen to have a great impact on 
business operations and performance, therefore it is said to be crucial to firms’ 
survival.666 Park and Luo find that guanxi has great impacts based on a survey 
of 128 firms from their findings that were collected in central China.667 They 
conclude that guanxi has direct connection towards better firm performance 
(market expansion).668 They also indicate that guanxi helps firms to expand their 
markets, and help to make firms competitive, but does not really work well for 
improving business operations internally.669 The relations and impacts of guanxi 
will be discussed in subsequent sections. 
 
In academic research, guanxi could be recognised as a concept, but has not 
been proved to be a theory at present. Scholars examined guanxi based on 
other theories. For instance, Park and Luo conducted an empirical study based 
on the framework that developed with organisational and strategy theories.670 
                                            
664 Gold T, Guthrie D and Wank D (eds.) Social Connections in China: Institutions, Culture, 
and the Changing Nature of Guanxi. (CUP 2002). 
665 Park S H and Luo Y D, supra n 662. “Although guanxi is embedded in every aspect of 
Chinese social life, companies demonstrate different needs and capacity for guanxi 
cultivation.” 
666 Ibid. “Chinese firms develop guanxi as a strategic mechanism to overcome competitive 
and resource disadvantages by cooperating and exchanging favors with competitive forces 
and government authorities.”  
667 Ibid. 
668 Guanxi has impacts on sales growth but only to a certain extent, it has much less impacts 
to profit growth.  
669 Park S H and Luo Y D, supra n 662. “Guanxi benefits market expansion and competitive 
positioning of firms, but do not enhance internal operations.” 
670 Ibid. 
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To conduct research on guanxi in this framework, it needs to be done according 
to the characteristics of guanxi - the setting of “institutional, strategic, and 
organisational factors”.671 Research result shows that these three factors are 
critical in the concept of guanxi. 672  However, Chinese firms use guanxi to 
different extents.673 Guanxi has different types within the individual level and 
organisational level, government relations and company relations; therefore, as 
mentioned in the research, government relations in guanxi is most likely to relate 
to the two settings - institutional and strategic factors.674  
 
6.2.1 Theories of Guanxi 
 
As a characteristic of Chinese culture, guanxi influences every aspect of 
people’s lives; now it obviously raises the attention for theorising it and its 
utilisation with the evidence that it influences business relationships with 
government and other institutions in China, which certainly includes family 
businesses. Guanxi firstly and originally use to describe the relationships at an 
individual level, such as the relationships among friends and family members. 
With the development of society, people found its use in business operations 
helps to improve market competition, which expands to the organisational level. 
 
From the perspectives of its meaning, it could be summarised into individual life 
and business practice. In individual life, guanxi normally is explained as a mix of 
several aspects: ganqing (emotions), renqing (favours), mianzi (face matters) 




674 Ibid. The guanxi with government authorities is a strategy of the firm.  
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as some scholars such as Ying Fan mentioned that is included in the “helper 
guanxi” aspect675, or as Yi Zhang and Zigang Zhang expressed as a reciprocity 
in a general guanxi context discussed in the paper676; In business practice, 
guanxi appears to be a positive factor for firm’s performance to a certain extent, 
for instance, as mentioned the market expansion. According to Park and Luo’s 
research, “… guanxi is more important in establishing external relations and 
legitimacy and positioning competitively in the market…”,677 but does not have 
much contribution to firm’s net profit.678  Furthermore, they concluded that the 
impacts of guanxi does not apply to internal operations in businesses.679 In other 
words, guanxi only helps on the firm performance (market expansion), but the 
issues that firms have internally are not solved with guanxi.680 To solve these 
internal operation issues, structures and setting of the firms should be applied. 
In other words, corporate governance structures could help to improve internal 
firm performance. However, due to the fact that many firms look at improving 
marketing profit instead of dealing with internal problems, this solution has been 
omitted by many firms. Meanwhile, maintaining guanxi is costly for firms, but it 
is perceived as crucial for firms to do so. Therefore, many firms still spend a 
certain amount of income to maintain it. The reason is that the business results 
guanxi brings to the market expansion are more obvious to firms in the short 
                                            
675 Fan Y, “Questioning guanxi: definition, classification and implications”, (2002) 11 
International Business Review, 543-561, 552. 
676 Zhang Y and Zhang Z G, “Guanxi and Organizational Dynamics in China: A Link between 
Individual and Organizational Levels”, (2006) 67 (4) Journal of Business Ethics, 375-392. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25123884 (accessed 21 October 2015). 
677 Park S H and Luo Y D, supra n 662, 473. “…the high costs to cultivate and maintain 
guanxi, which to some extent offset the benefits from market expansion, such as through 
operational inefficiencies.”  
678 Ibid.  
679 Ibid. “…the high costs to cultivate and maintain guanxi, which to some extent offset the 
benefits from market expansion, such as through operational inefficiencies.”  
680 Ibid. 
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term. 681  Nevertheless, we still have a limited understanding towards the 
marketing that guanxi has effects on.682 
 
As stated above guanxi is divided into individual level and organisational level. 
In the context of social norm and culture level, two theories are related to this 
organisational level of guanxi, which are institutional theory683 and legitimacy 
theory684. In the context of social networking, social networking theory685 and 
organisational learning theory686 are relevant to guanxi. Luo raised transaction 
cost theory, organisational networks theory, and resource-based strategy theory 
for understanding guanxi.687 Furthermore, guanxi-based governance theory as 
one body of grand theory has been introduced by Yang and Wang688, as these 
stated above theories help to understand guanxi from different perspectives to 
various aspects of guanxi. The researchers raised the attention of guanxi-based 
governance theory is demanding “cross-disciplinary and systematic research 
efforts” due to the complex nature of guanxi.689 
                                            
681 Ibid. “…the high costs to cultivate and maintain guanxi, which to some extent offset the 
benefits from market expansion, such as through operational inefficiencies.”  
682 Yang Z L and Wang C L, supra n 661, 494. 
683 Scott W R, Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interests, (3rd edn., Sage 
Publications, Inc. 2008). Xin K K and Pearce J L, “Guanxi: Connections as Substitutes for 
Formal Institutional Support”, (1996) 39 (6) Academy of Management Journal, 1641-1658.  
684 Yang Z L, Su C T and Fam K S, “Dealing with Institutional Distances in International 
Marketing Channels: Governance Strategies That Engender Legitimacy and Efficiency”, (May 
2012) 76 (3) Journal of Marketing, 41-55 
685 Wank D L, “The Institutional Process of Market Clientelism: Guanxi and Private Business 
in a South China City”, (1996) 147, The China Quarterly, 820-838. 
686 Ramasamy B, Goh K W and Yeung M C H, “Is Guanxi (relationship) a bridge to knowledge 
transfer?”, (2006) 59 (1), Journal of Business Research, 130-139. 
687 Luo Y D, supra n 663. 
688 Yang Z L and Wang C L, supra n 661. 
689 Ibid. 493. Guanxi as a governance mechanism has caught growing interests in doing 
business and academic research (Yang Z L and Wang C L, supra n 661, 492) The research of 
the unique aspects and the effectiveness of guanxi-based governance theory that Yang and 
Wang concluded is not much examined. Future study of guanxi-based governance is needed, 
for instance, examination in empirical examination of the interactions among the three 
elements - qing (emotion or feeling), li (reciprocity) and liyi (utilitarian benefits). 
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Some scholars raised an interesting argument, which is applying “interpersonal 
guanxi” to “organisational guanxi”690. It is a huge challenge for organisations 
according to Yang and Wang. 691  They stated that the interaction of 
“interpersonal trust” and “organisational trust” has been examined on a large-
scale, and guanxi appears to contribute differently in different contexts of trust. 
However, it does not seem to be the right interpretations between “interpersonal 
guanxi” and “interpersonal trust”, nor “organisational guanxi” and “organisational 
trust”. Yang and Wang did not have further detailed explanation as to whether 
the terms are equivalent to each other. Presently, it does not seem to be the 
right interpretation to conclude that “guanxi” is “trust”, because trust is one of the 




Guanxi and Trust 
 
Guanxi has been studied by academia and practitioners, trust as a very 
fundamental factor of building guanxi, the two terms sometimes come across as 
the same meaning. It can be said that due to trust being the basis of guanxi, 
what to gain from guanxi is gained based on trust in general. However, as I 
expressed earlier in the chapter, the guanxi in China is not exactly the same as 
the relationships or networks in a Western context. As Yi Zhang and Zigang 
Zhang stated, guanxi is built on the foundation of long-term and mutual trust, it 
                                            
690 Ibid.  
691 Ibid. 
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is more complicated than relationships and networks in Western contexts.692 
Therefore, the use of trust in guanxi is different from the Western understanding. 
The researchers concluded that guanxi is used under consciousness for both 
the individual and organisational level.693 When individuals or organisations 
want to achieve their objectives, they first resort to their Guanxi networks. 
Meanwhile, the possibility of satisfying their intentions depends upon the 
distance of the relationships and the degree of trust between them.”694 From the 
relationship between guanxi and trust, it is obvious that guanxi is a social 
relationship among people, which is not formally stated but built on mutual trust, 
therefore, it is not able to be stated directly and regulated by an external 
mechanism -  legal system. But to aim to use internal mechanisms such as 
corporate governance mechanisms in organisations to limit the use of guanxi. 
 
Study of Trust 
 
“The existence of trust is an essential component of all enduring social 
relationships.” 695  Trust has been recognised for its nature is changing, in 
modern societies, it appears to be important for a whole world to understand.696 
In the analysis of trust, the most fundamental factor that we need to recognise, 
is that trust has two sides: one side is the trustor, and the other side is the 
trustee.697 This distinction is made due to the reasons and sources of trust. In 
                                            
692 Zhang Y and Zhang Z G, supra n 676. 
693 Ibid. 
694 Ibid. 379. 
695 Seligman A B, The Problem of Trust, (Princeton University Press 1997), 13. 
696 Ibid. 14. 
697 Nooteboom B, Trust: Forms, Foundations, Functions, Failures and Figures, (Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited 2002), 8. 
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the relationship between trust and entrepreneurship, the lower the level of trust 
is, the more it restrains growth and market competition, and the less productive 
the firms can be.698 According to the summary of Höhmann and Welter, if the 
country’s environment favours entrepreneurship, which means the market 
economies are mature, institutional trust holds a prior position and personal trust 
is only a role that complements the entrepreneurship; however, if the country’s 
market is not mature, where there is a weak institutional framework, which 
happens in many emerging markets, such as China, personal trust comes as a 
priority.699 
 
In 2001 to 2003 the research of trust in entrepreneurial behaviour in Western 
and Eastern Europe formed the concept of trust and its measurement, to 
investigate entrepreneurial behaviour of small firms in differing cultural and 
institutional settings across Europe, assuming that trust has a decisive impact 
on entrepreneurship, as it determines ways into, and forms of, entrepreneurship 
as well as entrepreneurial behaviour.700 Explanation of trust in business and in 
culture determines analysing different levels of trust.701 
 
Thus, the concept of trust has been recognised by economists but has not been 
put into the framework of theories. 702  We know now that trust has an 
interpersonal side and an institutional side, which need to be examined in a 
                                            
698 Höhmann H H and Welter F, (eds.) Trust and Entrepreneurship – A West-East Perspective 
(Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2005), 2. 
699 Ibid. 
700 Ibid. 1. 
701 Ibid. 2. 
702 Nooteboom B, supra n 697, 8. 
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systematic way.703 The argument that trust is in the people’s interaction usually 
is a more accurate way of describing trust in my opinion, but there are debates 
in trust studies and relationships.704 The reason for this argument is that, in this 
argument, trust needs a process to achieve. The interaction is the part that is 
crucial to build trust.705 There is also another argument worth mentioning, which 
is trust requires four elements – trust, the object that trust is put in, the respect, 
and the conditions.706 These four elements mean a lot to guanxi in China’s 
context.  
 
China and Trust 
 
China has become the nation that international businesses would not risk to 
avoiding. China became the largest FDI recipient in 2002 for US $52.7 billion.707 
It increased by US $53.5 billion in 2003. Fang stated the statistics of “a total of 
465,277 foreign-funded enterprises, including more than 400 of the Fortune 
Global 500, were operating on the Chinese soil”708. China has been on the front 
line of global business operations since joining WTO and a series of world 
famous international events. China is known for its Chinese style of doing 
business. This approach is named as “one China, one style”709. It was once the 
method by which Western companies operated businesses in China, until they 
realised that there are a variety of approaches in doing business in China - 
                                            
703 Ibid. 
704 Ibid. 
705 Ibid. Six F, The Trouble with Trust: The Dynamics of Interpersonal Trust Building, (Edward 
Elgar Publishing Limited 2005), 4. 
706 Ibid. 
707 Fang T. “Chinese business style: A regional approach” in Brown D and MacBean A (eds.), 
supra n 3. 
708 Ibid. 1. 
709 Ibid. 
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guanxi is one of them. We are in an era of so much desire to understand how to 
do business in China or with Chinese enterprises. In other words, to understand 
how guanxi works in company performance. 
 
In general, the Chinese approach of doing business is recognised as 
relationship oriented. Other characteristics include hardworking, face-conscious, 
bureaucratic, bargaining-oriented and harmonious.710 As a Chinese culture, this 
relationship was examined by Fang in his research, and he brought up the 
varieties of Chinese business style. Furthermore he expressed the use of “etic 
cultural dimensions” for his research of this culture - which is a four dimensional 
framework.711 One of the dimensions “deal focused” people has been described 
as task-oriented and transaction-minded, it is opposed to “relationship focused” 
people who are more relationship-minded.712 This latter group of people prefer 
to do business with family, friends and his familiar circle, in other words, the 
people he trusts.713 They are the ones that do not prefer to do business with 
strangers. Trust is very crucial for them even prior to doing business. In contrast, 
the former group of people prefer to rely on written agreements in doing 
business. 714  This characteristic is also shown when disputes occur. This 
distinction between these two groups is recognised in the cross-cultural 
literature and study of trust.715 It is reflected perfectly by Chinese business 




713 Ibid. Gesteland R R Cross-cultural business behavior: Marketing, negotiating, sourcing and 
managing across cultures (3rd edn., Copenhagen Business School Press 2002).  
714 Ibid. 
715 Ibid. Fukuyama F, Trust: the social virtues and the creation of prosperity (Penguin Books 
1995). 
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behaviour, also as Graham and Sano named “non-task sounding”716 describing 
that the relationship focused people give enough time before business 
engagements (as long as it takes) to build trust. Li Ka-shing and other famous 
Chinese billionaires are known for this type of behaviour.   
 
The business mind-set in China is often described as driven by Confucianism717, 
which is the moral standard in Chinese society. It includes Chinese and 
overseas Chinese people in this context. As the details described by Fang, 
“moral cultivation, importance of interpersonal trust and guanxi, family-
orientation, respect for age and hierarchy, avoidance of conflict and need for 
harmony, and the concept of face” are Confucian traditions.718 Therefore, the 
interpersonal trust and guanxi is rooted in Chinese culture for thousands of years, 
and emphasis on harmony and the concept of face has been too. They are 
important for a Chinese person in his life regardless of the absence of him or 
herself.  
 
Traditionally, where China was before this decade, Chinese culture was very 
much regulated by moral standards of “placing high value on trust and sincerity 
on his own part and that of the other party” as Fang stated.719 He stated that 
being a Chinese businessman acting according to the mutual trust and benefit 
is very important, and it is more common to seek win-win situation for both 
parties to succeed. Since the rapid development and penetration of some 
                                            
716 Ibid. Graham J L and Sano Y “Business negotiations between Japanese and Americans” in 
Ghauri P N and Usunier J C (eds.) International Business Negotiations, 353-367. (Pergamon 
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718 Ibid. 9. 
719 Ibid. 10. 
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western culture into China in the last decade, people have learnt from and been 
affected by western culture of relying on contracts. Therefore, in the difficult 
market competition, some Chinese businessmen have lost the moral standard 
and are chasing profit at all costs. For this change in the society, people are 
more cautious in doing business with strangers. It has been shown in the society 
that people would rather go to someone that friends or families recommended, 
which has higher cost than other possible contacts. It appears that “trust” has 
been valued higher than ever, ironically, as a result of losing trust in society.   
 
Fang sees “trust is the ultimate indicator of Chinese business style”.720 Hong Liu 
also describes that trust in Chinese term is “xinyong”721, its closest translation 
into English would be “reputation”. This is not just used for maintaining the 
business reputation in Chinese daily life, it is a useful tool in reducing 
transactional costs and obtaining reliable information about the reputation and 
credit-worthiness of certain individuals. 722  This trust is mainly built through 
contact in person, since when it comes to the time people meet in person, the 
relationship knowledge will be considered superior to other forms of 
communications. That is also the reason that Chinese businessmen start many 
business deals from meeting up. 
 
The “social uses of kinship” of Pierre Bourdieu, brings the old to new in analysing 
trust and guanxi in terms of economic activity. Guanxi reflects as a type of 
promise-keeping to a certain extent in China. Grotius considered that keeping 
                                            
720 Ibid. 11. 
721 Liu H, “Old linkages, new networks: The globalization of overseas Chinese voluntary 
associations and its implications” (1998) 155, The China Quarterly, 588-609.  
722 Ibid. 598. 
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promises is regulated by natural law, and Kant states promise-keeping is the 
linkage among people in a moral community. 723  This usage of kinship or 
connection from same origin have been applied to perfection in social circle of 
the Fujian area. Huaqiao (overseas Chinese) and tongxiang (same origin) have 
been widely used well in overseas business.724 The overseas Chinese from the 
Fujian area formed various social organisations, such as the author heard about 
“Fu Qing Bang” in the UK (a named organisation for those people originally from 
Fujian province). The organisation helps overseas Fujian people to live and 
settle into new environments. In addition, as Hong Liu introduced, Fujian and 
Guangdong provinces are more traditional, they apply the Chinese connection 
circle even outside of China, especially in South-East Asia.725  There are a 
numerous number of networks organised by shetuan (organisations, clubs, 
societies in English). 726  The Second Fujian World Convention was held in 
Langkawi Malaysia, hosting 2,500 representatives in 1996. 727  The shetuan 
became the entity that linked people together overseas, and the trading among 
them also was bonded by shetuan.728 Hong Liu has described that shetuan 
formed the regional trading networks.729 Taking an example of the networks of 
trade (clan associations), which formed close business ties among Fujianese in 
Japan, allowed Chinese set up Chinese businesses in South-East Asia. 730 
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Apparently, the common usage of trust and support the Fujianese used among 
them won them a great success in Asia. It shows that many overseas Chinese 
retained their cultural and social norms and ideology outside of China, and use 
it to its advanced level to gain success. This type of regional networking 
overseas has been established over decades. 
 
Trouble of Trust 
 
There are other issues that is important in trust. Objects of trust can be people 
but also organisations, institutions, and socio-economic system.731 Commonly 
we are familiar with the concept of trust between people; system trust, however, 
appears to be too general to consider in relation to people’s trust. System trust 
can be the source of people’s trust. 732  In other words, the trust in the 
organisation will influence the trust in its people within it. As Nooteboom 
summarised “we need system trust as part of the basis for personal trust”.733 
The worth of this analysis is in the agency theory of family firms in my opinion. 
From the sociology to managerial analysis, from understanding trust to the 
reason of why and how family firms choose their professional management team 
instead of family members, or not to choose to hand out the ownership at all. It 
seems that if the trust in an organisation exists, the people in this organisation 
will appear to be more trustworthy among themselves. Therefore, when 
someone from outside of the family comes in to the organisation as a potential 
successor, it is more likely for the family to trust his/her profession. Of course, it 
                                            
731 Nooteboom B, supra n 697, 8. Six F, supra n 705, 4.  
732 Ibid. 
733 Ibid. 8. 
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comes with interactions in the process of building trust, but it is achievable with 
the interaction being embraced.  
 
In contrast with the above analysis, many cases are low-trust work relations, 
which shows that the trust is difficult to build and maintain.734 On sides of having 
problems, trust do help organisations survive in complex situations, especially 
in taking risks.735 But the organisational trust cannot separate from interpersonal 
trust, and vice versa.736 Thus the trust at an organisational level that affects 
company performance shall also be considered as the effect from interpersonal 
trust within the organisation. Trust is fragile and based on exchange of 
expectations, and mostly the expectations are not solid, which is why people 
need the assurance and strong faith through the pre-interaction in between to 
build up the confidence for later exchange.737  
 
Limitations of the Research 
 
There are various limitations on trust studies, such as, how to gain evidence 
from empirical research? And how to take the measurements?738 They are the 
challenges that exist in the research of relationship between trust and business. 
There is an existing definition of trust in the literature, but the measurements 
and research methods are enamoured with empirical research of trust. 
Commonly, the methodology of research has been quantitative, which brings a 
                                            
734 Six F, supra n 705. 
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737 Seligman A B, supra n 695, 70. 
738 Höhmann H H and Welter F, supra n 698, 2. 
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disadvantage to the research. In addition, targeting regions during the research 
could be difficult, as some regions are over conservative and dislike to share the 
“secret weapon” (guanxi), worrying that it will bring out more questions in how 
exactly they use it in the business. The answer to that question would not be 
beneficial to the business reputation.    
 
6.3 Future Research of Guanxi 
 
The concept of guanxi appears to be very complex through how many debates 
of guanxi and researchers’ proposals on future research. The proposals lead to 
many different angles of guanxi. Yang and Wang raised the finding of Chen, 
Chen and Xin in terms of effect that guanxi has on trust.739 The finding is in the 
institutional level, guanxi effects trust negatively, but shows the opposite in the 
individual level. Therefore, the calling of examining the negative effects and the 
legitimacy of personal guanxi in organisations are raising.740  
 
In addition, the approach to guanxi is another area of future research. In 
between of the individual level and organisational level of guanxi, the dynamic 
is the challenge to manage in guanxi concept. The culture and context are 
varying among institutions. Therefore, the approaches that including proactive 
and passive ways would need more attention.741  
 
                                            
739 Chen C C, Chen Y R and Xin K, “Guanxi Practices and Trust in Management: A 
Procedural Justice Perspective”, (2004) 15 (2), Organization Science, 200-209. Yang Z L and 
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Furthermore, the area of how firms “initiate, build, and use guanxi networks”742 
needs further studies.743 The companies that are in early stage of development 
commonly employ experienced and widely connected senior staff in their 
management team. In other words, by using guanxi in an organisation, to bring 
in more profit and win competition in market. However, this level of using guanxi 
is in the interpersonal level, and it is doubtful that the guanxi network in this level 
will progress to the organisational level of guanxi. It might be because guanxi 
networks of individuals is a key value, and it is more important to protect this 
value at the individual level from being controlled by others or their organisations. 
The fact is the senior staff would rather control the network in their own hands, 
rather than sharing it and handing it to the organisations. They will bring their 
personal guanxi net to their next employers when they move for career planning. 
Without the guanxi net, they will lose their value to employers. There are posts 
or articles recently posted on social media platforms with regards to such 
matters, it appears that nowadays the value of people is assessed by how much 
guanxi network they have personally in the institutions they work for. It also 
means that the knowledge of managing guanxi network in marketing is limited 
and further studies are needed. Other researchers brought up varying topics 
                                            
742 Chen X P and Chen C C, “On the intricacies of the Chinese Guanxi: A process model of 
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743 Yang Z L and Wang C L, supra n 661. 
 220 
that relate to guanxi, such as contract drafting effectiveness744, transaction cost 
advantages745 and so on.746  
 
Finally, there are many issues which have been listed on the future research 
agenda. 747  For instance, further studies on guanxi’s complex concepts, 
especially the theoretical and systematic studies are needed.748 There are some 
papers which have examined the differences and proved that guanxi as a 
particularity of Chinese culture has impacts over family businesses, which is 
worthy examination systematically. According to Yang and Wang, they selected 
some research papers that contained different aspects of guanxi research, 
which include 1) the various elements that scholars recognised as mechanisms 
of guanxi - renqing (relationship or commitment), mianzi (face), ganqing 
(emotional commitment) and xinren (trust); 2) guanxi and firm performance; and 
3) guanxi as a strategy.749 Apparently, the different views of research in guanxi 
need to be compared in future studies in order to gain an in-depth view of guanxi.  
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6.4 Guanxi and Family Businesses 
 
Guanxi has many aspects within its concept when comes to its understanding. 
One core in guanxi is the relationships of families, and this relationship among 
family members is named as kinship. Kinship also has different definitions, 
depending on the contexts of culture and other social factors. One of the formats 
of kinship is blood ties, and this is mainly the one that is recognised as family 
ties in the context of China. Kinship is indeed very critical in terms of family 
businesses. As Ruskola commented, compared with Western culture, the 
fundamental norm of businesses in China is kinship rather than the norm of 
contract in Western contexts.750 It is the factor that ties people together as a 
unity that owns the controlling voting shares or property. To explain further, the 
result leads to the ownership structure, which is as most scholars agreed on, 
the one feature of determining a family firm is the ownership structure. 751 
Therefore, the connection between guanxi and family businesses is important. 
As the voting shares or property percentage are the core of the controlling rights 
in family firm, as one of the crucial factors – kinship, which affects the 
percentage has been recognised subconsciously when decisions are made in 
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6.4.1 Guanxi Impacts and its Importance in and outside of China  
 
As Balfour mentioned, the first thing that businessmen learn when they arrive in 
China is how to do business with Chinese businesses, and guanxi is one aspect 
that firstly fascinates them.753 Although it might be similar elsewhere, but the 
forms of guanxi have been used to its maximum extent in China. According to 
Chu and Ju’s research (a survey in the PRC) cited by So and Walker, that guanxi 
is considered as very important in economic activities in society with over 42% 
responses, while nearly 50% is either important or somewhat important. 754 
However, guanxi is not only for foreign businesses to learn when they firstly 
enter to China’s market,  domestic businesses also use it daily and still use it to 
its maximum, especially when the businesses face difficult challenges. 755 
Balfour expounded that residence in Shanghai, as one of the largest and 
luxurious cities in China, they know guanxi is a key to everything. From business 
operating permissions to making a deal, and mediation treatment.756 It is shown 
clearly from the above statement that how important guanxi is for businesses 
and people’s daily life.  
 
The importance of guanxi has been widely recognised by both Chinese people 
and non-Chinese businessmen as well as investors from elsewhere. Chinese 
businessmen have done business with guanxi for centuries. As researchers find 
that in a Philippine city, Chinese businessmen used more social connections in 
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their business and were more successful than those who did not use guanxi. 
They found that there is no overseas businessman working in China, nor the 
other major Chinese business communities of Hong Kong and Taiwan who 
could afford to fail to be aware of the term guanxi but few understand it.  
 
Meanwhile, the relationship between buyers and suppliers is an important 
connection as one aspect of guanxi. Wuyts, and Geyskens precisely described 
guanxi in contract effectiveness of buyers and suppliers, “contracting becomes 
effective only when a non-close partner is selected and when the focal 
relationship is embedded in a network of close mutual contacts.”757 Certainly the 
rapid increase of China’s economy and its influences on the world, the way that 
guanxi and business relations are paid more attention recently.758  
 
Apparently, guanxi is unique and important for Chinese businessmen, it is also 
a crucial role to overseas Chinese businesses in terms of firm performance. 
Further to provide understandings for non-Chinese businessmen to deal and 
trade with Chinese businessmen, also to provide deeper understandings for 
Chinese businessmen to operate businesses.759 Balfour also highlighted that 
guanxi had been special and mysterious for foreign investors.760 All in all, guanxi 
is not the only reason of Chinese entrepreneurs become successful, but it has 
played an important role in the business environment in China. In addition to the 
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influences that guanxi creates to the business sector, it has an incredibly strong 
influence om the whole economy.761  
 
People in China also realise the importance of networks in its contribution to the 
development of the economy. As Yang Yuanqing (the chairman of the Chinese 
famous computer manufacturer – Lenovo Group) emphasised and discussed by 
Balfour, Chinese who studied or worked abroad know how to build networks, 
they noticed the importance of networking in and out of China.762 Also, as the 
founder of another famous online website in China - Tudou, which functions 
similar to YouTube, Gary Wang said when he gave a speech in Shanghai, that 
he probably could not create this successful online video website without 
knowing all the people who helped him.763 There are many other examples like 
this in the business area and different successes built on different “connections” 
or “relationships” (guanxi). Thus, guanxi has become important and even crucial 
for local and foreign businesses.  
 
Among various changes of China, guanxi might be the only thing that has not 
been changed much for Chinese and foreigners. It is remaining difficult to get 
the norm of guanxi and it is persistent in China for foreigners to understand.764 
Thus the situation for foreign firms is that it is easier for them to find some 
connections inside of China in order to help them in expanding the market, some 
rules applied to Chinese businesses when they tend to expand cross-regions. 
Chinese businesses are more experienced and under the impacts of 
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globalisation, they are also looking for foreign partners or connections in order 
to step into foreign markets.  As the chief representative of Viacom in China said, 
the Chinese firms are also looking at how strong guanxi networks foreign 
partners have.765 Therefore, the general environment has been changing for 
foreigners and Chinese individuals. There are deeper connections among 
Chinese and foreign businessmen as individuals. That is a new format of guanxi, 
truly is a “connection”. It may be debatable by Westerners that “guanxi” exists 
everywhere, not just in regions of China. However, the application of “guanxi” 
could not be the same between Chinese and Westerners. Furthermore, guanxi 
is a term of Chinese language. Although it is translated to other languages in 
other contexts, the terms cannot replace what guanxi is. In this sense, 
translating guanxi into a different language is merely a way to help people to 
understand what it represents. Therefore, guanxi is not a universal term for the 
world.   
 
6.4.2 Enterprises and Guanxi 
 
Family businesses have been driving economies growing in countries, for 
instance, Italy and the US.766 In international scope, family businesses have 
many differences in theory, and the social contexts they are operating; however, 
their similarities can overweigh the differences in varying jurisdictions. In terms 
of governance process, there are differences among family businesses and 
many challenges they face in individual countries. Especially in the context of 
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China or other countries that are emerging markets, elements of a political 
constitutional system and other changing matters in societies. In the period of 
rapid development, guanxi in the context of China could affect fairness in 
business operations.  
 
Majority of family businesses are small and medium-sized businesses, which 
puts them at a disadvantageous position in comparison to large corporations. 
Therefore, they rely on personal ties to bring more business profits than other 
businesses, to prevent loss of their fortune and wealth. Most owners of family 
businesses build trust with their partners in order to avoid unnecessary risks. So, 
we call the personal trust and this kind of connections “Guanxi Capital”767, similar 
opinions can also be found in the paper of Yang.768  
 
The fact is guanxi exists within a family business and out of a family business. 
In the case of “within a family business”, trust people is very difficult without any 
guanxi,769 which is why normally the successors come from the same families, 
at least from the same family roots. Generally, owners do not trust outsiders 
(wairen), so they would keep this tradition by choosing family members as 
successors within the families, which is the connection between guanxi and 
succession issue of family businesses. Guanxi is the direct reason that family 
business owners in China prefer family members instead of other outsiders. The 
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share of family blood is “kinship”, which is a basic form in guanxi. As Ruskola 
stressed that kindship is the fundamental norm in Chinese businesses 770 , 
naturally, this has affected the development of family firms in China. It can even 
potentially damage the performance of companies. Particularly during the 
process of succession, many businesses have been damaged even bankrupted 
because of it.  
 
As a classic topic in anthropology, anthropologists proposed an update of the 
changes occurring in kinship theory, these go beyond the context of China.771 
In my view, although kinship changes, as one typical form of guanxi, other forms 
of guanxi have unique influences on succession of family businesses. This is 
relevant to every aspect of families and businesses in family businesses. Could 
we minimise the negative influences for family businesses and manage the 
family businesses with only the positive affects? It is possible with the 
governance mechanisms. Thus, it may be possible that the whole family 
business can be formed as a “family”, further to make succession procedures 
easier and proper. 
 
Guanxi is so critical to family businesses. Family firms are the entities in this 
guanxi network for many different reasons, and businesses rely on this. The 
relationship of business partners and connections of government officials are 
some aspects that matter for firms surviving. As Wank criticised, “patron-client 
ties are productive by connecting entrepreneurs to the overarching bureaucratic 
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structure”.772 Thus guanxi is crucial for family businesses, they connect each 
other tightly through it and it directly influences the performance of family 
businesses. In other words, guanxi is seen as protecting family businesses from 
troubles and help them to profit better in practice. However, this protection would 
not protect the internal operation but market competition only. This is where 
guanxi affects the performance of family firms - business competition. This type 
of competition is normally held for stimulating the suppliers market. The 
department or the buyers need to sign the contract with the winner in the 
competition, it does not only happen between the government departments and 
firms, but also in all of the departments (danwei) – hospitals, universities and so 
on. Normally the amount of this type of trade is enormous, so it would be 
beneficial if the firm could win in the competition.  
 
Guanxi could be operated differently from region to region. According to the 
survey that provided by Wong and Stone773, cited by Fang – “Chinese regional 
stereotypes”774, which shows the differences of guanxi among Beijing, Shanghai 
and Guangzhou. The result is in the aspects of “relationship-focused”, 
“bureaucrat” and “importance of face” among these three major cities in China, 
the data of Beijing is higher than the Shanghai and Guangzhou.775 Based on the 
experiences, guanxi and networks are indeed more important for businesses in 
the northern part compared with the southern China. 
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There is a possibility that the owners may ignore the importance of the 
governance structure by using guanxi. However, it could result difficulties when 
they try to achieve greater purposes. Thus, guanxi is a crucial part of doing 
better businesses, but not the only nor main drive. Doing better and performing 
better is more reliant on the abilities of owners and the corporate governance 
systems of family businesses. Governance structure and mechanisms along 
with legal framework as one mixed mechanism in the society to balance and 
regulate all potential unfairness, faces many challenges in its process. Guanxi 
performs in society as a soft mechanism, and it helps only when certain 
circumstances occur. It seems that guanxi is special because of its use in critical 
situations that firms face, and it is also the one factor that never disappears. 
Even when rules and regulations are becoming more effective and strict, it still 
exists in its use to overcome difficulties for firms. However, it is a question that 
whether guanxi has been over emphasised in business environment. It is worth 
thinking especially for business owners. By using corporate governance 
mechanisms, family businesses could overcome the social effects and 
challenges in business operations. Over emphasising guanxi could cause more 
attention to use guanxi but neglect unfairness in economic activities. 
 
Large Publicly Listed Companies and Guanxi 
 
In fact, many publicly listed companies are family owned in most countries, such 
as in South and East Asia, Western Europe.776 Claessens et al. express that 
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“approximately 2/3 of firms are owned by families or individuals in Asian 
countries.”777 Globally, family businesses are significant. La Porta et al. reported 
that 30 per cent of firms are family-controlled while 36 per cent are widely 
held.778 Showing that in Asian countries, family firms are the predominant format 
in business sector. Hong Kong city is a classic example of this situation. In the 
US where it is thought that the ownership of companies does not assemble, 
Anderson and Reeb find that “around 35% of companies in the S&P 500 are 
familial.”779 In contrast, family firms are not the predominant ownership in the 
UK from Faccio and Lang research.780  
 
In the context of China, most public listed companies are SOEs. The managers 
and senior team members are Central Party Members. So naturally their 
connections are to the central government, and local government; state owned 
banks, local banks; even other businesses in general. The benefits of being 
SOEs are in various areas including financing, market competition, employment, 
reputation. Therefore, they have a lot of advantages compared with small and 
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Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises and Guanxi 
 
Less attention has been paid to issues of corporate governance in SMEs that is, 
in enterprises whose shares are neither sold to the public nor traded on the 
securities markets. The guanxi in SMEs is more crucial to the performance than 
to public-listed corporations. In the context of China, guanxi creates a crucial 
business environment for family businesses, since most of them are not strong 
enough to encounter many SOEs and other large corporations.  
 
6.4.3 Culture Guanxi and Family Businesses 
 
Culture is defined as distinguishing one human group from other groups through 
its mutual mind, even ideology.781 Guanxi is a direct reflection of a society 
culture in China.  
 
Culture of A Nation and Family Businesses 
 
National culture includes collectivism and power-distance. Members of families 
or groups have the high collectivism, so the family firms as entities that contains 
such collectivism strongly effected by a national culture.782 The high collectivism 
brings benefits to the relationships of families and groups, but not to professional 
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communication styles across cultures.” (1996) 22 (4) Human Communication Research, 510-
543. Chakrabarty S, supra n 776, 33. 
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managers whom are not in such collectivism culture. 783  According to the 
research, the literature suggests that having professional managers can help to 
hold family ownership further, therefore, protect family business legacies 
better. 784  It has been proved by Chilean and Nicaraguan family-owned 
business.785 It also reflects that family businesses have had a great contribution 
towards societies in general. The literature has suggested that the entities as 
families that have high level of collectivism could retain ownership of their 
businesses.786 The value they hold and the customers-oriented ideology are a 
great contribution towards public.  
 
Culture with power-distance, which are defined as “where a socio-economic 
class/status system prevents the upward mobility of certain sections of society, 
and where disparities exist in availability of opportunities and distribution of 
wealth and power”787, has been demonstrated in countries where economy is 
unique. In other words, China is a Confucian country, it has grown to an 
                                            
783 Chakrabarty S, supra n 776, 33. It says in research that one type of institutional void is in 
agency contracting, where there is not enough institutional norms and regulations for 
monitoring contracts. Therefore, it causes the difficulties and distrust between owners and 
professional top management positions. Agency theory economists strongly raised the need 
of hiring professional management team for the efficiency in economic activities. Fama E F, 
“Agency problems and the theory of the firm” (1980) 88 (2) Journal of Political Economy, 288-
307, 288. Obviously, it is not very acceptable for family firms as the owners are not 
comfortable with monitoring non-family managers, such as Italy. And Jensen M C and 
Meckling W H, supra n 273. 
784 Chakrabarty S, supra n 776, 33. Gomez-Mejia L R, Nuñez-Nickel M and Gutierrez I, “The 
role of family ties in agency contracts” (2001) 44 (1) Academy of Management Journal, 81-95. 
Gudykunst W B, Matsumoto Y, Ting-Toomey S, Nishida T, Kim K and Heyman S A M, supra n 
782. 
785 Khanna T and Palepu K, “The future of business groups in emerging markets: long-run 
evidence from Chile” (2000) 43 (3) Academy of Management Journal, 268-285. Chakrabarty 
S, supra n 776, 33. 
786 Ibid. “The literature suggests that cultures with high collectivism display reduced 
opportunistic behavior, reduced costs of transactions within the family/group, and greater 
attempts to retain ownership of their businesses within their dynasty. Gudykunst W B, 
Matsumoto Y, Ting-Toomey S, Nishida T, Kim K and Heyman S A M, supra n 782. 
787 Markus H R and Kitayama S, “Culture and the self: implications for cognition” (1991) 98 (2) 
Emotion, and Motivation Psychological Review, 224-253. Chakrabarty S, supra n 776, 33. 
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economy with a mix of socialism and capitalism features is included into the 
culture with power-distance. 788  Sociologists therefore have suggested the 
relation between market and culture in such contexts. They argued that 
economies react differently with cultures and societies, therefore, culture has 
been become a fundamental cause for society and economies in their 
structure. 789  This is the basis of guanxi impacts to market and further to 
economic activities. In the debate of the effects to economic and business 
structures, institutional economists argue that institutional voids affect economic 
and business structures, whereas cultural sociologists debate that culture 
implants the structures, which is culture in a country can shape the structure 
models.790 
 
National culture is one of the influences that affect family-ownership pattern in 
the world.791 Based on the research of Subrata Chakrabarty, the two factors – 
                                            
788 Chakrabarty S, supra n 776, 33. The research suggests that high power distance in culture 
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C, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (Basic Books 1973). Dore R, “Goodwill and 
the spirit of market capitalism”, (1983) 34 (4), The British Journal of Sociology, 459-482. 
Boisot M and Child J, “From fiefs to clans and network capitalism: explaining China’s 
emerging economic order” (1996) 41 (4) Administrative Science Quarterly. Ouchi W G, 
“Markets, bureaucracies, and clans”, (1980) 25 (1), Administrative Science Quarterly, 129. 
789 Swedberg N S R (ed.) Culture and Economy. Handbook of Economic Sociology. 
(Princeton University Press 1994), 27-57, 28. Chakrabarty S, supra n 776. Research has 
stated that cultural sociologists argued that “markets are cultural arenas where various 
“categories of economic action are culturally variable and socially constructed” and hence a 
country’s cultural dimensions are an underlying root cause that influence the existence and 
dominance of social and economic structures of a country. 
790 Chakrabarty S, supra n 776, 33. Biggart N W and Delbridge R, “Systems of exchange”, 
(2004) 29 (1), Academy of Management Review, 28-49. Fligstein N, “Markets as politics: a 
political-cultural approach to market institutions”, (1996) 61 (4), American Sociological 
Review, 656. Swedberg R, “New economic sociology: what has been accomplished, what is 
ahead”, (1997) 40 (2), Acta Sociologica, Taylor and Francis Ltd, 161-182. Zelizer V A, 
“Beyond the polemics on the market: establishing a theoretical and empirical agenda”, (1988) 
3 (4), Sociological Forum, 614. 
791 Chakrabarty S, supra n 776.   
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national culture and institutional voids792, affect family ownership patterns, and 
these two encounter each other in terms of the influence. In addition, Fama and 
North hold similar opinion that a country’s culture has a strong influence towards 
family ownership.793 Although the research is stated based on the large publicly 
listed firms that owned by family, but the similarity between the large public listed 
family firms and SMEs over this culture influence is undeniable.  
 
Guanxi and Family Businesses - Financing 
 
Financial credit availability in institutional void is where financial banking 
institutions are not functioning or not efficient enough in the economy. 794 
Institutional void includes financial credit availability and deficiencies of agency 
theory models795, which is a typical form that large corporations apply, also 
recognised as efficient in corporate governance is agency theory – hire 
professional agents (managers) – who are not connected to the families that 
own the firms.796 Lack of agency theory, as one type of institutional void would 
cause difficulties between family ownership and non-family managers.797 As the 
research found, Italy lacks such institutional void, and owners would like to 
control management ownership, giving Italy one of the largest population of 
                                            
792 Institutional voids are defined as “the lack of institutional facilities, norms, and regulations 
needed for a well functioning economy…” North D C, institutions, Institutional Change, and 
Economic Performance (CUP 1990).  
793 Chakrabarty S, supra n 776. Fama E F, supra n 783. North D C, supra n 792. 
794 Chakrabarty S, supra n 776. 
795 Ibid. Fligstein N, The Transformation of Corporate Control (Harvard University Press 
1990). North D C, supra n 792. 
796 Chakrabarty S, supra n 776; Fama E F, supra n 783, 288. 
797 Ibid. Jensen M C and Meckling W H, supra n 273. 
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family businesses. 798  The lack of agency theory is common among family 
businesses, and many family businesses have struggled to decide whether to 
apply the theory not. But comparing immediate financial pressures with the long-
term positive results that agency theory brings to family businesses, the former 
appears more direct and harmful, especially for the small and medium-sized 
family businesses.  
 
In the context of financial banking institutions are not functioning or not efficient 
enough, regulation is a very important tool that drives banking institutions to 
function, further to improve financial credit. In the context of China, financing is 
a very crucial and difficult issue for family businesses. Traditional banking 
system is not considered very helpful in terms of small and medium-sized family 
business lending. Which is why the national culture, here is guanxi, means so 
much to family businesses. The businesses or senior management team that 
have connection (network – guanxi) would most likely to gain funds through 
traditional banking system. Those do not have guanxi network would suffer from 
the fact that they have to rely on themselves. Therefore, many family businesses 
have learnt to maintain internal cash flow through years of building up their 
wealth. And many have only used their own cash flow in extending their 
businesses. From the financial crisis, shadow banking appears globally and it 
has been opening a new channel for consumers, especially family business. 
The details will be discussed in the following section.   
 
                                            
798 Chakrabarty S, supra n 776, 33. Bianchi M, Bianco M and Enriques L, “Pyramidal groups 
and the separation between ownership and control in Italy”, in Barca F, Becht M (eds.) The 
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However, because of this cash flow method, many family businesses are stable, 
strong, and less affected by economy crisis. In the paper, the research suggests 
that, although public suffer from the lack of access to credit as a result of 
institutional void in general, in financial credit availability, family businesses use 
their own cash flow so mostly likely they are not much affected.799 Such use of 
internal cash flow can be found in Korea, India and Chile.800 Moreover, research 
shows that if the societies have cultural power distance inequalities and financial 
credit absence, they provide a great environment for family businesses and their 
families.801 Only if institutional void in financial credit availability would encounter 
with such factors and make investors and entrepreneurs turn against the use 
family businesses.802 That provides a foundation of building up the structures 
and create the environment for family businesses to grow in general. 
 
Recently, the investment methods have rapidly grown across the globe. This 
strongly shows the interests from China, particularly small and medium-sized 
family businesses’ interests. The ones that are capable of expanding are looking 
to grow in international context, therefore, there are more potential opportunities 
in merger and joint venture forms coming in the next decades. However, the risk 
is that they might be facing the difficulties such as financing and remaining as 
family controlled firms. Many of them will be taken advantages of by large firms 
that develop strong corporate governance mechanisms and strong financial 
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power. Thus, the requirement of having unique family business characteristic 
mechanisms within small and medium-sized firms will potentially reduce such 
risks, and help small and medium-sized family businesses face challenges and 




Obtaining financing from traditional banking is one of the challenges family 
businesses face. With the global development of the finance industry, alternative 
investment, which is debatable currently and cannot be avoided is “shadow 
banking”. The newly developed system has challenged traditional finance 
industry and legal framework. Shadow banking system is taking a decent 
proportion of global financial system and even half of the total global banking 
assets.803 There is a difficulty in estimating the size of shadow banking, since 
government regulators do not have details nor reports in the organisations who 
operate as shadow banks. 804  The conclusion is shadow banking provides 
alternative channels and options in finance investment for current financial 
system and consumers.805 
 
Shadow banks in the West are different from Chinese ones. This is due to 
Chinese credit limits being strictly controlled.806 Compared with the US, where 
                                            
803 Shen W, “Shadow banking system in China – Origin, uniqueness and governmental 
responses”, 2013, 1, Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation, 20-26. 
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one of the largest shadow banking system operates807, China’s finance sector 
is slightly under-developed yet rapidly growing. 81 billion yuan of domestic 
deposits are in risky entities808, and SMEs have borrowed 2 thousand billion 
yuan through the shadow banking system due to the difficulty of gaining finance 
support from traditional banking809. It shows clearly it has become an issue in 
recent years, 810  yet the situation could turn worse if the bubbles in asset 
explodes, such as real estate.811 All professionals from all sectors in globe are 
paying attention to this issue, due to the risks that shadow banking system might 
bring to finance security, and also because of the influence China’s economy 
may affect the world. 
 
The research of shadow banking is fairly in the early stage for all academia 
worldwide, especially for China due to the latest investment practices China has 
been experiencing – bubble style investment practice.812 There is not yet a 
single precise definition of shadow banking due to the following two main 
reasons: the research and understanding has not been conducted systemically, 
and it is involved with huge and critical changes in banking regulation system 
for all countries.813 The Financial Stability Board in the US “defines the shadow 
banking system as “credit intermediation involving entities and activities (fully or 
partially) outside the regular banking system” or nonbank credit intermediation 
in short”. 814  In contrast with the US where shadow banking appears after 
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financial crisis, and according to scholars that it is caused by financial crisis, Yan 
and Li stated that shadow banks in Chinese context are different from the foreign 
ones that recently caused financial crisis. 815  The director of the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences Institute of Finance and Banking,  argues that 
“shadow banking” is defined as “only business related to debtor-creditor 
relationships and activities outside bank balance sheets should be considered 
shadow banking”.816  Whereas, another definition is recommended by Yuan 
Zengting, who is deputy director, focusing on bank products and business 
lines.817 To be specific, the business lines and banks’ wealth management 
products are normally referred as “shadow banking”, such as entrusted loans, 
loan pools and other products that are generated from the collaboration between 
banks and trusts.818 Furthermore, the director of the institute’s financial lab 
suggested there are unregulated securitisation activities in banks and 
unregulated private finance.819 In the urgency of having regulations against 
shadow banking, after the warning from International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the act of admitting the existence of “shadow banks” in China made by People’s 
Bank of China Governor Zhou Xiaochuan, “shadow banks” is the aim of next 
step for the China Banking Regulatory Commission, in terms of its content, 
function, size, structure, and risk.820 The China Banking Regulatory Commission 
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815 Yan Q M and Li J H, supra n 810. 
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(CBRC) has also warned banks in China of one form of shadow banking – 
“personal-to-person” lending platform and its risks.821 CBRC aims to remove this 
type of shadow banking from China eventually.822 It means a great step if the 
regulatory authority does so, and it brings the light to the future of banking 
system in China. But presently, it is under intensive scrutiny.  
 
Although the definition debates are continuing in the in academy worldwide, 
other definitions are discussed by varied institutions. There are debates in what 
exactly should be included in shadow banking: for instance, 1) bank-like 
organisations and their operations; 2) financial institutions that operates outside 
of any regulatory framework are considered as shadow banks; 3) as most 
scholars agree, it is all financial institutions that are excluded from commercial 
banks.823 All in all, the definition of shadow banking is not concluded, and 
caused debates in China, which is difficult to find solutions and regulated by law 
and regulations.  
 
Currently in China, there are several behaviours in financing: 1) regulated ways 
for bank lending; 2) illegal and unregulated ways of financing; 3) other 
institutions and businesses that issue hidden loans.824 Because they are still 
unregulated, and they have much easier standards to permit loans, they have 
been permitting loans for SMEs. According to Shen, person-to-person platform, 
which users use online platforms rather than traditional financial institutions 
                                            
821 Shen W, supra n 803. 
822 Ibid.  
823 Yan Q M and Li J H, supra n 810. chapter 3. 
824 Ibid. 
 241 
have grown rapidly in China as a form of shadow banking.825 Many consumers 
use this platform and are mainly SMEs badly in need of financial support.826 In 
the short term, there will be regulations and laws to regulate relevant activities, 
so the financing for SMEs would be a new challenge again in China. In the long 
term, the environments in politics, economy and law are needed for encouraging 
SMEs growing in this particular emerging market.  
 
In terms of regulatory improvement, it needs to be look closely and enforce rules 
based on the reality. We can see that China’s market has experienced rapid 
growth in shadow banking due to the difficulty of gaining loans from state 
controlled banks, and many wealthy families use the channels to gain more 
assets, further to embrace their businesses. However, the lack of regulation will 
put customers and their businesses at huge risks. Then how to regulate shadow 
banking system and implement future regulations? In dealing with the debt crisis, 
the State Council and CBRC offered 5 per cent of non-performing loan ratio to 
the loans borrowed by SMEs.827 IMF suggested that having a set of policies 
might control the size of shadow banking, or guide financial intermediation with 
new regulatory practices might help.828 Which is one of the fast and efficient way 
of solving issue in the short term. It also might be worth learning from Western 
practises in the sense of considering some elements: 1) before creating the 
proper framework for regulating shadow banking, systemic information is 
needed. As suggested by Adrian and Shin, systemic information needs to be 
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gathered from a wider scope of entities, including hedge funds, 2) regulators will 
need to maintain a focus while enforce rules. 829  These two elements are 
supported at London G20 meeting, and they will be guideline for future 
regulatory framework.830 However, most important is the Chinese government’s 
need to consider reform the lending system and create more appropriate and 
regulated financial products to solve the issue completely.831 Such as Wenzhou, 
has been a “special financial zone” trying to legalise shadow banking locally.832 
It encourages new small financial firms, buying and investing other financial 
products, easier loans, capping interests rates in lending, and other ways in 
order to crack down on loan sharks and unregulated shadow banks.833 While 
the goal of creating a framework or making new policies, while building regulated 
banking framework, the possibilities of providing long-term savings, mutual fund 
or pensions, and bonds might be solutions.834 State-owned banks will also have 
to change their practices in lending to compete with shadow banks, and 
potentially improve lending policies and procedures to SMEs. Due to the policies 
and central government’s guidance, SOEs still gain a lot more loans than SMEs 
in China. However, rarely they return the loans on time or they are not able to 
return at all. In contrast, some SMEs are able to return loans and drive economy 
growing in China while the policy and experiments favourable in my opinion.  
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6.5 Guanxi and Social Capitalism 
 
Luo claimed that the business level of guanxi network is not heritable, nor a 
formal inter-organisational tool.835 It is not a formal way of operating business in 
the network, which Luo was correct on that statement. However, guanxi network 
has been proved to be heritable in the context of family business. Family 
business owners or founders have been passing over the network resources to 
their successors836.  
 
Regarding guanxi in business level is not a formal way of organisational 
operations, Luo expressed that “guanxi helps a firm overcome its resource 
problems so that it can grow while avoiding the substantial bureaucratic costs 
which come from internalising operations”837, and Fang recognised guanxi is 
one of the organisational forms. 838  If guanxi helps firms to “overcome its 
resource problems” and “grow avoiding the substantial bureaucratic costs”, then 
as Fang stated that it builds a characteristic institutional form - “network 
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6.6 Guanxi in the United Kingdom and China 
 
Guanxi can be traced back to the philosophy of Confucianism, according to 
Luo840 and Fang841. Fang has pointed out that Luo has thoroughly analysed and 
published the guanxi model in the literature study of guanxi for the first time.842 
It was also noticeable that the guanxi concept was compared between China 
and Western in terms of networking aspect in the book.843 The differences of the 
aspect of networking in guanxi concept, are described and compared by Luo in 
the book: 
1. Guanxi is mainly a personal relation, as in social capital; West mainly use in 
“commercial-based, corporation-to corporation relations”.844 
2. In business practice, Chinese businesses consider guanxi as ultimate 
important; Western businesses enforce contracts and details in such concept.845 
3. People in the context of China in the business operation lie their faith and 
trust in to personal trust to a substantial level; Where Westerns lie their faith and 
trust in the system.846 
 
It is worthy to point out that the UK and China have different understanding from 
the perspective of personal experience and understanding in two contexts. 
Firstly, trust is built with time in both contexts, but it is easier to build in the UK 
rather than in China in terms of time. In other words, it is not necessary to do 
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something first for one party in the UK context; but the situation in China is that 
one party must prove he/she is harmless and sincere. Secondly, after trust is 
built, it is still fragile in both contexts; in the UK, the trust is not easily broken, 
unless it is people’s reputation is challenged as it is an extremely important 
factor in the UK. In China, trust is sometimes easy to be broken for attempting 
desires, mostly financial benefits. Thirdly, in the UK it is easier to build 
connections with strangers, and consider it is as network (guanxi in Chinese); 
but guanxi in China is mostly used for people in the closer relationship circle, it 
takes a very long time and interactions before entering into the circle of guanxi 
networks for people. Often when British mention guanxi, it is not the guanxi term 




Family businesses face many corporate level challenges, one of these with 
guanxi brings family businesses competitions in market, competitions in gaining 
guanxi and extend guanxi network, further to gain more business opportunities 
especially the ones with larger enterprises, SOEs and local governments. 
However, it also brings the side effects such as losing business opportunities 
when the guanxi network is broken, significant expenses used for maintaining 
guanxi network, risks of breaking a set of regulations and so on. From economic 
perspective, it may break the balance in the market, unfairness in trading, and 
potentially damage the law enforcement and business operation internationally.  
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The fundamental factor of guanxi is trust, which runs in all aspects of “guanxi 
model” as named.847 The description was expressing “a model of guanxi is 
constructed to hold together guanxi’s philosophical, sociocultural and socio-
political dimensions, business-economic activities, and Chinese society and 
economy”.848 However, I think that guanxi does not have a particular model, 
perhaps it can be understood as “aspects” or “formats” rather than a model. The 
reason of this is in practice it is a way of doing/behaviour of Chinese nation 
rather than having guidance of how to operate it. A model would be a fixed 
operative method, but in reality, guanxi is so varied that people have no 
guidance of doing but more often they find themselves doing it without thinking. 
Therefore, there is no certain protocol to follow, nor book to keep, it merely is a 
feeling and instinct that guide people to act. In this sense, guanxi seems to be 
more difficult to be examined systemically. 
 
Although it is more difficult to be examined systemically, it is still crucial to gain 
systemic information to try to conceptualise this unique social phenomenon for 
literature review in future. To understand the behaviour in individual and 
organisational levels, it is important to have the literature and theories to assist 
the understanding and practice. It also benefits to understand the challenges 
these soft mechanisms bring to business operation, then to further overcome 
the challenges with appropriate solutions. That is the purpose of the research in 
this thesis. It is a long way to achieve the proper solutions for each individual 
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enterprise, especially in family businesses, but with the continuing efforts in the 
area of research, it will eventually be accepted for family firms in general.    
 
One of the crucial solutions would be building up the appropriate mechanisms. 
Having realised the benefits and weaknesses guanxi network might bring for 
business and the general economy, it might be possible to create some policies 
in this field such as an external risk prevention mechanism. Meanwhile, to build 
up internal corporate governance mechanisms for businesses and/or families to 
evaluate, maintain, conduct decision making process for social challenges like 
guanxi would be helpful. Family and business can have meetings setting up for 
procedures and discussions on how business performance is under the certain 
proportion guanxi network brings, and what shall be done with no influences of 
guanxi. This is also an opportunity for controlled family members and 
professional management team to work on the best for business. For small 
family businesses, it might provide an opportunity for owners to gain advice from 
other family members. It will further create an environment of professional and 
less family influential operation for family businesses. Certainly, it takes time to 
gain understanding and acceptance from family businesses, but with the 
research and practice developing in recent years, it will not be long before family 




Chapter 7 Conclusion 
 
This thesis examined the corporate governance challenges from a 
comprehensive level and an integrated manner for family businesses through a 
comparative approach between the UK and China, an angle which is a rarity in 
comparison to other studies. In the meantime, it examined China’s legal 
framework in a managerial and social context. Corporations grow through the 
stages of SMEs, some survived but most do not. During the development of 
SMEs, corporations grow by stages, from one to the next stage, the corporations 
experience a lot of changes in ownership and management. These changes are 
the weakest time of the corporations. Ownership and management changes 
mostly bring risks to shareholders. Family business owners are the large 
shareholders in the firms, where they protect their rights over small shareholders’ 
rights. Countries have tried to protect small shareholders’ rights and minimise 
the damage caused. However, it is a very challenging issue for China.  
 
Modern China does not provide a friendly environment for SMEs, most of the 
development especially GDP rate has been pulled up by SOEs. Therefore, the 
emphasis on SOEs’ development has always been the task of central 
government. However, in the last five to ten years of central government’s 
policies and economic development started to show that SMEs have been put 
under consideration more than before. Examined in second chapter, the new 
Company Act of China has shown encouraging SMEs to make individual 
changes and recognising the rights created within the firms. It also recognised 
the value of micro level firms. It exhibited that China’s legal reform has 
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progressed one step further and reaching out to the advanced level with other 
advanced legal systems.  
 
An old proverb says from rags to riches and back again in three generations. 
This is very true for family businesses. The reasons of failure are varied, but 
understanding the challenges is to overcome the difficulties. Majority of SMEs 
are family businesses, which means if knowing the analysis of challenges that 
family businesses face, then finding solutions for longevity will not be an issue. 
However, challenges come differently in varied contexts. Comparative study like 
this thesis could benefit family businesses to play the advantages and bypass 
the disadvantages in globalisation.   
 
China has a political system with socialist characteristic, a socialist economy 
with market economy characteristic, a legal system with political characteristic, 
a social context with Confusion ideology and a mind-set which praises trust 
between parties. Whereas UK holds a democratic political system, an advanced 
case law system with “think small first” policy to encouraging SMEs, a concept 
of individualism which bonds parties by contracts. The family businesses in 
these two contexts show different characteristics, therefore, the corporate 
governance challenges differ from one to the other. For instance, Chinese family 
businesses especially the small to medium-sized firms heavily rely on guanxi 
network to maintain firm’s performance, whereas British family businesses 
mostly apply management strategies in managing firms and legally binding 
contracts in trade. As another example, the general policy environment also 
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brings different support to family businesses. British policies are more beneficial 
for family businesses compared with China’s policies.  
 
The existing studies in family business field normally examine one discipline that 
relates to family businesses. This thesis analysed several disciplines that are 
related to family businesses. In my view, corporate governance mechanisms 
and models need to be localised to specific context. The specific context 
includes a country’s economic environment, political system, legal system and 
social context. Without analysis of the environment, it could be wrongfully 
applied to businesses. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse challenges at a 
more comprehensive level in relation to corporate governance of family 
businesses in China.  
 
Chinese culture has educated public that each person holds several roles in 
society. In the case of the family business, we often see Chinese family business 
owners behave as fathers and the bosses in the families; they behave as bosses 
and fathers to their successors in the businesses It is a very patriarchal system. 
British culture in contrast, tends to teach citizens to have separate roles and 
non-conflicting responsibilities. The separation of being fathers in families and 
being bosses at work is clear. The unseparated responsibilities make Chinese 
family businesses more difficult than British family businesses. In the meantime, 
British family businesses have shown better corporate governance mechanisms 
acknowledgement and acceptation than Chinese ones. 
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The family business form is a crucial business type for the economy. They exist 
everywhere in globe and the majority of family businesses worldwide are SMEs. 
The countries with advanced legal system generally create SMEs friendly 
environments. In contrast, the countries with less advanced legal system which 
have a lot of political controls do not, such as China. Family businesses face a 
variety of challenges in this context. China is a country with a legal system that 
is under reform and is under strong control of central government. Chinese legal 
system is not yet “rule by law” in any of the senses understood in the West. This 
has led to a less protected and supportive environment for family businesses. 
Thus, to understand the challenges for corporate governance in family 
businesses, the thesis explored the source of the challenges. This thesis also 
explained and analysed each perspective that brings challenges for family 
businesses in details.  
 
This thesis is a research conducted from a macro level to lay out the challenges 
for family business study and find a new angel for researching family business 
corporate governance. Furthermore, this thesis hopefully suggests 
considerations for law makers and scholars in China to find corporate 
governance mechanisms for family businesses. It also suggests to family 
business scholars to conduct research on varied dimensions when examining 
family businesses. However, it would be more beneficial to have first-hand 
materials from Chinese small to medium-sized family businesses in discovering 
their opinions towards corporate governance, difficulties in existing legal 
framework, unfairness compared with large corporations and the like in China’s 
context. In my view, with the completion of legal framework reform, 
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implementation of “rule by law”, change of family businesses owners’ mind-set, 
guanxi and further exploration of applying legal framework to limit effect of 
guanxi will be found. The range of research conducted on Chinese family 
business is another great challenge, since China has 34 provinces and province 
level administrative zones. Each administrative zone has great differences in 
custom, behaviour and dialect, it leads to great challenges in research.  
 
This thesis brought a new insight of understanding the challenges for family 
businesses through a comparative approach. Through examining business 
history, legal framework, political interference, managerial challenges, social 
and cultural obstacles, this thesis gives a comprehensive level of understanding 
the challenges family businesses are facing. This thesis examines the 
challenges for family businesses in several sections. Chapter 1 covers the 
research background and purpose of the thesis. It also explained the research 
methodology for the thesis and research limitations. In chapter 2, the 
examination identified business history as a new angle to research the family 
business field. Through the lens of business history in comparison of the UK and 
China, it indicates that family businesses as a crucial type of enterprises have 
existed in the history of business for a very long time. It raised the necessary 
approach to study family businesses is the comparative research as well. In the 
meantime, the examination of business history in a comparative approach 
shows that family businesses have lessons to learn from the past. It provides 
family business study a foundation in research that is different from other 
methods in the family business study. Through the lens of business history 
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studies, new theories and frameworks could be developed for corporate 
governance, family businesses, and guanxi by looking at the past.  
 
The chapter 3 examined two different legal frameworks of the UK and China, as 
well as its correlation with corporate governance and the social impacts of 
guanxi in China. The British legal framework is built on democracy, but Chinese 
legal framework is built on political planning and interfering through CCP 
meetings. During CCP meetings, the government set tasks and goals in 
reforming economy and law. Transplantation was done by learning from other 
jurisdictions and is associated with the economic reforms in China. Discussing 
the policy making process, economy and legal reforms as well as the correlation 
is useful to understand the legal framework in China, further to understanding 
why China’s legal system is very different. Chinese socialist politics and law are 
tighter in relationship than other countries, which is not very helpful for family 
businesses as the government has been focusing on SOEs for decades, the 
new amendments of Company Act 2005 and 2013 might be the turning point for 
SMEs. The structure of Chinese law and its features led to a later discussion of 
Company Law and corporate governance regulations for businesses. 
Furthermore, this chapter helped to discover the balance between law and soft 
mechanisms in society - guanxi, which strongly affects Chinese businesses’ 
daily operation. Guanxi is also the foundation of the research as it is one of the 
biggest challenges that less complete legal framework needs to face. Chinese 
context including social cultural challenges, such as guanxi, combined with less 
advanced legal framework and strong political interference, is not helping SMEs 
particularly family businesses in market competition. 
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The chapter 4 examines corporate governance and mechanisms. Although 
corporate governance started to change for the last two to three decades in 
China, the legal framework and general environment is not favourable. CCP has 
been under pressure of embracing GDP growth rate, which means the focus 
has been on SOEs for pulling up the GDP rate. Therefore, even though the 
government announced to build a socialist country with Chinese characteristics, 
reforming legal framework to more advanced status and economic environment, 
corporate governance mostly changes among SOEs whereas in private sector 
it still faces tremendous challenges. Another solution for the SMEs (recalling 
that the majority of SMEs are family businesses) is using guanxi to compete in 
the market. The theories in family business study show the needs of having 
proper corporate governance. The corporate governance mechanisms if 
adapted in the family businesses could help family businesses to solve many 
challenging issues. In comparison of the UK and China, corporate governance 
in legal framework shows different source of setting: UK has developed a mind-
set of “think small first” behind the law making whereas China does not. 
Understanding the mechanisms of corporate governance and the legal vehicles 
could lead to the development and longevity of family businesses. This fourth 
chapter also provides an extended discussion of the previous chapter - Chinese 
legal framework.  
 
The chapter 5 examined family business theories and ownership. In family 
business theories, agency theory and ownership is examined since it is closely 
related to corporate governance. Yet the definition of family business is not 
unified, which remains to be defined. The ownership structures in the UK and 
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China are under strong influences from the US. Therefore, there is a brief 
American ownership description. Furthermore, life cycle theory in family 
business study is examined due to its relationship to minority shareholder 
protection. Family businesses have development cycles which scholars defined 
as life cycle theory. Many minority shareholders’ rights were omitted and 
damaged in between the life cycle stages passing over. Large shareholders in 
the family business which are mainly holding families would protect the assets 
and their own rights over minority shareholders’. Therefore, it is necessary to 
understand the theories and conflicts in family businesses to determine 
corporate governance mechanisms. The chapter further examined corporate 
governance mechanisms existing in family businesses in advanced countries, 
hope to bring an insight for Chinese family businesses in future operation. At 
last, there are research findings show that although the family business is 
ubiquitous, cultures and contexts affect corporate culture and business 
strategies, especially in China’s context. Knowing the advantages and 
disadvantages of the family business is not widely accepted in China. Family 
business theories and practice is also not widely accepted. The minority 
shareholder protection issue remains as a challenge although the government 
has had intention to encourage private sector by improving legal framework in 
the recent years. It is difficult to find a unified solution at an international or 
national level. Recent changes in Company Act 2013, have given more 
monitoring power to the public. The ongoing reforms in legal framework and 
application of corporate governance mechanisms, would hopefully provide the 
solutions to the challenge highlighted above. 
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The chapter 6 focuses on a soft social mechanism for businesses. Guanxi exists 
in all types of business operations and personal activities. It is so common for 
the public; however, it has strong side-effects for businesses because it is so 
widely and deeply influencing people’s lives. In terms of family businesses, one 
feature of guanxi – kinship, is the foundation of family businesses. One feature 
of guanxi – networks, gives great advantages for family businesses in and out 
of China for decades. It also brings businesses trustworthy and long-lasting 
business partners. There are many benefits of having guanxi in business and 
personal activities. However, in long term, it is a challenge for China to become 
a “rule of law” country. For instance, some lawyers win cases or gain less level 
of punishment due to the close relationships with judges. It is also an obstacle 
for applying corporate governance mechanisms and for the fair competition in 
market. It is undeniable that guanxi is a long-lasting custom over thousands of 
years. It helps with businesses’ competition in market. The chapter presents 
study of guanxi, more insights of guanxi and the importance of conducting 
further studies on guanxi because guanxi is more complex than it is understood 
in Western contexts. For example, guanxi in China is inherent and systematic, 
its application updates with rapid development of China. Guanxi is more widely 
used in society these days with economic, legal and social changes in new 
PRC. 849  It affects businesses more than ever due to the current strong 
competition in market. Guanxi might have been seen in Western contexts as 
networks. However, it is used deeper and wider in China. Guanxi in China has 
long term effect and sometimes are not in place for both parties to be mutually 
beneficial. It has a function similar to debt in people’s lives. In other words, there 
                                            
849 Li Y Y, Parnell M F and Hawkins N, “Guanxi, relationship marketing and business strategy” 
in Brown D H and MacBean A (eds.) supra n 3. 
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is an additional understanding with future favours and payback once someone 
uses his or her guanxi network. Because of such function of favours, it can give 
businesses something normal methods cannot. For example, guanxi has been 
used to help SMEs gain fundings. Due to banking system is not well-designed 
to help SMEs, they seek strong favour from banks and other funding resources. 
Therefore, the area of shadow banking was examined in this chapter, as a result 
of guanxi network. There are some scholars and CCP committee members have 
noticeably raised the need of setting better banking system or forming better 
support for SMEs, there will be changes in future. Although guanxi is not a well-
defined concept or theory in academia; it is changing and necessary to discover 
and update constantly. There have been updates since the past studies were 
conducted and continuing works on guanxi are needed. Guanxi needs to be 
balanced with appropriate legal framework and mechanisms in order to help 
family businesses overcome the obstacles. One solution would be to approach 
the issue from organisation level and apply individual corporate governance 
mechanisms in the context of China.  
 
The thesis has brought insights to each of the main challenges that family 
businesses face in China, explored the reason of examining these challenges 
and the correlations of these challenges. In addition, it provided insights for 
future studies to conduct a combined examination over family businesses. Most 
importantly, the comparison of macro environments in the UK and China and 
further analysis of each challenge, forms the basis of learning and development 
of family businesses to potentially overcome the challenges. The comparison 
could help China to create another Chinese characteristic socialist market 
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economy with a better legal framework and corporate governance mechanisms 
for family businesses in China to overcome challenges in unique social context 
(especially in guanxi network) from an organisational level.  
 
After referendum of Brexit, UK and China both need regulations on large 
corporations and work on encouraging SMEs. Since the financial crisis in 2008, 
banks have had difficulties to fund SMEs in the UK, whereas China has been 
growing but lack of good policies and regulations to support SMEs. SMEs 
benefits employment, GDP growth and stability of the economy. Chinese law 
makers have raised the importance of having banks support SMEs’ funding 
sources, hopefully there will be actions taken towards funding difficulties. It also 
appears that there has been less flexibility for SMEs in the UK whereas China 
is opening individual legal flexibility for SMEs and less monitoring control from 
central government. With time, hopefully China will create a good corporate 
governance environment for family businesses, good policies to support SMEs 
and positive mind-set of developing family businesses. 
 
There are remaining aspects that wait for future research. For instance, 
developing applicable mechanisms for family businesses in China that could 
overcome the influence of guanxi network and the complex background. 
Meanwhile, controlling or balancing the use of guanxi within legal framework, 
changing mind-set of family business founders and family members in China, 
conducting empirical research of Chinese family businesses in aspect of 
corporate governance mechanisms are the most desirable research in the near 
future. Despite the social context influence with family business study, the 
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connection between family business and other corporation types will be helpful 
to improve legal framework. In the meantime, the definition and the 
characteristics of family businesses which are normally examined in 
management science are also deserve further examination. These 
examinations are useful in regulating and protecting shareholders’ rights in 
regulations. 
 
The research of life cycle theory needs further examination as the theory needs 
to be updated, refined and shall be examined within individual context. Chinese 
legal reform remains under changes, law makers shall still learn and improve, 
learn from the advanced countries but avoid mistakes to catch up with the rest 
of the world quickly. This has been demonstrated by recent developments in 
legal framework in China. More importantly, the mind-set of Chinese family 
businesses is very much in needs of changes. It is necessary to be changed as 














Appendix 1 There are meetings of CPC Central Committee and NPC Standing 
Committee held that relevant to important decisions made on legal reforming: 
Time Meeting Highlight 
18th December to 22nd 
December 1978 
the 3rd Plenary Session 
of the 11th CPC Central 
Committee Meeting 
The meeting was held 
right after the “Cultural 
Revolution” and was the 
beginning of the "Reform 
and Opening Up" policy. 
This meeting was also 
seen as the beginning of 
the modern China starting 
a different path in the 
world stage, and it was 
also the political career of 
Deng Xiaoping, as a 
paramount 
leader of China, guided 
Chinese people to a 
unique journey in 
history.850  
In addition, there are 
other important rules that 
CPC raised during the 
Plenary Session. Such 
as, raising the importance 
of the principles of “rule of 
law”; “There must be laws 
to follow; these laws must 
be observed and strictly 
enforced; and 
lawbreakers must be 
prosecuted”, “From now 
on, legislative work 
should have an important 
place on the agenda of 
                                            
850 At the meeting, Deng Xiaoping replaced Hua Guofeng and continually led China and 
government to the socialist country with Chinese characteristics. He was the Chairman of the 
Communist Party of China until 1981.  
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the National People’s 
Congress and its 
Standing Committee.” 851 
Thus, this committee 
meeting has been seen 
as the initial point where 
China raised the 
importance of legislation 
and put “rule of law” on 
the agendas of the 
National Congresses of 
the CPC. 
20th October 1984 the 3rd Plenary Session 
of the 12th CPC Central 
Committee Meeting 
The decision of reforming 
economy was adopted, 
which was shown that 
Deng Xiaoping’s 
leadership was 
determinate to pursue the 
economy changes and 
development for China. 
Thereafter, in 1985, the 
plan and goal was further 
completed during the 4th 
Plenary Session. 
9th March to 12th March 
1990 
the 6th Plenary Session 
of 13th CPC Central 
Committee Meeting 
the economic reform was 
exciting, at the same time 
it was also noticeable that 
the bureaucracy and 
corruption started along 
with the development as 
well. The Central 
Committee denounced 
that the growth of the 
situation. The situation 
was not difficult to predict, 
as the corruption and the 
ideology of using 
personal connections 
were hesitated from 
social and historical 
environment. In modern 
                                            
851 Zhu J W, “The Socialist Legal System with Chinese Characteristics: Its Structure, Features 
and Trends” (2011) XXXII (3), Social Sciences in China, 89. 
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China, it is so-called 
“guanxi”. 
25th December to 30th 
December 1990 
the 7th Plenary Session 
of 13th CPC Central 
Committee Meeting 
“Program of the National 
Economy and Society 
Development Decade” 
and guidelines was 
adopted, further to 
develop the economy of 
China. 
5th March to 7th March 
1993 
2nd Plenary Session of 
the 14th CPC Committee 
Party Meeting 
further approved some 
aspects of economic 
measures, a program for 
institutional reform was 
raised on agenda as well. 
11th November to 14th 
November 1993 
3rd Plenary Session of 
the 14th CPC Central 
Committee Meeting 
adopted “A Decision of 
the CPC Central 
Committee on Certain 
Issues in Establishing a 
Socialist Market 
Economy System” and 
fostered the 
establishment of private 
enterprises. As 
commented and 
emphasised, this was 
mainly for the “Southern 
Trip” that Deng Xiaoping 
made in 1992. Further to 
confirm the economic 
reform progress even 
when other paramount 
leaders criticised about 
the slow economic 
reform. It was not difficult 
to see the doubts and 
criticism among the 
leaders at the time, but 
Deng Xiaoping and his 
policies was confirmed 
the efficiency later. 
12th October to 14th 
October 1998 
3rd Plenary Session of 
the 15th CPC Central 
Committee Meeting 
reviewed the economic 
reform in the past 20 
years and set the goal of 
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establishing new rural 
towns 
19th September to 22nd 
September 1999 
The 4th Plenary Session 
of the 15th CPC Central 
Committee Meeting 
discussed the “modern 
enterprise system” which 
was regarding the reform 
of the State-owned 
enterprises.  
9th October to 11th 
October 2000 
the 5th Plenary Session 
of the 15th CPC Central 
Committee Meeting 
Zhu Rongji, who was the 
Premier of PRC, and a 
very tough administrator 
who believed the 
continued double-digit 
growth of Chinese 
economy, delivered a 
report and proclaimed 
“modernization, opening 
up and technological 
progress” as the basic 
goals. 
24th September to 26th 
September 2001 
the 6th Plenary Session 
of the 15th CPC Central 
Committee Meeting 
when the CPC was 
established for 80 years, 
capitalists were allowed 
to join the Party. That 
certainly showed that the 
Party was not only 
developing the economy 
with Chinese 
characteristics but also 
from the governing 
leadership to accept new 
attendees to bring in the 
ideas in order to help to 
the unique path that PRC 
decided to work on. The 
determination and efforts 
that CPC made was the 
drive that economic 
reform and legal reform 
established. 
11th October to 14th 
October 2003 
3rd Plenary Session of 
the 16th CPC Central 
Committee meeting 
the Party stated some 
issues that concerning 
the socialist market 
economy system. Also, 
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calling for the regulations 
to foster private 
enterprise.852 
8th October to 11th 
October 2005 
5th Plenary Session on 
the 16th CPC Central 
Committee meeting 
The Party aimed to 
promote "social harmony" 
and stressed on 
the "building of 
democratic rule of law, 
justice, sincerity, amity, 
vitality, stability and 
order"853 
9th October to 12th 
October 2008 
the 3rd Plenary Session 
of the 17th CPC Central 
Committee meeting 
Hu Jintao delivered the 
report regards the rural 
reform and development 
goals for rural reform by 
2020. Considering the 
agriculture sector has 
always been seen as the 
basis of the economy in 
China, and as the 
foundation of the people 
from the historical 
perspective. The report 
and the goal would only 
be beneficial for economy 
reform and meanwhile, 
would encourage 
agriculture labours in 
general. Thereafter, 
series of laws and 
regulations came into 
force to foster the 
development of the 
agriculture development.   
 
15th September to 18th 
September 2009 
the 4th Plenary Session 
of the 17th CPC Central 
Committee meeting 
Hu Jintao (former 
president and chairman) 
delivered a report that Xi 
                                            
852 CPC People official website, in Chinese language, 中国共产党历次全国代表大会数据库. 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64569/ (accessed 17 November 2013). Jiang 
Zemin’s full report on the 16th CPC Central Committee meeting, which published by XinHua 




Jinping (current president 
and chairman) submitted, 
regards the major issues 
on improving the Party’s 
strengths and building 
under new 
circumstances. The 
report emphasised the 
continue persistence on 
reform and opening up. 
Therefore, we could say 
that under the new 
circumstances that China 
in, and in the world stage, 
that China has achieved 
initial success on creating 
an unique path for 
economy and legal 
reform, thereafter, the 
Party is aiming to build 
and adjust itself to the 
new environment, 
meanwhile, to continually 
improve and maintain the 
leadership. This is a proof 
that the political, legal and 
economic aspects are 
interacted with each 
other, meanwhile, all the 
aspects developed all 
together with the Chinese 
characteristics – planning 
market economy with 
socialist society – but 
truthfully is the market 
economy merged or 
transplanted to socialist 
society and under the 
plan and interfere of the 
government. 
15th October to 18th 
October 2011 
the 6th Plenary Session 
of the 17th CPC Central 
Committee meeting 
the Deepening Cultural 
Reform and Promoting 
Development of Socialist 
Culture issues were 
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raised. Thus, we could 
see that the Party deeply 
understood the 
importance of the cultural 
and social society 
building, which was 
important for building the 
ideology, further to 
develop economy and 
law aspects for the 
modernization. 
26th February to 28th 
February 2013 
the 2nd Plenary Session 
of the 18th Central 
Committee meeting of 
the CPC 
the plan of aiming to 
restructure to a “simpler 
and decentralized 
administration” was 
raised. Xi Jinping’s leader 
team aims to improve the 
CPC’s work, and to 
further boost the 
economic development, 
and further modernize 
China.  
9th November to 12th 
November 2013 
The 3rd Plenary Session 
of the 18th CPC Central 
Committee meeting 
Highly commented the 
success and 
achievement since 
opening up revolution in 
the past 35 years. Facing 
the challenges, the 
government is 
determined to continue 
on a path to a harmony 
society. Legal reform and 
taxation incentive are still 
the main focus from this 
meeting. 854  The legal 
reform is raised as 
“comprehensively rule the 
country according to the 
                                            
854 The 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee Meeting (中共十八届三中全会
公报全文)，BBC China，12th November 2013，
http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/china/2013/11/131112_183rdannualplenum (accessed 
online on 29 July 2017). 
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law” as the latest update 
of legal reform.855 
 
 
                                            
855 Li, Anthony HF, “Centralisation of Power in the Pursuit of Law-based Governance: Legal 
Reform in China under the Xi Administration”, China Perspectives, (2016) 2: 63-68.  
https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy.lancs.ac.uk/docview/1802729558?accountid=11979 
(accessed online on 29 July 2017).		 
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Appendix 2 The details of changes in Company Act 2013 set as follows856: 
 
Before amendments After amendments 
第七条 依法设立的公司，由公司登记机
关发给公司营业执照。公司营业执照签
发 日 期 为 公 司 成 立 日 期 。 
公司营业执照应当载明公司的名称、住
所、注册资本、实收资本、经营范围、





Article 7 The company registration 
authority shall issue a business license 
to a company incorporated according to 
law. The date on which the business 
license is issued shall be the date on 
which a company is incorporated. 
In the business license of a company 
shall clearly be stated such items as the 
name, domicile, registered capital, 
actually received capital, scope of 
business and name of the legal 
representative of the company. 
Where the items stated in the business 
license of a company are altered, the 
company shall have the alterations 
registered according to law, and the 
company registration authority shall 











Article 7 Company registration 
authorities shall issue business 
licenses of companies to the 
companies established under the 
law. The date of issuance of the 
business license for a company shall 
be the date of establishment of the 
company.  
The business license of a company 
shall state therein such matters as 
the name, domicile, registered 
capital, business scope, and the 
name of the legal representative, 
etc. of the company.  
Where any of the matters stated in 
the business license of a company is 
changed, the company shall go 
through the formalities for change of 
registration in accordance with the 
law, and the relevant company 
registration authority shall issue a 
                                            
856 Companies Law of People’s Republic of China 2006, DATABASE OF LAWS AND 
REGULATIONS, The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, 
ww.npc.gov.cn (accessed on 18-19 July 2017). Company Law of the People’s Republic of 




2014_chinese.pdf (accessed online 17-21 July 2017) 
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new business license to replace the 
old one.  
 
第二十三条 设立有限责任公司，应当具
备 下 列 条 件 ： 





公 司 要 求 的 组 织 机 构 ；    
（五）有公司住所。 
 
Article 23 The following conditions shall 
be met for the incorporation of a 
company with limited liability: 
(1) The number of shareholders 
conforms to the statutory number; 
(2) The capital contributions of the 
shareholders reach the statutory 
minimum amount of capital; 
(3) The shareholders have jointly 
formulated the articles of association; 
(4) The company has its name and has 
established an organizational structure 
in conformity with the requirements for 
a company with limited liability; and 
(5) The company has its own domicile. 
 
第二十三条 设立有限责任公司，应
当 具 备 下 列 条 件 ： 
（ 一 ） 股 东 符 合 法 定 人 数 ； 
（二）有符合公司章程规定的全体
股 东 认 缴 的 出 资 额 ； 
（三）股东共同制定公司章程； 
（四）有公司名称，建立符合有限
责任公司要求的组织机构；    
（五）有公司住所。 
 
Article 23 To establish a limited 
liability company, the following 
conditions shall be satisfied:  
(1) The number of shareholders 
meets the quorum;  
 
(2) The capital contribution 
subscribed to by all shareholders 
meets the requirements of the 
company's articles of association.  
 
(3) The shareholders jointly 
formulate the company's articles of 
association;  
 
(4) The company has a name, and 
its organizational structure meets 
the requirement for a limited liability 
company; and  
 























Article 26 The registered capital of a 
company with limited liability shall be 
the amount of capital contributions 
subscribed for by all of its shareholders, 
as is registered with the company 
registration authority. The amount of 
the initial capital contributions made by 
all of the shareholders of the company 
shall be not less than 20 per cent of the 
company’s registered capital, or not 
less than the statutory minimum 
amount of the registered capital either, 
and the remainder shall be paid for in 
full by the shareholders within two years 
from the date the company is 
established; and in the case of an 
investment company, it may pay for the 
remainder in full within five years. 
The minimum amount of the registered 
capital of a company with limited liability 
shall be RMB 30,000 yuan. Where a 
greater amount is provided for by laws 
or administrative regulations, such 
provision shall prevail. 
 
Article 26 The registered capital of a 
limited liability company shall be the 
amount of capital contribution 
subscribed to by all shareholders as 
registered with the relevant 
company registration authority.  
 
The provisions otherwise prescribed 
by laws, administrative regulations 
and the decisions of the State 
Council on the actual payment of 
registered capital and the minimum 
registered capital of a limited liability 
























Article 27 A shareholder may make his 
capital contributions in currency or do 
so by contributing such non-currency 
property as material objects, intellectual 
property rights and land-use rights that 
can be evaluated in currency and can 
be transferred according to law, except 
for the property that is not allowed to be 
used as capital contributions, as is 
provided for by laws or administrative 
regulations. 
Non-currency property used for capital 
contributions shall be evaluated and 
verified, and shall not be overvalued or 
undervalued. Where laws or 
administrative regulations provide 
otherwise, those provisions shall 
prevail. 
The amount of capital contributions 
made by all of the shareholders in 
currency shall not be less than 30 per 
cent of the registered capital of a 




Article 27 A shareholder may make 
capital contributions in the form of 
monetary funds, or alternatively may 
make capital contributions with such 
valuated non-monetary property as 
physical items, intellectual property 
rights, and land-use rights that may 
be valued in monetary terms and 
may be transferred in accordance 
with the law, excluding the property 
that shall not be used for capital 
contributions as specified in laws 
and administrative regulations.  
 
The non-monetary property that is 
used for capital contributions shall 
be valued and verified, and shall not 
be over-valued or under-valued. The 
provisions on the valuation of such 
property as prescribed by laws or 






Article 29 After the shareholders have 
made their capital contributions, such 
capital contributions shall be subject to 
capital verification by a capital 
verification authority set up according to 

















Article 30 After the initial capital 
contributions made by shareholders 
have been verified by a capital 
verification authority set up according to 
law, a representative designated by all 
the shareholders or a proxy jointly 
entrusted by them shall submit to the 
company registration authority such 
documents as a written application for 
registration of the company, the 
company’s articles of association and 
the capital verification certificates, in 
order to apply for registration of the 
incorporation of the company. 
 
 
Article 29 After the shareholders of a 
company have fully subscribed to 
the amount of capital contribution 
prescribed by the company's articles 
of association, the representative 
designated by all shareholders or 
the agent authorized by all 
shareholders shall apply for 
registration of the establishment of 
the company by submitting the 
written company registration 
application, the company's articles 
of association and other documents 




名 册 ， 记 载 下 列 事 项 ：    
（一）股东的姓名或者名称及住所； 
（ 二 ） 股 东 的 出 资 额 ；    
（ 三 ） 出 资 证 明 书 编 号 。    
记载于股东名册的股东，可以依股东名






Article 33 A company with limited 
liability shall prepare a roster of its 
shareholders in which the following 
items shall be recorded: 
(1) the names or titles and domiciles of 
the shareholders; 
(2) the amounts of the capital 
contributions made by the 
shareholders; and 
(3) the serial numbers of their 
investment certificates. 
The shareholders recorded in the roster 
of the shareholders may claim to 
第三十二条 有限责任公司应当置备
股东名册，记载下列事项：    
（一）股东的姓名或者名称及住
所 ；    
（ 二 ） 股 东 的 出 资 额 ；    
（ 三 ） 出 资 证 明 书 编 号 。    
记载于股东名册的股东，可以依股







Article 32 A limited liability company 
shall prepare and make available a 
shareholder register, with the 
following items specified therein:  
 




exercise their rights in such capacity on 
the basis of the said roster. 
The company shall register with a 
company registration authority the 
names or titles of its shareholders and 
the amount of their capital 
contributions; and where items of 
registration are altered, it shall have the 
registration altered accordingly. 
Without registration or without 
registration for alteration, the company 
shall not act against the third party. 
(2) Amount of capital contributions 
made by each of the shareholders; 
and  
 
(3) Serial number of each capital 
contribution certificate.  
 
The shareholders who are recorded 
in the shareholder register may 
exercise the shareholder's rights on 
the strength of the shareholder 
register.  
 
A company shall register the names 
of the shareholders with the relevant 
company registration authority. In 
the case of change of any registered 
item, the formalities for change of 
registration shall be completed. A 
company that fails to go through the 
formalities for registration or change 
of registration shall not set up a 










Article 59 The minimum amount of the 
registered capital for a one-person 
company with limited liability is 100,000 
yuan. The shareholder shall make the 
capital contributions in one lump sum 
as stipulated by the articles of 
association of the company. 
A natural person may only make 
investment for the incorporation of one 






Article 58 One natural person can 
only establish one one-person 
limited liability company which is 
prohibited from investing in the 
establishment of another one-
person limited liability company.  
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liability. Such a company may not make 
investment for the incorporation of a 
new one-person company with limited 
liability. 
第七十七条 设立股份有限公司，应当具
备 下 列 条 件 ：    
（一）发起人符合法定人数；    
（二）发起人认购和募集的股本达到法
定 资 本 最 低 限 额 ；    
（三）股份发行、筹办事项符合法律规
定 ；    
（四）发起人制订公司章程，采用募集
方式设立的经创立大会通过；    
（五）有公司名称，建立符合股份有限
公 司 要 求 的 组 织 机 构 ；    
（六）有公司住所。 
 
Article 77 The following conditions shall 
be met if a company limited by shares 
is to be incorporated: 
(1) The number of promoters conforms 
to the statutory number; 
(2) The share capital subscribed for and 
raised by promoters reaches the 
statutory minimum amount of capital; 
(3) The issue of shares and the 
preparations made for incorporation 
conform to the provisions of law; 
(4) The company’s articles of 
association are formulated by the 
promoters, and such articles of 
association of a company incorporated 
by means of share offer are adopted at 
the inaugural meeting; 
(5) The company has its name, and its 
organizational structure conforms to the 
requirements for a company limited by 
shares; and 
(6) The company has its domicile. 
 
第七十六条 设立股份有限公司，应
当 具 备 下 列 条 件 ：    
（一）发起人符合法定人数；    
（二）有符合公司章程规定的全体
发起人认购的股本总额或者募集的
实 收 股 本 总 额 ；    
（三）股份发行、筹办事项符合法
律 规 定 ；    
（四）发起人制订公司章程，采用
募集方式设立的经创立大会通过；   
（五）有公司名称，建立符合股份
有限公司要求的组织机构；    
（六）有公司住所。 
 
Article 76 To establish a company 
limited by shares, the following 
conditions shall be satisfied:  
 
(1) The number of promoters meets 
the statutory quorum;  
 
(2) The total share capital 
subscribed to by all promoters or 
total amount of paid-up share capital 
raised meets the requirements of the 
company's articles of association  
 
(3) The issuance of shares and the 
preparatory work are in compliance 
with the law;  
 
(4) The company's articles of 
association is formulated by the 
promoters, or is adopted at the 
inaugural meeting if the company is 




(5) The company has a name, and 
has established an organization 
structure that conforms to the 
requirements on a company limited 
by shares; and  
 




















Article 81 Where a company limited by 
shares is incorporated by means of 
promotion, its registered capital shall be 
the total amount of the share capital 
subscribed for by all the promoters, as 
is registered with the company 
registration authority. The initial capital 
subscriptions by all the promoters of the 
company shall be not less than 20 per 
cent of the registered capital and the 
remainder shall be paid in full by the 
promoters within two years from the 
date the company is incorporated; in 
















Article 80 Where a company limited 
by shares is established by way of 
promotion, its registered capital shall 
be the total amount of share capital 
subscribed to by all promoters as 
registered with the relevant 
company registration authority. The 
said company is not allowed to offer 
shares to others for subscription 
before the shares subscribed to by 
its promoters are fully paid up.  
 
Where a company limited by shares 
is established through stock 
flotation, the registered capital 
thereof shall be the actual total paid-
up share capital registered at the 
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may do so within five years. Before the 
money is furnished in full, the company 
shall not offer shares to others. 
Where a company limited by shares is 
incorporated by means of share offer, 
its registered capital shall be the total 
amount of the actually received share 
capital as is registered with the 
company registration authority. 
The minimum amount of the registered 
capital of a company limited by shares 
shall be 5,000,000 yuan. Where the 
minimum amount of the registered 
capital of a company limited by shares 
is greater than the said amount, as is 
stipulated by laws or administrative 
regulations, the provisions there shall 
prevail. 
relevant company registration 
authority.  
 
The provisions otherwise prescribed 
by laws, administrative regulations 
and the decisions of the State 
Council on the actual payment of 
registered capital and the minimum 
registered capital of a company 







当依法办理其财产权的转移手续。     
 
发起人不依照前款规定缴纳出资的，应








Article 84 Where a company limited by 
shares is incorporated by means of 
promotion, each of the promoters shall, 
in writing, subscribe for the full portion 
of the shares to be subscribed for by 
him as stipulated by the company’s 


















Article 83 Where a company limited 
by shares is established by way of 
promotion, its promoters shall 
subscribe, in writing, to all shares 
that they are required to subscribe to 
under the company's articles of 
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offers to pay the subscriptions in a lump 
sum, he shall do so immediately; and if 
a promoter offers to pay the 
subscriptions by instalments, he shall 
immediately pay for the first instalment. 
Where a promoter invests with non-
currency property, he shall go through 
the formalities for the transfer of his 
property rights according to law. 
Where a promoter fails to pay the 
subscriptions in accordance with the 
provisions of the preceding paragraph, 
he shall be liable for the default in 
accordance with the promoters’ 
agreement. 
After the initial payment of the 
subscriptions by the promoters, the 
board of directors and the board of 
supervisors shall be elected. The board 
of directors shall submit to the company 
registration authority the company’s 
articles of association, the capital 
verification certificate issued by the 
capital verification authority, which is 
set up according to law, and the other 
documents specified by laws or 
administrative regulations, in order to 
apply for registration of the 
incorporation of the company. 
association, and make capital 
contributions pursuant to the 
company's articles of association. 
Where capital contributions are 
made with non-monetary assets, the 
promoters shall go through the 
procedures for transfer of property 
rights pursuant to the law.  
 
In the event of a promoter's failure to 
make capital contributions in 
accordance with the preceding 
Paragraph, the promoter shall bear 
the liabilities for breach of contract 
pursuant to the promoters' 
agreement.  
 
After the promoters have fully 
subscribed to the capital contribution 
prescribed by the company's articles 
of association, the board of directors 
and the board of supervisors of the 
company shall be elected, and the 
board of directors shall apply for 
registration of the establishment of 
the company by submitting the 
company's articles of association 
and other documents prescribed by 
laws and administrative regulations 
to the relevant company registration 
authority.  
第一百七十八条 公司需要减少注册资本























Article 178 Where a company needs to 
reduce its registered capital, it shall 
draw up a balance sheet and a detailed 
inventory of assets. 
The company shall, within 10 days from 
the date a resolution on reduction of its 
registered capital is adopted, notify its 
creditors of such resolution, and shall 
make an announcement in the 
newspaper within 30 days therefrom. 
The creditors shall, within 30 days from 
the date they receive the written notice, 
or within 45 days from the date the 
announcement is made in the case of 
those who have not received such 
written notice, have the right to claim full 
repayment of their debts or provision of 
a corresponding guarantee from the 
company. 
After reduction of the capital, the 
amount of the company’s registered 
capital shall not be less than the 
statutory minimum. 
Article 177 Where it is necessary for 
a company to reduce its registered 
capital, it shall prepare the balance 
sheet and a list of property.  
 
The company shall notify its 
creditors within ten days after the 
resolution on the reduction of the 
registered capital is made, and shall 
publish an announcement in 
newspapers within 30 days. The 
creditors shall, within 30 days upon 
receipt of the written notice, or in the 
case of the failure to receive the 
written notice, within 45 days after 
the public announcement, be 
entitled to request the company to 
repay the debts or provide the 
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